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ABSTRACT   *The republican regime of Turkey started a comprehensive program in its early years for civic training and ideological mobilization in the country. Institutions such as the Turkish Language Society, the Turkish Historical Society and People's Houses were created in order to undertake this program. These institutions were basically engaged in building a new political culture in order to support the ideals of the new regime. Of these institutions, the People's Houses are of special interest due to their nationwide popularity and multi-purpose character. People's Houses were intended as a means of political communication between state and society, the intelligentsia and ordinary people in the absence of mass media and other intermediary elements.*

KEY WORDS: People's Houses, Kemalism, ideological motivation

Introduction

The 1930s were an important decade for the new political regime of Turkey. In this decade, one-party rule was reaffirmed and consolidated by the foundation of certain institutions in order to reach the utmost ideological mobilization of society. Alongside the formal school system, the National Schools (*Millet Mektepleri*) (1928), the Public Orators' Institution of the Republican People's Party (*CHP Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*) (1931), the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) (1931), People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) (1932), the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) (1932), the Faculty of Language History and Geography (*Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi*) (1936) and People's Rooms (*Halkodaları*) (1939–40) were among such institutions. This study will concentrate particularly on the People's Houses, which were the most comprehensive and widespread of all these institutions in establishing and perpetuating the Kemalist single-party ideology. It examines the regime–society relations in the republican era in order to learn the basic

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historical processes and phenomena that led or forced the new regime to initiate a total political indoctrination project in the 1930s.

With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the channels of legitimacy exercised by the Ottoman rulers were radically altered by the new government. First of all, Ottoman rule was premised and legitimized on religious (Islamic) grounds. The Kemalists, on the other hand, began to exercise their political power on more and more temporal (secular) bases. Secondly, they rejected the whole Ottoman superstructure. In this attempt, the greatest emphasis was placed on Ottoman polity and government. Thirdly, the *fin de siécle* Ottoman Empire was an absolutist state, consisting of a large social mosaic composed of many ethno-religious communities. The new Turkey was contrarily established as a nation state with strong unitary characteristics.

Despite all these changes that took place within society, society itself was principally the same society as under Ottoman rule. Traditional Islamic and pre-capitalist values continued to characterize the essence of social relations. This meant that the new rulers deprived the society of its traditional submission channels and habits. To put it more clearly, a people, who had until then been proud of its Islamic leadership in the world, was now said to be "secular," "the single source of sovereignty" and so forth. This attitude increased the existing distance between state and society in Turkey. However, the Kemalists were not the only government to praise the "nation" and its "individual members." This was rather part of a more general trend in the early twentieth century. The trend is clearly described by Kris and Leites as follows: "leaders in both totalitarian and democratic societies claim that decisions ultimately rest upon the common man's consent, and that the information supplied to him fully enables him to evaluate the situation."[2]

When praising the "Turkish nation" and "people," of course, the Kemalist regime knew very well that the "nation" and the "people" could hardly believe that it was they who were being praised because of their thoroughly ambiguous situation. One of the most crucial questions at this point is why the new authorities rejected the pre-established means of exerting political power and adopted some new but eminently precarious ones. The answer to this question is to be sought in the class conflicts and alliances in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, especially during the War of Independence.

Contrary to the claims of Kemalist populism (*halkçılık*), there can be no society without class conflicts. In other words, there can be no society in which the interests of all groups or classes would be in perfect coherence. In this sense, neither the Ottoman Empire nor the newly republican Turkey could have been an exception. Therefore, the Turkish War of Independence was not merely the salvation of a nation that had been dishonored by the imperialist forces, but it was also a war between two contending coalitions of major social groups. According to Taner Timur,[3] these groups were the Ottoman government and the revolutionary Ankara government. The Ottoman government represented the imperialist forces, the commercial bourgeoisie in Istanbul and some semi-feudal lords and local notables in Anatolia. The Ankara government, on the other hand, represented the military-civilian bureaucrats, big notables and small commercial bourgeoisie. If we think of

the ordinary people in Anatolia, we can say that they largely supported the Ankara government simply because it was warring against the occupation forces that were oppressing them. It is difficult to believe that the people were consciously interested in the foundation of the Turkish Republic or the adoption of a secular western culture. Although people were mobilized into war through their right to self-defense and patriotic feelings, they were not deliberately involved in the war in order to seize political power. Thus, the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was not enforced by the masses. The masses would submit or acquiesce to any regime that legitimized its existence with the victory coming after such a total war.

The Kemalist ruling elite, however, could not have exercised their political power by classical Ottoman means such as the Sultanate and the Caliphate. First of all, these means were compatible primarily with a large imperial society composed of many different ethno-religious communities, and they could no longer suffice to hold the components of the mosaic together. During the foundation of the Republic many such communities had already become autonomous nation states. Secondly, the National Pact of 1920 (*Misak-ı Milli*) contained some heterogeneous elements and therefore Islamic means could not be the basis of the new political regime of Turkey. To subjugate all the elements in the Pact, the Kemalist rule initiated a total secularization of the superstructure, including the prevailing polity. Thirdly, the war conditions had accelerated the decay of traditional economic relations while capitalistic relations began to increase. Therefore the new state could become more or less a bourgeois state, a nation state. Fourthly, the viability of a limited and sovereign nation state would be more than that of any other statecraft.

Moreover, Kemalists had to continue their struggle until 1929 in order to establish and guarantee their political power.[4] Up to that year, the government had proceeded to eliminate all major opposition such as the Sheik Said Rebellion and the Progressive Republican Party (PRP). It also passed a number of radical reforms to eliminate all the remaining connections between the new Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. These reforms were practiced in a wide range of areas, from law to the alphabet and from education to fashion. In a way, as Mustafa Kemal said, "the new Turkey has nothing to do with the old Turkey. The Ottoman government passed away into history. Now a new Turkey is born."[5] In fact, when we come to the 1930s we have a new Turkey seeming to have guaranteed its existence through its victorious government, which had entirely monopolized the political power at home, and through some international treaties, such as the Lausanne Treaty, abroad.

Most of the reforms of the 1920s aimed at an ultimate seizure of political power, and at the embodiment of a viable polity which would exert that power forever. Needless to say, a polity can only be perpetuated through popular support. But how can the people be made to support the new regime if they are not already willing to do so? Tapper suggests that people's demands can be shaped through a socialization process.[6] Then, in line with their changing demands and expectations, they may become more likely to support the new government. Thus, the Kemalists had to create a new society which would be congruent with the new polity. In other words, the new regime required a new society. However, the regime could not pay much attention to

issues relating to the people in the first years of the Republic, because it was too busy to undertake institutional changes and reforms at the society level. Massimo d'Azeglio once said: "we created Italy; now we must create the Italians."[7] Indeed, the new government had created the Turkish Republic, but it had yet to create the republican Turks. As a matter of fact, "it is not the nation which creates the state, but it is the state which creates the nation," as the Polish statesman Pilsudski claimed.[8]

If we examine the principles of Kemalism, we see that every single one of them aims, in the first place, at defending the existing polity in a different way or against a different danger. In the second place, they aim at adapting the available social structure and relations to the prevailing polity. The Six Arrows (*Altı Ok*) principles are: Republicanism (*Cumhuriyetçilik*), Nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), Populism (*Halkçılık*), Étatism (*Devletçilik*), Secularism (*Laiklik*) and Reformism (*Devrimcilik*). In fact, all these principles have organic relations with one another; their frames are designed to complement one another. This is why the lines dividing them are not so clear-cut. For example, it is quite difficult to separate Republicanism and Etatism from Reformism and Secularism from the others, especially from Nationalism. Put differently, all Six Arrows come from a common origin, which is the defensive philosophy of the Republic.

As for the primary dynamics underlying the process of ideological mobilization in the 1930s, the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist movement, which culminated in a stiff one-party rule, constitute the most important. In order to understand the rise of these tendencies we should once again look at the discordance between the Ottoman legacy and the Kemalist world view. As noted by Taner Timur, "the western capitalism represented by the positivism of the single-party was too advanced for the existing relations of production. Islamic ideology meanwhile continued to reflect faithfully the residues of the pre-capitalistic mode of production."[9] Thus, the new regime started its life in a break-off with society. Nevertheless, this break-off was blurred during the first years by the abstract legitimacy conferred on the regime by the victory at the end of the War of Independence. When we come to the 1930s, we see some crucial facts which clarify and even exacerbate the discrepancy.

By the time of the Great Depression, the major reforms had been completed but the objectives of "rapid economic development" and "reaching the highest level of contemporary civilization" had not been successfully accomplished. The military victory was too far in the past to reproduce the kind of legitimacy which was urgently needed by the government, for the people had not been mobilized into political administration. Movements of opposition—both legal and illegal—had been suppressed. In short, the government was now alone in its path, devoid of popular support. Moreover, the rise in 1930 of the Liberal Republican Party (LRP) (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkası*), which was an example of official-legal opposition, and the Menemen Incident, which was part of the illegal line of opposition, made the ruling party become even more isolated.[10]

Lack of mass support is not a simple problem for a political regime. Tapper suggests that: "Of course many political systems exist that cannot rely on mass

mobilized support for their perpetuation for they simply do not have the means to achieve this … This could mean using resources to develop elite cadres to run the nation state almost in isolation from the populace."[11]

Indeed, the Kemalists, besides establishing their single-party rule through suppression of all kinds of opposition, polarized state and society by enforcing voluntary dissolution of most of the intermediary social organizations such as student unions, the Teachers' Union (*Mualimler Birliği*), Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the Journalists' Society (*Gazeteciler Cemiyeti*), the Reserve Officers' Society (*İhtiyat Subaylar Cemiyeti*), the Turkish Women's Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*), etc.[12] Thus, in 1930–31, the Kemalists became the sole power to govern, shape, educate, organize and control the entire society for at least the next 15 years.

At this point one may ask why a government, holding all sources and means of rule in its hands, needs political communication with, and the extensive support of, the populace. The answer to this question should be sought in the psychology of authoritarian single-party regimes. According to Sartori, single-party states need politicized societies more than would the states of pluralist political systems: "The single-party faces the problem of justifying and proving itself because it claims extensive appeal."[13]

Under these unique circumstances, the People's Houses were intended as a means of political communication between state (party) and society, the intelligentsia and people in the absence or scarcity of mass media and intermediary elements such as pressure groups and voluntary organizations. More importantly, they would serve the ideological mobilization of the people in bridging the gap (or polarity) between state and society on behalf of the former.

The Conceptual Framework of Political Indoctrination

The preceding section was intended to introduce the basic processes and circumstances which culminated in the adoption of ideological mobilization as a nationwide project. The present one will try to set up a conceptual framework in order to analyze this comprehensive project.

The definition of propaganda is given by Lasswell as follows: "Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols."[14] In propaganda as a complex psychological process, there are four basic elements: (i) the propagandist(s); (ii) the propagandee(s); (iii) the message(s); and (iv) the symbol(s). Any definition of propaganda would include these elements implicitly or explicitly. In Lasswell's definition, the propagandist and the message are implicit; the collective is the propagandee and the significant symbol, as the name clearly shows, is just that.

According to Lasswell, there are certain objects "which have a standard meaning in a group and are called significant symbols."[15] In his conceptualization, "the elevated eyebrow, the clenched fist, the sharp voice, the pungent phrase, have their references established within the web of a particular culture."[16] Only through such significant symbols can public opinion or a collective attitude be created. Most movements of nationalism, large groups and communities communicate via

significant symbols. Especially where all individuals do not have the opportunity of facing and contacting one another, significant symbols function as a cement to hold them together. Anderson's "imagined community" is perhaps a complex system of significant symbols.[17]

Symbols, as the means of conveying the assigned message(s) in propaganda, are used mainly in two distinct forms. These forms are called "condensation symbolism" and "referential symbolism" by Edward Sapir, according to whom they can be compared and distinguished in this way: "While the latter grows with formal elaboration in the conscious, the former strikes deeper and deeper roots in the unconscious and diffuses its emotional quality to types of behavior or situations apparently far removed from the original meaning of the symbol."[18] However, a third form of symbolism should be added to these. It is the form of symbolism which appeals to superego identifications: symbols which bind up the individual with a collective attitude, morality and ideals are of this form. As will be shown later, all these forms of symbolism are adopted in political indoctrination.

"Significant symbols" in a society are also very important in that they function as the bases of public opinion. If we take public opinion as "a deeply pervasive organic force, intimately bound up with the ideological and emotional interplay of the social groupings in which since the earliest times gregarious individuals have come together …,"[19] then significant symbols are the components of this force. Thus, if a new political regime tries to change the pre-established public opinion of the society under its rule, the existing significant symbols must be made to evanesce, and a new set of significant symbols must be either adapted or created. Tapper's suggestion that the demands of people should be shaped in order to provide popular support is, in a way, identical with shaping the available significant symbols. It would be quite meaningful here to remember from the previous section how the republican government tried to change the pre-established value systems in the Ottoman legacy with radically new ones in order to create a new society, compatible with the new polity. To put this in more technical terms, Kemalists tried to create a "dynamic public opinion" out of the "static public opinion"[20] that they inherited. The successful Turkish War of Independence and the so-called great pre-Islamic Turkish civilizations are good examples of crucial "events" and/or "happenings," which were used by Kemalists to create a new type of national culture.

Lasswell developed an explanatory model of propaganda called the "tripartite principle." The principle is based on the three psychoanalytic divisions of human personality. The divisions are: "the id—including biological needs; the superego—the socially acquired inhibitions; and the ego—the testing of reality …"[21] "Impulse," "conscience" and "reason" are given as the concepts with which the divisions respectively correspond. More interesting than these is that Lasswell categorized social phenomena according to which level or division of human personality they appeal:

Elections are appeals to rational considerations; patriotic holidays to conscience; carnivals and various celebrations to natural impulse. The tripartite principle may also be extended to the analysis of policies and practices,

doctrines, as well as myths and legends. It is particularly promising when applied to the problem of social dynamics.[22]

In a more general categorization of Lasswell, the propagandee receives the message basically at two different levels: "the common sense level" and "the emotional level."[23] The propagandist, being aware of this fact, tries to influence the propagandee at both levels. It should be noted here that Edward Sapir's "referential symbolism," and Lasswell's "reason" and "common sense level" are more or less similar and complementary categories. Likewise, Sapir's "condensation symbolism," and Lasswell's "impulse" and "emotional level" resemble and complement one another. However, none of these levels and categories are rigidly defined, nor are they totally exclusive of one another.

The most important part of Lasswell's work is perhaps where he applies his triple psychoanalytic model to social institutions, and reaches the following generalizations: "the appeal to expediency is predominant in economic, political, scientific, and technological institutions; the appeal to conscience is that of religion and fundamental law; the appeal to natural impulse is that of art and sociability."[24] Once again, it should be noted that these generalizations are not more than modest approximations. Lasswell continues: "politics appeals to hatreds, omnipotence, lusts and submissive urges; economics includes appeals to powerful acquisitive, retentive, and potentially expulsive drives; and science offers much opportunity for isolated imaginings, aloofness from many ordinary demands of society, and underlying sadistic designs against the reality which it pretends to serve."[25]

How do these conceptual categories of human personality function under democratic and totalitarian regimes? The individual is taken as the basis of democratic politics. In this sense, propaganda appeals to the ego (or reason) of the individual. Propagandists promise concrete benefits which are expedient in the eyes of individuals and testable through reality. Totalitarian regimes, where state, society, nation and people are merged into, or considered identical with, one another, operate the id (impulse) and especially the superego (conscience) in propaganda. The betterment of the national economy or progress in national culture is an exemplary goal that is intended to ignite the superego identifications in individuals.

Leaders, too, present themselves differently under the two regimes. According to Kris and Leites, the democratic leader is one "who functions as a model," whereas the charismatic leader "offers himself as an object that replaces superego functions in the individual."[26] In simpler terms, the individual is invited to take the democratic leader as his role model if his reasoning tells him to do so. The charismatic leader, on the other hand, shows himself as the defender of the best ideals, and implies that individuals are perfect citizens only in so far as they share his ideals.

State–Society Relations at People's Houses

The fundamental objectives of People's Houses were to bridge the gap between state and society, between intellectuals and ordinary citizens, to educate people in

line with the positivist world view of Kemalism, to introduce the reforms and the principles of the Republican People's Party (RPP) to the masses, to help the economic and cultural development of the country, and to create a new national identity. In other words, People's Houses were intended to change the demands, the habit patterns, the minds and the souls of the people. That is to say, they would replace the old "significant symbols" in the society with new ones.

Among the widely practiced activities of the Houses were conferences and orations, concerts and music courses, theatrical performances, entertainment and family meetings, daily excursions and visits to villages, ceremonies, festive events and processions, public courses and exhibitions, contests and races, radio broadcasts and film shows.

People's Houses were the agents to convey official ideology to people. In this respect, one can say that state and society used to meet at People's Houses, one as a teacher and the other as a student. But this is a critical presentation. Normally, Kemalist scholars would not phrase the meeting like this. They would rather show state–society relations as a display of harmony or solidarity between the two sides. Here is one example describing the People's Houses in such a manner:

> People's House: … As the name suggests, this is not a palace or manor house; this is a national institution which gathers all the Turkish people who are deeply populist and totally against class conflict of any kind. There is no "you" or "I" there; there is "we." A politically and socially high-ranking citizen and a peasant or a worker sit down elbow to elbow (side by side); they speak to each other …[27]

According to Cevdet Nasuhi a crisis of national consciousness is one of the most overwhelming problems for a society.[28] Therefore, People's Houses were the fittest venues where state and society could come together and make up the self-conscious and national identity of the new Turkey. The efforts of the Ankara House to organize balls for the university students in the city is a good example of uniting state and society under the roof of People's Houses. The balls held during weekends tried to introduce university students to bureaucrats and members of the elite. In this way students would not only dispel loneliness and homesickness, but also attain a feeling of belonging to the privileged group and its world view. Poets and artists used to present their verses and works of art for the first time during such meetings.[29]

What are the basic characteristics of the kind of state and of the kind of people or society which were being welded under the roof of People's Houses? Normally, state and society are in antagonistic relations in most world literature on statecraft. However, Kemalist scholars, while accepting this as a common practice for other countries, denied it for Turkey. According to Orhan Arsal, the state is the "thesis" and society the "antithesis" but they can constitute a "synthesis" through the Turkish experience. Arsal ends up his analysis with a certain definition of the state: "(t)herefore, according to the ideology of the Turkish revolution, it is possible to define the state in this short sentence: the state is the people (nation) uniting around its ancestor."[30] The definition obviously reduces all the institutions and institutionalized

relations between state and society to a strong connection between a charismatic leader, Atatürk, and his people. A number of intermediary elements negotiated between state and society are blue-penciled.

Although the new regime claimed to rest its political power on popular sovereignty the practice did not confirm this claim. Democracy, as the most concrete indicator of popular sovereignty, meant nothing more than the collaboration between state and people. For Kemalists it did not cover formal democratic exercises such as popular elections.[31] Their approach to the individual did not have a distinct existence. It was connected to the group by social and genetic ties. Thus the state is superior to the individual. Under these conditions, democracy or popular sovereignty may signify only limited things. In Mehmet Saffet's categorization it means "1) disciplined freedom, or the relation between right and duty; 2) equal opportunities, or providing personalities with maximum development; and 3) solidarity, or maximum improvement of national spirit."[32] Democracy may thus yield freedom, equality and fraternity, but in limited forms and teleologically conditioned to the ideological model of the single party. In accordance with this approach is the article, "Disiplinli Hürriyet" (Disciplined Freedom), written by Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the RPP. He states: "While offering the sap of freedom (of an organized and safe state) to citizens, we try to educate ourselves as a new nation having understood the nature of anarchy and disobedience which can destroy even the strongest society, and avoiding them …"[33] Peker suggests that the concept of "disciplined freedom" should be taken as a *mot d'ordre* by the youth gathering in the halls of the Houses.

What, then, is the characteristic difference between the new political regime of the Turkish Republic and other totalitarian regimes of the 1930s? According to Nusret Kemal, in a republican regime, the state populism, *devlet halkçılığı*, aims to train people for democracy (self-rule).[34] However, this aim has not been realized anywhere in the world up to the present time. People could only approve decisions taken by the regime rather than become active participants in the political process. Democracy is not an immediate function of the revolution, but its goal in the long term. Kemal further suggests that democratic reformers, *demokrasi inkılapçıları*, are the apostles of the road to democracy, and are thus dictators like religious prophets. However, they are obeyed out of love and not out of fear. The republicans, too, make up a ruling stratum; but they offer a chance for intelligent people to participate in the state administration. At this point it is quite clear that people's access to democracy is within the incentive of the ruling elites. Nusret Kemal formulates the scope of this incentive as follows: "The greatest task for a populist state is to take the necessary measures in order to make the people attain the level of culture and consciousness through which they can rule themselves."[35] Calling the educated to power in an automatic style is also within the scope of this incentive.

Kemalist scholars, who idealized the union of state and society, have presented the Houses in a similar way. For example, *Ülkü*, the journal of Ankara House, stated:

People's Houses were not considered merely as instructive institutions from the top downwards. People's Houses, while teaching the ignorant youth positive

knowledge and teaching uneducated masses positive manners on the one hand, undertake the task of compiling the elements of national culture, national mores and national art, presenting them in the form of a national perspective to the outside world, on the other.[36]

This kind of construct about People's Houses is perfectly compatible with Ziya Gökalp's model of communication between the intelligentsia and ordinary people. According to him, members of the intelligentsia would teach "positive knowledge and technology" (civilization) to people and, in turn, people would teach them "various elements of authentic national culture." However, the Kemalists renounced Gökalp's approach in practice, if not in theory, since they attempted to teach people both civilization and culture.

Could the Houses embrace masses of people as both House and party authorities claimed on numerous occasions? Or, did they remain limited to state bureaucrats and intellectuals? Observations and assertions of different people create different impressions concerning the Houses. For example, the following comparative statistics given by Şükrü Kaya in Ankara present them as successful and far-reaching institutions:

> While 59 exhibitions were held at our Houses in 1935, we opened 179 exhibitions this year. While we visited 495 villages again in 1935, this year the number of villages we worked with reached 1,495. Public courses shifted from 8,300 to 16,000. In 1933, 500,000 citizens had come to People's Houses; their number is 6,642,000 this year. The number of our active members was 95,253 last year. Of them, 8,877 were teachers, 15,577 farmers, 23,935 workers, 5,113 tradesmen, 1,551 doctors, 1,904 lawyers …[37]

However, we cannot be certain if these numbers were either accurate or modest. İlhan Başgöz has a counter-argument with regard to the statistics on the House activities and members:

> In the official statistics of RPP, as prepared by the People's Houses' Directors, large numbers of workers and farmers are listed as members. However, the reliability of these statistics is very questionable. There was no organized, professional method for collecting these statistics at the People's Houses. In addition, the directors quite often distorted the actual figures in their eagerness to indicate a rapid expansion of their membership when they made their annual reports. The author of this book spent five years (1941–46) as an active member of the Ankara People's House, but never encountered a member of the working class there.[38]

Which statement should we believe in since there is no way to accommodate or synthesize them? Before reaching a conclusion, it may be useful to refer to the further observations of İlhan Başgöz:

(T)he Houses became and remained centers for bureaucrats and those who had already had an education. From the very beginning, all government officials were instructed to support the Houses. The Ministry of Education put pressure on teachers to become active at these centers. By special decree, the government declared the Houses to be non-political organizations. Thus, government officials, who were forbidden by law to participate in political organizations, were permitted to take part in the activities of the People's Houses. They did so to a considerable degree. The majority of uneducated people, on the other hand, did not participate, refusing to accept the Houses as their activity centers.[39]

Sometimes the confessions of certain House directors give the same impression as do the observations of İlhan Başgsöz. For instance, the art section of the Giresun House opened a music course which was free of charge. But no one applied during the six months that followed the first announcement of the course. On the other hand, some wealthy families organized private lessons for their children. The music teacher was the same person who was stated to give the courses at the People's House. The editorial board of *Aksu*, the journal of the Giresun House, criticized these families: "A citizen, who is reluctant to send his child to the People's House and yet thinks that he has the right to take private courses from its paid teacher, in fact suffers from a mental handicap."[40]

Since the House teacher and the private teacher are one and the same, the attitude of those families can have nothing to do with mental disorder. A more realistic interpretation of the situation may be put like this: the Giresun House, like most other Houses, wanted to teach and practice western music of various kinds such as the classical sort as well as jazz. These kinds of music were then totally against the traditional taste of the time in the country. In addition, children were educated through suggestive methods between and even during music courses.

M. Muhlis Koner from the Konya House complains about the elitist atmosphere at the People's Houses: "Most of our People's Houses—not most of them, but almost all of them—may be said to have been places where only the educated people meet."[41] Koner suggests that the House activities had to be carried out on two different levels: one for the intelligentsia and one for ordinary people. According to him, uneducated classes would not want to listen to a conference on philosophy, literature or classical music; even if they listened to it, they would not be able to understand it properly.

As we can see, at People's Houses, most of the time there was a gap between state and society, or intellectuals and ordinary people. It was difficult to find the "Turkish synthesis" there. This problem became so important that Muhlis Koner proposed the convening of a large congress with the participation of delegates from all the People's Houses. The congress would deal with every kind of difficulty and issue faced by the Houses on a spectrum ranging from the lack of participation in the House activities to the re-amendment of "*faaliyet tüzüğü*" (activity by-law).[42]

Basic Means and Activities of Political Inculcation

The publications of People's Houses are of the utmost importance, first because they are among the basic means of propaganda employed by the Houses, and secondly since our study concerning these institutions rests on them, to a great degree. The House publications consist of about 70 journals, published at different times, and hundreds of books and brochures by individual Houses.

Among the House journals, *Ülkü* is the most important one since it was published regularly between 1933 and 1950. In addition, it was the most comprehensive journal both in the number of its pages and the scope of its themes. However, a third point which concerns the position of *Ülkü* against other House journals is more interesting than the first two. *Ülkü* was normally the journal of the Ankara House. However, it appeared in practice as an example of, and as a theoretical guide for, propaganda and revolutionary printing. Nusret Kemal states that *Ülkü* teaches the methods of covering revolutionary issues to scholars and House journals in other places. He says: "[T]he other journals published by individual Houses, on the other hand, must bring out elaborate studies notably on local issues … Meanwhile, the Istanbul House must prove an exception for it is in the main a science center …"[43] In short, while *Ülkü* and *Yeni Türk* (the journal of the Istanbul House) would formulate the theoretical construct of Kemalist political education, other journals would apply them in practice.

However, other journals did not always obey such a division of labor imposed on them by *Ülkü*. The Houses of Bursa and Afyon were sometimes criticized for publishing articles on theoretical and philosophical matters concerning the Turkish revolution.[44] Journals such as *Ün* (Isparta) and *Kaynak* (Balıkesir) were often praised by the editorial board of *Ülkü* as they concentrated on local elements of culture through compilation and lay scholarship.[45]

The insistence of *Ülkü* on a hierarchical division of labor among the People's Houses and among their journals is rather part of a general tendency. As we all know, strict centralization, central control, compulsory annexation and voluntary dissolution are major facts practiced by the single party and its secondary institutions. The following news that appeared in *Ülkü* is also part of the same process:

> The Istanbul Teachers' Union, *Istanbul Muallimler Birliği*, and Üsküdar Teachers' Union, *Üsküdar Muallimler Birliği*, joined the People's Houses by dissolving themselves. That People's Houses with their vast organization and comprehensive program have overtaken the limited and local existence of such associations has had a bearing on this decision. The participation of other organizations such as the Youth Union, *Gençler Birliği*, is likewise anticipated.[46]

The publication policies of *Ülkü* and the kind of issues it dealt with shed light on how the People's Houses were preoccupied with politicizing the content of national culture. In the tenth year of the Houses, statistics were published touching on the rates of major issues in the House publications. Those statistics are as follows:

"Folklore and language: 36 percent; history and geography: 22 percent; social and scientific issues: 14 percent; economics, agriculture, village life: six percent; fine arts: five percent, other: nine percent."[47]

Apart from the list of topics to be covered in *Ülkü*, the editorial board cautioned the prospective contributors in their style of writing and inculcating. The following extract is part of an announcement that appeared in *Ülkü*: "To make the suggestions through instances and figurative constructs; even in this way, not to make the propagated idea more conspicuous than necessary; to avoid making suggestions in the form of advice and clichés."[48]

The propagandist aims of *Ülkü* become even clearer as we read some of the slogans and announcements on its back page:

– The pages of *Ülkü* are open to all writing that will serve to expand our revolution …
– *Ülkü* will be a connection between the knowledge and sense in mind, and the country.
– *Ülkü* expects you to help "in diffusing a genuine ideal of your own."[49]

In addition to journals, the Houses published hundreds of books and brochures on an even wider range of topics that appeared in *Ülkü*.[50]

Kemalists were interested in every means of propaganda. They seemed to have discovered the power of propaganda. Münir Hayriğ points this out as follows:

The twentieth century is given various names. One calls it the century of iron, one as that of coal, one as that of electricity. In my opinion, the future generations will name the century in which we live as the century of propaganda. Nowadays the power of propaganda has been well understood. Ministries of propaganda have been organized everywhere in the world. Moreover, propaganda wars are going on beyond boundaries and with magic armies.[51]

The art of propaganda was seen as a political opportunity by the new regime in Turkey. *Ülkü* stated:

We can happily say that the Republic, which found solutions to our every retardation, was not late in giving propaganda the value it deserves. But, some of our people misunderstand this word or understand it in a pejorative sense. When we say propaganda, we imagine lies or at least exaggeration … Propaganda may mean these when it is used against an enemy. But when used on behalf of an ideal, of a revolution, propaganda means only to propagate the facts in their full reality …[52]

This also shows that Turkish people, like most people, disliked propaganda. There must be two basic reasons for this. The first reason concerns the very nature of propaganda itself. As we know, propaganda is not an unbiased form of informing

people. It is rather a partial, purposeful action. It often obliges us to believe something that is not true or at least not beneficial for us. The second reason should be sought in the insurmountable discrepancy between the habit patterns, interests and cultural characteristics of the Kemalist elite and those of the ordinary people.

The RPP defined the considerable number of means to be utilized for propaganda in its 1935 by-law and program, and repeated these in the 1939 and 1943 by-laws and programs. Radio, cinema, conferences, public orators and public pulpits, newspapers and other publications, revolutionary museums, exhibitions, meetings, celebrations, festive events, art, theater and music were among the basic means of political propaganda.[53] All of these means were employed by most People's Houses in their activities.

Rhetoric or oral propaganda was the most favored style in House activities. As H.Z. Koşay said: "Speech (söz) has a great power in awakening, molding and guiding the soul."[54] Koşay likens speech to a sword, both edges of which are equally sharp: that is to say speech can form both positive and negative propaganda.[55]

In 1936, the party launched regular conferences on various national topics. The RPP's General Board of Directors assigned not only the subjects of conferences but also those who would give the conferences. The common subject matter of the conferences was determined as "revolution and the future."[56] Party conferences gained greater importance between the years 1938 and 1941. The party invited many university professors and instructors from Ankara and Istanbul Universities to give conferences in their own academic fields. These academicians gave conferences in many Anatolian cities and administrative districts where they went for research or on holiday.

Apart from these formal conferences, certain Houses held small meetings for communication and discussion. For example, the Kayseri House organized speeches on Sundays; history courses on Monday evenings; Turkish geography on Tuesday evenings; and Turkish courses on Friday evenings.[57] Similarly, the Ankara House sent its young propagandists to the big coffee houses in the city to show short films and to make speeches. The Adana House, on the other hand, organized broadcasts through the loudspeakers installed in the crowded neighborhoods and coffee houses of the city. Music and oratory were used in these broadcasts to educate and entertain people.[58] Manisa House, too, broadcast radio programs every day between 6 pm and 11 pm. This House had a rich program during the week of *Cumhuriyet Bayramı* (the anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic), and later the House authorities decided to double the five loudspeakers in the city.[59] By 1941, the use of both radio and gramophone had become common at People's Houses. By that time, 162 Houses owned radio receivers, and 109 Houses had their own bands made up of members.[60]

A wide range of arts were used in propagating the ideology of the new regime. The artistic understanding of Kemalism was largely characterized by propaganda purposes. B.K. Çağlar declared: "In revolutionary countries like ours, art must … live at the service of the revolution …"[61] Likewise, the painter Ali Sami described art's contribution to propaganda as follows: "The fact that propaganda, which was

used as a means of espionage and religious pressure during the Middle Ages, became more congenial in the twentieth century is explained by the use of fine arts."[62]

Music was employed by most People's Houses for creating and developing the ideological formation of people as an integral part of the ideological acculturation policy of the Kemalist regime. Music was believed to provide a more flexible state of mind and a good opportunity for heightened suggestibility in individuals.[63] After some pleasant music sessions and recitals, the human spirit, having been alerted by emotional and artistic stimuli, can easily be infused with patriotic sensations.[64] The musical activities at the Houses were generally carried out in two main directions. One direction was taken simply by adopting and teaching various kinds of western music. The second direction was based on the practice of Turkish folk music, military and heroic songs, and national anthems using western musical instruments.

For example, the performance of Madame Butterfly as a Turkish Opera at the Ankara House in 1941 was reviewed by F.R. Atay,[65] and considered by him an example of so-called revolutionism. He strongly implied that western music was the real Turkish music. The "Fasıl music,"[66] on the other hand, was to him alien to the nature of Turkish folk culture.

The new regime aimed to impose the tyranny of new cultural and artistic values while abolishing those of the old, pre-established ones. According to Kemalists, the tyranny of mores and values was not less than that of political despots. That is why they placed so much emphasis on political and cultural education.[67]

Revolutionary museums and exhibitions were indispensable symbols of the "new regimes." The Russians, Germans and Italians opened political museums. In Turkey, the ruling party, in its 1931 congress, decided to open an *İnkılap Müzesi*, Revolutionary Museum. It repeated this decision in at least three more congresses in 1935, 1939 and 1943. Efforts and practices were rather slow-paced within this project. People's Houses, although they were not allowed to set up their own museums, were prompted to collect the necessary items for a revolutionary museum to be opened by the state (or the party).

Münir Hayriğ worked out a chart summarizing the groups of items and objects required for an *İnkilap Müzesi*, which included personal effects of revolutionary leaders, souvenirs, flags, weapons, uniforms and other relics from the period of revolution, photographs, portraits and pictures, archival and other written documents.[68]

"The contributions of People's Houses," Münir Hayriğ once again suggests, "could be in the form of opening revolutionary exhibitions, *inkilap sergileri*, as an initial step to an *İnkılap Müzesi*."[69] Hayriğ also presents a chart of an exemplary *İnkılap Sergisi*, the exhibition of which consists of four main sections: (i) The Country Before the Revolution (depicting the period of poverty, invasion and decadent administration); (ii) The Country During the Revolution (exhibiting souvenirs of the revolutionary war, the role of the city or town concerned); (iii) The Country After the Revolution (deeds and undertakings successfully accomplished, local affairs and

works realized); and (iv) The Atatürk Section (Atatürk's statue, souvenirs, his memories concerning the city or town).[70]

As can be seen, this exhibition model not only offered the new "significant symbols" characteristic of the Kemalist regime, but also compared them with the old ones. Furthermore, the model sheds light on the Kemalist statecraft. The exhibition was designed to conclude with a section about the charismatic leader of the Turkish revolution. Since this section came at the very end of the exhibition, it was most likely to create a "recency effect" in visitors' minds. In other words, the visitors would no doubt remember what they had last seen since it was the latest and freshest stimulus received.

The most popular revolutionary exhibitions were opened by People's Houses at the International Fair in İzmir from 1938 onwards. In 1941, the largest of these exhibitions opened. Each House section displayed its own activities through the exhibition of related objects.[71] For example, the History and Museum Section showed an old man, symbolizing history, in the act of excavating, ax in hand. A column rises on which the names of Oghuz, Atilla, Tamerlane and Atatürk are inscribed.

Among the items shown by the Language and Literature Section was an open book. On one page was written: "*Rayete meylederiz kamet-i dilcü yerine / Tunca bel bağlagmışız kakülü hoşbu yerine*," which means "We tend to love the flag instead of a beautiful and tall stature and we admire the bronze instead of an odoriferous lock," whereas the other page contained these lines on Atatürk: "*Biz uyuduk o bizleri bekledi/Uyudu nöbeti bize bıraktı*," meaning "We slept, he guarded us; He slept and he entrusted the duty to us."[72]

In the exhibition, a place of honor was made for the Turkish flag, which was illuminated by electricity, and the splay of Six Arrows, shown symbolically; Atatürk, who had created these, the Turkish Flag, the RPP and People's Houses, and İnönü, who protected them, were also symbolically represented. In sum, this exhibition stressed once again the identification of state, nation, charismatic leader and second-string leaders with one another.[73]

Celebrations of festive events and national days were perhaps the most colorful activities of the Houses. Each year the following events and days were celebrated by each and every People's House: *Halkevleri Bayramı* (People's Houses' Day), Kubilay's Day, Mimar Sinan's Day, Great Hamit's Day, *Ağaç Bayramı* (Tree Festival), April 23, May 19 Sports and Youth's Day, İnönü Victories, İbni Sina's Day, Lausanne Day, Hunting Festivity, Alphabet Reform's Day, August 30 Victory Day, September 26 Language Festival, *Cumhuriyet Bayramı* (Republic Day), National Economy and Saving Week, Soil Festivity, Commemoration of Aero-Martyrs (*Hava Şehitlerini Anma Günü*), and even the Week of Defense Against Tuberculosis, as well as others.[74]

For example, at a Soil Festival in 1937, the Ankara House sent a group of 100 people to Taşpınar Village, where they planted 1,500 trees; Orta Oyunu was performed in the village square; wrestling, the mounted game of Jereed, horse races, and a "Sturdy Child Competition" were organized.[75] The Izmir House, on the other

hand, held a Poetic Competition dealing with the Turkish Flag in which 38 children participated. Some of the contestants recited their poems during a concert during *Cumhuriyet Bayramı* Week.[76]

Conclusion

The Kemalist regime set up certain institutions specific to its self-expression. Institutions such as the Turkish Historical Society, Turkish Language Society, People's Houses and People's Rooms, which characterized the 1930s and after, served as the cultural and ideological nerves of the Kemalist regime. They cooperated and collaborated with one another and with the single political party of the period. They were engaged in formulating and diffusing the ideology of the new regime. The Turkish Historical Society and Turkish Language Society were mainly occupied with the theory and the theses of ideological propaganda, whereas the People's Houses, People's Rooms, Turkish Sports Institution, Public Orators and so on undertook the activities of agitation and propaganda.

Perhaps the best way of understanding a particular regime is to examine how its basic institutions function in society, since institutions not only represent the outlook of the regime but also put this outlook into practice. Thus, by studying a major institution, we can crosscheck the self-image that a regime wants to create and the discourse that it makes use of in its actions and practices.

A fundamental question to be answered in this study was how and why the ruling single party came to be engaged in a comprehensive ideological mobilization throughout the country. As may be recalled, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the new conditions of the twentieth century forced the Kemalists to constitute a polity that would be legitimized through totally different means compared to the religious sources of power exerted by the Ottoman Sultans. The ethnically heterogeneous structure of the Anatolian populace compelled the new government to develop a unifying ideology, which would be above every social segment and its distinctive identity. Therefore, a secular state embracing all the different elements in society was taken up as the new polity of Turkey. On the other hand, any form of statecraft other than the nation state was unable to survive in the international arena of the 1920s and 1930s. To establish a viable nation state and to create a unitary national ideology were the optimum choices for Mustafa Kemal and his men.

The Kemalist government tried to eliminate all possible residues of power belonging to the imperial period. In this context it abolished the institutions of the Sultanate and the Caliphate in the early 1920s, and changed a number of social and cultural means such as the calendar, the system of weights and measurement, and the alphabet. Later on that decade, its political and religious platforms included suppressing political riots like that of Sheik Said in 1925, whereas on the ideological platform it began to establish new institutions such as the *Millet Mektepleri* (Nation Schools), which were established soon after the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1926.

We can observe two fundamental differences between the institutions of the 1920s and 1930s: the latter had deeper ideological concerns compared to the former;

and although the institutions of the 1920s were relatively autonomous institutions, those established in the 1930s were either branches or secondary institutions of the RPP, thus the social and cultural institutions of the 1930s were put into service by the government as political and ideological investments.

Although the Kemalist rulers exalted and amply praised people on every possible occasion, their practical deeds were quite contrary to their political discourse. This was actually the typical case at all People's Houses. They said that the Houses were open to everybody regardless of his or her social status, but most of those who attended the Houses and participated in their activities were members of the bureaucratic class and of the intelligentsia. They claimed that the House activities would appeal to all social sections without discriminating against any of them, but most House activities were not in line with people's actual intellectual level. The party and House authorities said that there would be no protocol in the halls of People's Houses, but they reserved special seats for high-ranking military and civilian authorities. At times of popular performances or interesting activities where the available seats were far from sufficient for the whole crowd, primacy was given, formally or informally, to members of the elite and their families. Thus the dual structure of Turkish society was entirely preserved and even exacerbated at People's Houses, because the dominant polity conceived of the people as a *tabula rasa*, and wanted to give them a strong cultural and political education totally of its own. This was actually the result of the positivist ideology of Kemalism, which gave absolute supremacy to science and civilization as well as to scientists and intellectuals *vis-à-vis* traditional values and ordinary people. In all the House activities, from theatrical performances to village development programs, the former concepts and actors were presented as winning the struggle against the latter concepts and actors. Thus the relations between state and society remained largely unilateral, in perfect coherence with the logic of a revolution from above.

The changes experienced by People's Houses, the failure of the RPP in the 1946 and especially in the 1950 elections, the revival of traditional and religious patterns of behavior during the multi-party period all indicate that the success of People's Houses remained far below the expectations. The strategy of Kemalism intending to create an historically amnesiac or weak-minded people did not yield the expected results.

However, should we appraise the repercussions of the House activities over a longer period of time, we see that an important number of intellectuals and scholars, if not the ordinary people, internalized and further consolidated the Kemalist ideology. In other words, Kemalism's cultural graft budded over time and turned into a transplantable shoot. In this way cultural Kemalism came to be more successful than political Kemalism throughout the following decades. Teachers, writers, intellectuals and scholars of the 1960s and 1970s conveyed their ideology, which had been formed during their youth at People's Houses, to new generations.

Today our perception systems are overloaded and contaminated by the signals and messages coming from a large number of mass media. Most of these signals and messages have direct or indirect political connotations. Therefore a propagandist

institution such as the People's Houses may not be so interesting and crucial now as it was in the 1930s. However, the longevity of Kemalist ideology and statecraft that have reached the present day from the 1920s shows that one cannot neglect the role of People's Houses.

Acknowledgement

Notes

1. This study is based on a wider study that was submitted by the author bearing the title of "People's Houses: An Experiment in Ideological Training in Turkey, 1932–1951," as his doctoral dissertation to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Boğaziçi University, 1996.
2. E. Kris and N. Leites, "Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda," in B. Berelson and M.J. Janowitz (eds.), *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, 4th edn. (New York: The Free Press of Glenco, 1964), p.283.
3. T. Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* [The Turkish Revolution and After] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1993), p.57.
4. Ibid.; M. Tunçay, *T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* [The Establishment of the Single-Party Regime in the Turkish Republic] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1989).
5. M.K. Atatürk, *Söylev ve Demeçler* [The Oration and the Statements], Vol.III (Ankara: TİKE Yayınları, 1981), p.50.
6. T. Tapper, *Political Education and Stability: Elite Responses to Political Conflict* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp.2–3.
7. E.J. Hobsbawm, *1780'den Günümüze Milletler ve Milliyetçilik* [Nations and Nationalism from 1780 to the Present] (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1992), p.63.
8. Ibid., p.110.
9. Timur (1993), p.57.
10. Tunçay (1989); Ş. Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* [The Turkish Modernization] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993).
11. Tapper (1976), p.9.
12. *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol.9 (1951), p.618.
13. See E. Öz, *Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katilim* [Single-Party Rule and Political Participation] (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), pp.56–7.
14. H.D. Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda," in Berelson and Janowitz (1964), p.176.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991).
18. E. Sapir, "Symbolism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol.14, pp.493–4.
19. W. Bauer, "Public Opinion," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol.12, p.670.
20. Static public opinion, as formulated by Bauer, ibid, p.670, "manifests itself in the form of traditional customs, mores and usages, and bears the same relation to the dynamic as costume does to fashion or customary law to parliamentary enactments." According to him, "[d]ynamic public opinion, on the other hand, … is built upon the cultivated arts of persuasion and systematic publicity and draws upon definite historical events or contemporary happenings as the material for its propaganda and agitation."

21. H.D. Lasswell, "The Triple Appeal Principle: A Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Political and Social Science," *The American Journal of Sociology*, No.4 (1931), p.523.

22. Ibid., p.513.

23. H.D. Lasswell, "Propaganda," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol.7, p.524.

24. Lasswell (1931), p.533.

25. Ibid., pp.533–4.

26. Kris and Leites, in Berelson and Janowitz (1964), p.287.

27. K.N. Duru, "Halkevleri ve Halk Terbiyesi" [People's Houses and Popular Training], *Ülkü*, No.81 (Nov. 1939), p.209.

28. C. Nasuhi, "Halkevlerinin Çatısı Altında" [Under the Roof of the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.3 (April 1933), p.197.

29. B. K. Çağlar, "Halkevlerinde Bariz Çalışmalar ve Beliren Değerler" [The Egregious Works in the People's Houses and the Emerging Values], *Ülkü*, No.62 (April 1938), p.176.

30. O. Arsal, "Devletin Tarifi" [The Definition of the State], *CHP Yayını Konferanslar*, Series I, Book 22 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1938), p.32.

31. M. Saffet, "Devlet ve Vatandaş" [The State and the Citizen], *Ülkü*, No.3 (April 1933), p.184.

32. M. Saffet, "İnkılap Terbiyesi" [Revolutionary Training], *Ülkü*, No.8 (Sept. 1933), p.106.

33. R. Peker, "Disiplinli Hürriyet" [Disciplined Freedom], *Ülkü*, No.3 (April 1933), p.180.

34. N. Kemal, "Halkçılık" [Populism], *Ülkü*, No.3 (April 1933), p.186.

35. Ibid., p.187.

36. See *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No.3 (1947), p.2.

37. See *Halkevleri Neşriyatı Konuşmalar* [Speeches Published by the People's Houses], Broşür 3 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1942), p.62.

38. İ. Başgöz and H.E. Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey* (Bloomington, IN: Mouton, 1968), p.157.

39. Ibid.

40. "Evimizde Çalışmalar," *Aksu*, No.17-1 (Feb. 1968), p.23.

41. M.M. Koner, "Konuşma: Halkevleri İçin Bir Kongre Lazımdır" (Speech: A Congress is Necessary for the People's Houses), *Konya*, No.58 (Aug.–Sept. 1943), pp.57–8.

42. Ibid.

43. N. Kemal, "Halkevleri Neşriyatı" [People's Houses Publications], *Ülkü*, No.18 (Aug. 1934), pp.455–6.

44. See *Ülkü*, No.23 (Jan. 1935), p.39.

45. For the studies of lay scholarship and folklore at People's Houses, see A. Öztürkmen, "The Role of People's Houses in the Making of National Culture in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.11 (Fall 1994), pp.159–81.

46. See *Ülkü*, No.36 (Feb. 1936), pp.462–3.

47. See *Yeni Türk*, No.109 (Jan. 1942), p.63.

48. See *Ülkü*, No.1 (Feb. 1933), p.1.

49. Ibid.

50. Most of the House publications can be learned from two bibliographies prepared by Avni Candar: *Bibliografya* [Bibliography] (Ankara: Halkevleri Neşriyatından, Sümer Matbaası, 1941); and *Bibliografya* (Ankara: Halkevleri Neşriyatından, Sümer Matbaası, 1950); and *Türkiye Bibliyografyası* [Bibliography of Turkey] (especially its volumes covering 1938–40 and after). Besides these major references, *Ülkü* and other individual House reviews gave from time to time lists of their House publications. Finally, the writings that appeared in the first series of *Ülkü* (108 issues) were given under several topical categories in a large index book.

51. M. Hayriğ, "Güzel Epikller: Halk Eğitim Yolu-Kukla Tiyatrosu" [Beautiful Epics: Puppet Theater as a Means of Popular Education], *Ülkü*, No.31 (Sept. 1935), p.70.

52. See *Ülkü*, No.36 (Feb. 1936), p.452.

53. See, *CHP Nizamnamesi 1939* [RPP's 1939 By-law] (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), pp.13–134; *CHP Programı 1939* [RPP's 1939 Program] (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), pp.15–22. The means

and activities of ideological mobilization have not been exhaustively discussed in this study. A more comprehensive analysis of such means and activities can be found in the author's (unpublished) doctoral dissertation, "People's Houses: An Experiment in Ideological Training in Turkey, 1932–1951" (see note 1).

54. H.Z. Koşay, "Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları" [Means of Popular Training], *Ülkü*, No.2 (March 1933), pp.153–4.

55. In 1937 a conference by the name of "Hitabet Sanatı," or "The Art of Oratory," was given by Hamdi Akverdi at Ankara House for all public orators, lecturers and voluntary propagandists. The conference dealt with various techniques of suggestion, necessary qualifications of orators, stress, diction, intonation, a healthy voice and so on. See, H Akverdi, *Hitabet Sanatı Teknik ve Psikolojisi* [The Techniques and Psychology of Oratory] (Ankara: CHP Ankara Halkevi Dil Tarih Edebiyat Şubesi Neşriyatı, 1937).

56. K. Ünal. "Ayın Politikası/Halkevleri Yıl Dönümü" [The Politics of the Month/The Anniversary of the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.37 (March 1936), p.70.

57. B. K. Çağlar, "Halkevleri Haberleri" [News from the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.59 (Jan. 1938), p.469.

58. B. K. Çağlar, "Halkevleri Çalışmaları" [Activities of the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.52 (June 1937), p.307.

59. See "Birinci Teşrin Ayı İçinde Evimizde Çalışmaların Anahatları" [The Outline of the Activities in Our House in October], *Gediz*, No.19 (Nov. 1938), p.3.

60. See "Halkevleri Postası" [People's Houses' Mail], *Ülkü*, No.97 (March 1941), p.69.

61. B.K. Çağlar, "Gönüllü Sanat" [The Voluntary Art], *Ülkü*, No.23 (Jan. 1935), p.336.

62. A. Sami, "Propaganda ve Resim" [Propaganda and Painting], *Ülkü*, No.19 (Sept. 1934), p.47.

63. H.Z. Koşay, "Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları" [The Means of Popular Training], *Ülkü*, No.2 (March 1933), p.156.

64. M. Saffet, "İnkılap Terbiyesi" [Revolutionary Training], *Ülkü*, No.8 (Sept. 1933), p.113.

65. F.R. Atay, "Bir Temsil Karşısında Bazı Düşünceler" [Some Reflections on a Theatrical Performance], *Ülkü*, No.101 (July 1941), pp.385–8.

66. *Fasıl* music consists of a program of musical pieces that are performed always in the same *makam*.

67. Saffet (1933), p.107.

68. M. Hayriğ, "Devrim Müzesinde Halkevlerinin Ödevi" [The Task of the People's Houses at the Revolutionary Museum], *Ülkü*, No.31 (Sept. 1935), pp.18–20.

69. Ibid., pp.22–3.

70. Ibid.

71. The major organs of a People's House were its activity sections. There were nine sections at a House: (i) *Dil Tarih Edebiyat Şubesi* (Language History and Literature Section); (ii) *Ar Şubesi* (Art Section); (iii) *Gösterit Şubesi* (Drama Section); (iv) *Spor Şubesi* (Sports Section); (v) *Sosyal Yardım Şubesi* (Social Assistance Section); (vi) *Halk Dersaneleri ve Kurslar Şubesi* (Public Classes and Courses Section); (vii) *Kitapsaray ve Yayın Şubesi* (Library and Publication Section); (viii) *Köycülük Şubesi* (Village Development Section); and (ix) *Müze ve Sergi Şubesi* (Museum and Exhibition Section).

72. See *Fikirler*, No.122-3 (Feb. 1941), p.20.

73. See *Fikirler*, No.105 (Sept. 1940), p.36; *Fikirler*, No.122-3 (Feb. 1941), p.20.

74. See *CHP XVI. Yıldönümünde Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* [People's Houses and People's Rooms at the 16th Anniversary of the RPP] (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), p.11; *Gediz*, No.23 (March 1939), p.10.

75. B.K. Çağlar, "Halkevlerinde Bariz Çalışmalar ve Beliren Değerler" [The Egregious Works and the Emerging Values in the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.62 (April 1938), pp.175–6.

76. B.K. Çağlar, "Halkevleri Haberleri" [News from the People's Houses], *Ülkü*, No.59 (Jan. 1938), p.469.