Contesting Urban Space
in Early Republican Ankara

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Vakifs, pious foundations that provided various religious and social services, were critical institutions of the Ottoman Empire. They were severely undermined during Turkey's transition from an empire into a nation-state because their autonomous character and religious premises were incompatible with the modernist, secular, and homogenizing principles of the new regime. Because *vakifs* were major landowners, the process of dismantling them had a strong spatial component. Focusing on the confiscation of a *vakif* cemetery during the construction of Turkey's new capital, Ankara, this essay demonstrates how structural changes within the state and its institutions triggered unprecedented contestations over space by opening it to new uses and users while displacing the old, thereby profoundly transforming the urban cultural landscape.

THE MARCH 12, 1934 ISSUE OF A LOCAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER FEATURED a curious essay about the fate of Sogukkuyu, a squatter settlement in Ankara (Figure 1). Accompanied by photographs, the article elaborated on the miserable conditions of life in this northwestern corner of town: "Sogukkuyu gets its name from a cold water well by the vegetable gardens. On days when there is no rain, and mud does not claim every passing pair of shoes, the well becomes a gathering place where the locals stage their fights over who gets to fill their bucket with cold water under the scorching summer heat. This is also where with the very first spring blossoms, young lovers with hearts afire will stroll down past piles of manure and refuse to exchange their vows."[1] The witty and uninhibited sarcasm of these words cleverly encouraged the reader to excavate further the complex and layered story of dislocations and disorienting encounters that took place in this marginal neighborhood. Written barely a decade after Ankara became the capital of the Turkish Republic, the article exposed the soft underbelly of the process of building a modern capital in this newly formed nation-state.

Formerly a modest provincial town, Ankara rose to prominence in the aftermath of World War I as the launching pad of an all-out counteroffensive against the extensive Allied occupation of the Ottoman Empire. Upon victory, the nationalist leaders who led the independence struggle decided to sever ties with all things Ottoman and build a modern state with its own institutions, laws, and political culture. The making of a new capital was an integral component of these comprehensive reforms, and Ankara was forever transformed by this process. Whereas the population was 20,000 in 1920, it had soared to 75,000 in 1927, and to 123,000 in 1935.[2] Housing was scarce and of low quality, yet rents were exorbitantly high. Even relatively well paid government officials had a hard time finding an affordable and decent place to live. The situation was far

worse for prospective job seekers who migrated to the city and worked in low-paying jobs. Not surprisingly, since their wages were insufficient to maintain agreeable living standards, they landed in the slums and squatter settlements, such as Sogukkuyu, that mushroomed on the outskirts of the city (Figure 2).

However, Sogukkuyu was not just another squatter settlement; there was more to its story than met the eye. Located on the site of a former cemetery that had been expropriated from a pious foundation, it stood on ground contested by the Treasury, the Pious Foundations Administration, and the city. The delay in reaching a resolution pitted state agencies, the city administration, and the citizens against one another. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of its ownership opened Sogukkuyu to a variety of other unprecedented uses, such as equestrian training. These activities overlapped in space but were disparate in nature and juxtaposed the lifestyles of the rich and powerful with those of the poor and the marginal, resulting in jarring contrasts.

Sogukkuyu's tale is one of multilayered displacements—displacements of things, of people, and of institutions; displacements of legal frameworks, of narrative strategies, and of collective imagination. In this essay, by using the parable of Sogukkuyu, I intend to examine how, during a time of profound social, cultural, and political transformation, people coped with change. I contend that in the face of constraints far beyond their control, people still worked out their own strategies for survival and that even if they were not able to change the contexts of their decisions, they quite literally managed to claim a place of their own in Ankara's history as modern Turkey's capital.

The Rationalization of Space and New Urbanism in Ankara

Turkey's new leaders intended Ankara to be the model site where the structural transformation of the state could be inscribed into the landscape and where the sociospatial practices of this new order could be acted out. To make a city that embodied their visions of modernity, the leaders of the republic organized a competition in 1928 and eventually commissioned Herman Jansen, a professor of urban design at the University of Berlin, to plan Ankara. Jansen's plan for the city included such elements as uniform residential streets, large tree-lined avenues, and parks, as well as such building types as museums, sports complexes, and concert halls, which were new to Turkey.

The most striking aspect of this plan was the grouping of similar land uses within the same part of the city. Accordingly, the

Kösemiz Bucağımız:

"Soukkuyu" Mahallesi Ne olacak?

Buraya Akköprü diyenler de vardır. Fakat bu yerinde bir anış sayılmamalıdır. So- ukkuyu, Akköprünün poyrazı- na rastlar. Ankaranın bir baş- ka köşesidir.

Soukkuyudan bir görünüş.

Bu semte "Soukkuyu" adı verilmesinin sebebi burada ya- zın suyu pek souk olan bir kuyunun mevcudiyetindendir. Hakikaten bugün de soukku- yu köprüsünü geçtikten sonra

bir görünüş daha

bostanlar arasından sola ay- rılan yol takip edilirse, iki katlı sarı bir binanın ve bir batakhğın yanında kuyu görü- lür. Yalnız şimdi kuyu, çıkrık yerine bir tulumba işletmek-

Kiralık Ev

tedir. Yağmurlu havaların her papuçtan alacaklı çıkan yapış- kan çamuru olmayınca, burası yazın her gününde "Souk su" arıyanların kavğa döğüş yeridir

(Sonu 6 ıncı sayfada)

Halâ o mektup!..

— Ne, Ayda 25 lira mı? Fakat burası nedir ki beyim?
— Burası, Ankaradır efendim!

2. Renter: What, 25 TL? What the hell is this?
Landlord: This sir, is Ankara!
This cartoon depicting the difficulty and expense of finding a place in Ankara appeared in *Ankara Haftasi* on November 9, 1934. The cottage in the background is remarkably similar to the housing stock available in Sogukkuyu.

1. "*What will become of Sogukkuyu?*" was the title of the article that appeared in the weekly *Ankara Haftasi* on March 12, 1934.

HERMAN JANSEN'S PLAN FOR THE DIVISION OF THE ZONES
(FLÄCHENAUFTEILUNGSPLAN)

SURFACE STREETS 1ST ORDER	▬▬▬	NEW	▬ ▬ ▬	OLD
SURFACE STREETS 2ND ORDER	▬▬▬	NEW	▪ ▪ ▪	OLD
RAILWAY				
OLD TOWN				
NEW TOWN				
BUSINESS DISTRICT				
GREEN BELT				

3. Specialization of the urban space. Redrawn by the author
from Ankara's Master Plan submitted by Herman Jansen in 1928
to the Ankara Urban Design Competition.

new ministries were located within the same vicinity in the new downtown, and institutions of higher education and cultural activities were located slightly to the south of the citadel. Residential neighborhoods, for their part, were distributed around town in a way that acknowledged the different class and cultural backgrounds of the residents. Thus government officials would live close to the ministries, while blue-collar workers would be located to the northwest (Figure 3). This new rationalization of urban space in Turkey, first implemented in Ankara and recommended by the government for cities throughout the country, was based on functional special-

ization and spatial separation.[3] Jansen introduced these new principles of modern planning in his plan for Ankara. Although he did not seem to espouse the ideologies of radical architectural thought or the modernism of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) that were prevalent during his time, Jansen certainly was addressing the same concerns and providing similar solutions to some of them.[4]

This new approach to urbanism ushered in new mental templates for imagining the city by recasting its spatial order. At the same time, however, it was clearly antithetical to long-established spatial traditions of Anatolia, where historically the urban fabric consisted of a fine texture of mixed uses that spilled onto one another quite informally. Prerepublican Ankara was organized in much the same fashion, with its narrow and irregular streets, mosques, and shrines small and large scattered around town in mixed residential neighborhoods and intertwined with commercial structures. Jansen did not touch much of the old town except for demolitions to the south of the citadel to make room for large arteries because the land was physically too congested and legally too complicated for him to work on. Instead, he concentrated on establishing a development pattern and on regulating urban growth in the new parts of town outside the citadel (Figures 4 and 5). Yet the fact that the sites of new development were unbuilt did not necessarily mean that they were unclaimed. On the contrary, the environs of the citadel were covered with cemeteries and sacred hills that belonged to the Pious Foundations Administration.

The Ankara Master Planning Bureau, with its extraordinary executive powers, was in charge of solving problems posed by complex land tenure issues and clearing urban land for the implementation of the plan. Founded in 1928 specifically to enforce the plan, the bureau received a high degree of autonomy and ample state funding because government officials regarded the making of the "republic's capital" as a matter that lay beyond the purview of the Ankara municipality but that directly concerned the state.[5] The bureau had special provisions for the acquisition of property that lay within the area of eminent domain, but most importantly, it was specifically entitled to expropriate land that belonged to the State Treasury or the Pious Foundations at no cost and with no appeals allowed.[6] According to the Ankara Master Plan, Sogukkuyu and all other burial grounds in and around the city had to be moved and consolidated at a new site appropriately labeled the "Modern Cemetery" to make room for new development. What is more, the bureau demanded that the move be at the expense of the original owner, which in all cases was unmistakably a pious foundation. Gradually, as land became available, many of the high-profile build-

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ANKARA IN 1928

19TH CENTURY GOVERNMENT DISTRICT
19TH CENTURY COMMERCIAL DISTRICT
HISTORICAL COMMERCIAL DISTRICT
AGRICULTURAL LAND
NEIGHBOURHOOD MOSQUES
CEMETERIES
RIVERS

4. Ankara in 1928. The street pattern is irregular, and land use
is mixed. Redrawn by the author based on the 1839 Ankara map
by Major von Vincke, the 1926 Municipal Map of Ankara (Ankara
Sehremaneti Haritasi), and Sevgi Aktüre's maps of Ankara in 19.
Yüzyil Sonunda Anadolu Kenti Mekansal Yapi Çözümlemesi
(Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 1978).

5. Sogukkuyu in relation to other important reference points of
the growing capital. (Based on a map of Ankara published in
İnönü Ansiklopedisi, vol 1. [Ankara: T.C. Marif Vekaleti Yayinlari,
1942].)

ings of the new capital, such as the Parliament, the Ethnographic
Museum, the Ankara Model Hospital, and the Central Bank of
Turkey, to name a few, began to take over sites that had once been
urban cemeteries or other foundation property.[7]

As suggested by these few examples, the making of Ankara
went far beyond inaugurating modern institutions in new build-
ings, but permanently displaced certain patterns of use and move-
ment in the city as part of that very process. Taking credit in the
name of the republican administration for "dealing for the first time
with the disorderly and hideous condition of urban cemeteries,"
Minister of Interior Sükrü Kaya stated, "In the past, for some rea-
son, respect for the dead was shown at the expense of the well-be-
ing of the living. The most beautiful portions of urban real estate
were . . . use[d] as cemeteries. And graveyards constituted the ex-
clusive view of many a nice home. Wouldn't you agree with me that
things are much better today?"[8]

Kaya's portentous words suggest that he did not merely want
the cemeteries out of sight, but that he wanted them out of mind.
More than lending a strong support to modern urbanism, his words
reveal a profound shift in the official view of life, death, and spiritu-
ality. To appreciate this change, we need to situate the cemeteries
not only in their physical context, but also within the institutional
context of an intense network of social and religious services offered
by the pious foundations, known as *vakifs* in Turkish.[9]

Dismantling the Religious Landscape

Vakif complexes were indispensable elements of Ottoman urban-
ism. The largest and best known examples that graced the skyline
of Istanbul were funded by sultans to bolster their public image and
legitimacy as benevolent rulers providing for the needs of their sub-
jects.[10] More commonly, *vakif* complexes were used to instigate ur-
ban development and imparted their character to towns throughout
the empire.[11] Typically, the services they offered included the build-
ing and maintenance of mosques, schools, orphanages, hospitals,
burial grounds, baths, and so on. To support these, *vakifs* often were

endowed with revenue-generating properties, such as stores, fields, and farms. They provided work and places to work; gave shelter to the poor and food to the needy; and five times a day they provided a place for the faithful to commune together in the name of God Almighty. Since they performed so many functions within a given community, *vakifs* were critical institutions of Ottoman urban life that brought faith down to earth and made it concrete and practical.

However, things took a very different turn once the republican administration came to power. There were mainly two reasons for this change: In the first place, the motley functions that the *vakifs* provided had an undeniably important part in sustaining the constitutive role religion played in Ottoman society. As a major source of collective allegiances, however, religion presented an ideological challenge to the Turkish nationalism espoused by the republic. Thus to undercut the prominence of religion in social life, the republican administrators promptly proceeded to dismantle the infrastructure of sites and services maintained by the *vakifs*. To justify these interventions, they argued that in a modern nation, faith could no longer be understood as a collective practice by birthright. Rather, they claimed, it was a private choice made by individual citizens and was not meant to intersect with the public sphere. Subsequently, they decreed that the formation and sustenance of a pious community of believers was not in the purview of public institutions, such as *vakifs*.

In the second place, the republican leaders wanted to provide a uniform and standardized institutional and legal framework for all operations nationwide. Instead, they had inherited from the Ottoman Empire a complex tapestry of unique and idiosyncratic organizations entrenched in myriad local processes that categorically defied such homogenization. Motivated by faith but brought to life by different individuals under different circumstances, each *vakif* was run according to its own rules and regulations and supported specific causes with its revenues. Profitable commercial enterprises lent the *vakifs* a considerable degree of autonomy. Moreover, they were based on and protected by religious law rather than a secular civil code, and they operated without the supervision of a central authority. Therefore, they appeared to republican administrators to be unruly and prone to corruption. As far as the administrators were concerned, this was an outdated and helplessly fragmented system that had to be rationalized.[12]

This was easier said than done. *Vakifs* were pervasive entities that were very difficult to dismantle. In Turkey, there were no fewer than thirty thousand of them.[13] Therefore, instead of trying to purge them completely, the republican administrators looked for ways of taking them over, centralizing their administration and functions, and ultimately subordinating them to the interests of the new state. In fact, Ottoman reformists had already attempted to rationalize the management of this immense network of variegated organizations. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, most of the *vakifs* within the Ottoman Empire fell under government supervision; later a ministry that dealt with religious services and the administration of the *vakifs* was founded.[14] In other words, the Ottomans had been working on a centralized system that was taken over by their republican counterparts. However, the policies of the latter were fundamentally different because their predecessors had never intended to challenge the premises of the *vakif* system or to dismantle the religious law *(shariya)* that sustained it. The displacement of the legal framework that guaranteed perpetuity constituted the vital blow for the *vakif* system.[15] Several laws passed between 1925 and 1935 conveniently authorized the state to take over all of the assets of foundations that it deemed to have "expired." If a *vakif* no longer had regents or beneficiaries, or its mission was no longer seen as valid or viable, all of its property and assets could be transferred to the Treasury to fund the chosen projects of the cash-strapped Turkish state.[16]

Although in theory this seemed to be an especially promising strategy, in practice it was far from smooth. The ambiguous definition of an "expired" foundation gave enormous leeway to state agencies in deciding which foundation to prey on. Yet it also sparked prolonged legal battles, as in the case of Sogukkuyu. Even before the Ankara Master Planning Bureau demanded to take it over, the *vakif* administration had taken the State Treasury to court for unlawfully confiscating the cemetery. The bureau's request was stalled indefinitely because the original imbroglio remained unresolved. Ironically, while they fought over the legal ownership of the cemetery, none of these agencies actually staked a claim on the physical possession of the property itself, thus leaving it vulnerable to the occupation by fiat of those who did. At the interstices of this legal impasse, the city's newest and poorest immigrants found a window of opportunity to make themselves a home by physically holding onto the land. Describing this landscape of poverty, the article voiced ruthless cynicism packaged as though it were tongue-in-cheek humor: "The style of the houses here, the stores, the roads and the avenues are simply something else. As opposed to 'reinforced concrete' [*betonarme*], here the homes are made of 'reinforced tin' [*tenekearme*]. This is where you will find the finest dwellings made from discarded gas containers filled with mud, stacked on top of each other, supported by a wooden pole or two and roofed by layers of flattened tin cans"[17] (Figure 6).

6. A squatter's cottage in Sogukkuyu. (Ankara Haftasi, March 12, 1934.)

Neither part of the old town left intact by the planners nor part of the modern city envisioned by the nationalists, this was a third Ankara lying at the gap between unrealized visions and displaced institutions. In a 1935 speech, Minister of Interior Sükrü Kaya, who saw the likes of Sogukkuyu as shadow landscapes that were necessary but undesirable, observed:

This third Ankara consists of cheap houses built overnight and sold for anywhere between 4–15 Turkish Liras. Last year the city tried to deal with them. . . . But you will remember that was very painful to watch. . . . We will move them elsewhere . . . but we postponed that because we are in the middle of winter. I feel better knowing they at least have a roof over their heads. . . . But clearly we do not intend to leave these ugly places with dirt roads there for good. We are, for instance, determined to cleanse the area by the Equestrian Club [Sogukkuyu]. . . . They may have the material in large supply, but the land does not belong to them. So in fact we can demolish them anytime we want.[18]

Kaya clearly wanted to demolish them because they were unsightly and unsanitary. However, he was in no position to stop the constant influx of people to the city, nor did his government have the financial prowess to provide humane alternatives for the squatters. Caught in a web of difficult choices, he seemed to be resigned to the status quo. His ambivalence on the matter gave the phenomenally resilient residents of Sogukkuyu even more room to maneuver. In fact, according to the article, the city inspectors had already gone to visit them quite a few times, but they had managed to bounce back every time:[19]

Some of these phyllo dough dwellings even have their very own lovingly kept dossiers at the Planning Bureau. At times the ax of law comes down crashing through their roofs. . . . Yet this neighborhood keeps growing. At night, the people . . . work like an army to build these. . . . The police come and tear them down, only to find the very next day a larger one mushrooming on its roots. "Reinforced tin" construction takes little to put together. A vacant lot may be transformed overnight, and in the morning you will wake up to see sunlight reflecting from the window panes of a "tin palace," with its makeshift chimney, steadily smoking.[20]

Although Sogukkuyu provided an opportunity to erect squatter housing, the poor were not the only intruders in this place. Located right next to the stables of the Ankara Equestrian Club, this was also the playground for the rich and the powerful. Since the cemetery had been moved and as long as there did not seem to be an official owner, anybody who was somebody in Ankara would show up clad in their spiffy imported equestrian outfits to ride horses on balmy afternoons. This was an equally illicit invasion of the site. But the activities of the Equestrian Club were welcome because they showcased the bourgeois sensibilities of the new elite and thereby reinforced the image of modernity that the leaders of the new state wanted to project at home and abroad. As a former general who had won battles on horseback, Prime Minister Ismet İnönü had a particular liking for horses. He frequently sponsored competitive and social activities around the sport and attended the races on a regular basis. As a result, equestrian activities were given a very high profile in the social life of early republican Ankara. The dailies carried news about the races on their covers, and official propaganda publications frequently featured images of the social activities at the Equestrian Club as well as photographs of the stables and training sessions. Meanwhile, the presence of the squatters who ostensibly shared the same space was impossible to detect from the abundant pictures in these publications. In fact even after careful examination, none of the pictures disclose the slightest hint about this unusual overlapping of such incompatible uses (Figure 7).

Visions and Divisions in the Urban Landscape

The glaring contradictions of this landscape must have been what caught the eye of the author of the article in the weekly magazine *Ankara Haftasi* who, rather than providing a brief informational report, chose to launch an effective critique of the government re-

7. Members of the Ankara Equestrian Club in training at Sogukkuyu (*La Turquie Kamaliste* 32–40 [Aug. 1939–Dec. 1940]:61.)

garding the unfair and uneven urban development in Ankara. To heighten the impact of his observations he deployed particularly powerful strategies. Like the squatters who had taken advantage of the gap between the real and the legal, he chose to mock the weaknesses and the lacunae in language. He borrowed narrative structures from contemporary novels that appealed to the cultural sensibilities of the elite but undermined their romantic associations by using them to describe the darkest squalor. To depict the housing stock of the poor in Sogukkuyu, he appropriated the terminology used to promote high-style modern architecture in professional and propaganda publications. Moreover, he freely subverted the meanings of words or invented new ones. He labeled Sogukkuyu's prevalent construction technique "reinforced tin" *(tenekearme)* as opposed to the industry standard reinforced concrete *(betonarme)*. He spoke of the jerry-built shacks but called them *palas*, a term that referred to new apartment houses with modern amenities. Dirt roads became "avenues" in his writing, and roadside stalls were "stores." There was more than a whimsical sense of humor in this peculiar rhetorical strategy. These unpredictable shifts in meaning and the juxtaposition of jarring contrasts provided a compelling textual analogy for the disorienting encounters experienced by the squatters and visitors of Sogukkuyu on a daily basis: "Those unaware that this is also the site of the Ankara Equestrian Club and its stables may be puzzled by the frequent sightings of luxury cars with official or diplomatic plates in the neighbourhood. Yet the inhabitants of Sogukkuyu, who have developed an unusual pen-

chant for this sport as spectators watching it for hours at a time, do not even have a donkey of their own."[21] Although it was delivered as a casual remark, this was a particularly poignant statement. Here the author was clearly invoking the widespread assumption that in the Anatolian countryside, the donkey constituted the most basic means of transportation and that even the poorest peasant household was expected to own one. If Sogukkuyu's squatters, by and large recent immigrants from the countryside, did not have donkeys, this clearly signaled their displacement from their places of birth, emphasizing that they no longer were part of the rural population. However, carefully edited out from the official representations of "ideal urban life" in Ankara, the squatters were not seen by the government as part of the new capital's urban population either.

Excluded from the official vision of a modern and exemplary capital, the squatters' presence in the city could hardly be ignored. Their labor was what kept the frantic pace of construction going. They cleaned the streets and the houses of the wealthy. They drove the buses that took people to work every morning and back home every evening. They served tea or coffee at their offices or waited on them at the restaurants. They were the gofers, the janitors, the handymen; in short, they were Ankara's workforce. Even if what they called home was as elusive as they were in the eyes of official Ankara, their invisibility did not translate into resignation. They never stopped rebuilding and found ingenious ways of doing so quickly, cheaply, and efficiently. They had little to lose, so they took various degrees of risk as they bet on legal delays and the impossibility of implementing the plan uniformly across the city. In fact, Fehmi Yavuz, who was both a professor of planning and an insightful observer of Ankara's development in those years, noted that "they learned to gauge the government's actions so well that they often shrewdly chose to build their homes on national holidays when the limited police force would be busy keeping vigil on ideologically charged celebratory pageants."[22] Their stubborn ways and clandestine activities eventually paid off. In their struggles to hold their ground, the squatters learned to organize, so that when the opportunity arose, they turned their voices into votes that forever changed urban politics, thereby forcing the authorities to recognize them.[23]

In Ankara, where the population was undergoing unceasing expansion, many similar settlements gradually encroached on the plan, primarily on comparably contested properties. Those slated for extensive land uses and on which no immediate action was taken following expropriation were particularly open both to squatter settlements and other illicit uses (Figure 8). Such uses were known to the authorities, who sometimes could not and at other times would not do much to stop them. In a city where the male popula-

tion was double that of the female population, Bentderesi was tac-
itly zoned for prostitution, and the nearby Hacettepe was where
gangs and pimps conducted business.[24] All constituted shadow
landscapes that according to court documents were, without a
doubt, legal entities, but officially they did not exist. Everyone knew
where they were, but no map defined them. Born out of the dis-
placement of the *vakif* institution and its legal framework, they
seemed to belong to nobody and were therefore open to incursions
by everybody. Not surprisingly, then, it was in these shadow land-
scapes, these spaces with a dual character, that rich and poor, sacred
and profane, intentional and accidental were thrown together in
unprecedented ways. And it was in these shadow landscapes where
the very principles of Ankara's master plan, which demanded the
separation of uses and users, were challenged and ultimately sub-
verted by the actions of those on both ends of the power spectrum.

Notes

1. F. G. "Sogukkuyu Ne Olacak?"*Ankara Haftasi,* Mar. 12, 1934: 4.
2. Rusen Keles, *Eski Ankara'da bir Sehir Tipolojisi* (Ankara: Ankara
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1971), p. 5.
3. For the zoning specifications of the Ankara Master Plan, see Hermann
Jansen, *Ankara Ili Imar Plani* (Istanbul: Alaadin Kiral Matbaasi, 1937). Some of the
ideas in this plan were later suggested for implementation in other cities. (See *1580
Sayili Belediyeler Kanunu,* Resmi Gazete, Apr. 3, 1930.)
4. Hermann Jansen had worked under Camillo Sitte in his formative
years. As a professor of architecture and urban design, he was most probably ac-
quainted with the issues raised by the modernist vanguard in CIAM and innova-
tive large-scale housing projects built in Germany at this time. In his own approach,
Jansen also promoted the extensive use of urban greenbelts and emphasized the
importance of sunlight and fresh air. His plans for Ankara demonstrate his interest
in making these resources accessible to all. Jansen differed from the visions of the
modernist vanguard in his ambivalent approach to industry and traffic and his reti-
cence to make provisions for the expansion of either. The report that accompanied
his final revisions to the master plan also reveals that he envisioned Ankara as a town
of single or row houses and walk-up apartments. He was opposed to the kind of
residential density typical of high-rise apartments that he referred to as residential
barracks, clearly invoking the imagery of the Mietkaserne in Berlin at the turn of
the century. For further information, see also Gönül Tankut, *Bir Baskentin Imari:
Ankara, 1929–1939* (Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1990).
5. From the report that accompanied the foundation charter of the Ankara
Master Planning Bureau (*1351 Sayili Ankara Sehri Imar Müdüriyeti Teskilat ve
Vazaifine Dair Kanun,* Resmi Gazete, May 28, 1928).
The problem of forming an appropriate executive organization to build a
model capital in Ankara had been the agenda of the National Assembly since the
earliest days of the republic. Transcriptions of debates in the National Assembly
indicate that the shortcomings of the Ankara Municipality as the executive body had
been brought up as early as 1924. Although the foundation charter of the Ankara
Municipality was modeled on that of Istanbul, it completely eliminated citizen par-

ticipation. (See *417 Sayili Ankara Sehremanetinin Teskilat ve Vazaifine Dair Kanun,*
Resmi Gazete, Feb. 16, 1924.) This was intended to be an expedient measure that
also gave the central government more control over local processes and the shaping
of the new city. However, government intervention, still couched in terms of local
government laws, was rather indirect. The lack of funds and autonomy slowed the
process of clearing land and building. Frustrated by the red tape that surrounded
these processes, the republican administrators established the Ankara Master Plan-
ning Bureau at about the time that the competition for the city's plan came to
completion in May 1928. The bureau, which became operational in fiscal year 1929,
was an autonomous state agency that overrode the authority of the city government
and responded directly and exclusively to the minister of the interior.
6. The expropriation of land from individuals also took place under very
restricted terms. Although some payment was made to property owners in affected
areas, in most cases appeals were not allowed. The first large-scale expropriation,
which affected four million square meters of urban land and took place in 1925,
did not leave any room for appeals but paid the original property owners a fair
amount of money (*583 Sayili Ankara'da Insaasi Mukarrer Yeni Mahalle için Muktezi
Yerleri ile Bataklik ve Merzagi Arazinin Sehremanetince Istimlakine Dair Kanun,*
Resmi Gazete, Mar. 24, 1924). A few interesting anecdotes that demonstrate the
confusing situations that arose from expropiations that took place in marginal
neighborhoods are offered in Ibrahim Ögretmen's *Ankara'da 158 Gecekondu* (An-
kara: Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1957).
What distinguished the cases of the Pious Foundations and the Treasury was
that rather than being governed by the regular expropriation laws, the expropriation
of these properties was explicitly written into the charter of the Bureau in its ninth
clause as a distinct kind of transaction. Moreover, although neither the foundations
nor the Treasury was paid in exchange for the seizure of its property, revenues that
were generated from the properties' resale or lease were funneled to the bureau to
use at its discretion. Eventually, this mode of expropriation was extended to all mu-
nicipalities, entitling all cities to request property from the Pious Foundations at no
cost under the Municipalities Law (*1580 Sayili Belediyeler Kanunu*).
7. Nazif Öztürk, *Türk Yenilesme Çerçevesinde Vakif Müessesi* (Ankara:
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1995), pp. 136, 203, 427–29, 443–45.
8. Ekrem Ergüven, *Sükrü Kaya Sözleri ve Yazilari, 1927–1937* (Istanbul:
Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1937), pp. 193–94.
9. *Vakif* (pl. *evkaf, vakiflar*) is an Arabic term that means "to seize and
bring to a standstill." More commonly, it is used to describe a general category of
institutions most closely translated into English as "pious foundations" or "endow-
ments." Basically, *vakif* entails the setting aside of a revenue-generating property
(buildings or land) as an endowment to support some religious or charitable ser-
vice for perpetuity. In theory, according to Islamic law, all assets of the *vakifs* are
immune to transfers of ownership that could be detrimental to their survival be-
cause, according to the *shariya* (religious law), they are sacrosanct and inalienable.
Taken out of the sphere of commercial transactions, they are in effect at a legal
standstill. For more information on *vakifs,* see John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction
to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
10. Ottoman sultans and state officials commonly founded several *vakifs* in
different cities to encourage urban development or to ensure the provision of vari-
ous urban services. However, the practice was not limited to the ruling elite: Local
notables also established more modest *vakifs* in their own towns. Already by the
seventeenth century, there was a proliferation of different types of *vakifs* on Otto-
man lands, classified according to size, type of endowment, title of the founder, and
so on. *Vakifs* were institutions with a dual character that were established by pri-
vate initiative to serve public needs. For a brief discussion of the Ottoman imperial

vakifs, see Howard Crane, "The Ottoman Sultan's Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy," in *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order,* ed. I. Bierman, R. Abou El-Hajj, and D. Preziosi (New Rochelle, NY: A. D. Caratzas, 1991). In both *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* and his unpublished dissertation on the history of Ottoman *vakifs,* "Vakif Administration under the Ottoman Ministry of Imperial Religious Foundations, 1839 to 1875" (Ph.D. diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 1980), Barnes provides a thorough history of the development and proliferation of this ubiquitous Ottoman institution.

11. Halim Baki Kunter, "Türk Vakiflari ve Vakfiyeleri Üzerine Mücmel bir Etüd," *Vakiflar Dergisi* No. 1 (Ankara: Vakiflar Umum Müdürlügü Nesriyati, 1938): 105.

12. *Cumhuriyetten Önce ve Sonra Vakiflar: Tarih Kongresi ve Sergisi Münasebetile Turk Tarih Kurumuna Takdim Olunan Rapor* (Istanbul: Vakiflar Umum Müdürlügü, 1937).

13. Çelik Resit, *Vakiflar Genel Müdürlügündeki Kayitlara Göre II. Mesrutiyet Döneminden Cumhuriyetin Ilanina Kadar Tesis Edilen Egitim ve Kültür Müesseleri* (unpublished expertise thesis, Ankara: TC Basbakanlik Cumhuriyet Arsivi Daire Baskanligi, 1986), p. 12.

14. Nazif Öztürk, *Türk Yenilesme Çerçevesinde Vakif Müessesi* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yayinlari, 1995), pp. 66–75.

15. The most important law that undermined the legal tenets of the *vakif* system was the Turkish Civil Code that discontinued the *vakif* as an institution *(Türk Medeni Kanunu,* Resmi Gazete, Oct. 4, 1926). The administration of all existing *vakif* already established was given to the Vakif General Directorate, which was directly accountable to the prime minister.

16. Among the most influential laws were *748 Sayili Mazbut Vakif Tasinmazlarin Kamu Kuruluslari ve Menafi-i Umumiyeti Hadim Müesseselerine Ihalesiz Satislarina Dair Kanun,* Resmi Gazete, Feb. 22, 1926; *Türk Medeni Kanunu,* Resmi Gazete, Oct. 4, 1926; and *2762 Sayili Vakiflar Kanunu,* Resmi Gazete, June 5, 1935).

17. F.G., "Sogukkuyu Ne Olacak?" p. 6.

18. Ekrem Ergüven, *Sükrü Kaya Sözleri ve Yazilari 1927–1937* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1937), pp. 132–33.

19. "Ruhsatsiz Binalar," *Hakimiyeti Milliye,* Oct. 18, 1929.

20. F.G., "Sogukkuyu Ne Olacak?"p. 6.

21. Ibid.

22. Fehmi Yavuz, *Ankara'nin Imari ve Sehirciligimiz* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayinlari, 1952), p. 71.

23. Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 92, 205, 213.

24. Ankara'nin Büyüyüsü, *Hakimiyeti Milliye,* Oct. 29, 1933; "Bayram Yolculari," *Hakimiyeti Milliye,* Mar. 2, 1934; and Mehmed Kemal, *Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara* (Istanbul: Çagdas Yayinlari, 1983), pp. 81–88.