

Urban Planning in Istanbul in the Early Republican Period

Mehmet Murat Gül & Richard Lamb

To cite this article: Mehmet Murat Gül & Richard Lamb (2004) Urban Planning in Istanbul in the Early Republican Period, Architectural Theory Review, 9:1, 59-81, DOI: [10.1080/13264820409478507](https://doi.org/10.1080/13264820409478507)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264820409478507>



Published online: 28 Jul 2009.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 178



View related articles [↗](#)

URBAN PLANNING IN ISTANBUL IN THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD

HENRI PROST'S ROLE IN TENSIONS AMONG BEAUTIFICATION, MODERNISATION AND PEASANTIST IDEOLOGY

MEHMET MURAT GÜL AND RICHARD LAMB

This paper examines an important period in the modernisation and westernisation of Istanbul associated with the works of the French urbanist, Henri Prost, conventionally portrayed as a visionary figure in the westernisation of Istanbul and its physical transformation into a modern and secular city in the early republican period. Despite his not being the winner of an urban design competition conducted for the purpose, Prost was invited by Atatürk to develop a Master Plan for Istanbul. The government tolerated and encouraged works that were largely cosmetic and achieved little in terms of modernisation. Prost may have been acceptable to the republican elites and the peasantist ideology that supported it, aiming to beautify the city and make it more motor car friendly, but not to put in place wholesale interventions. Later changes in economic and political structures rekindled his projects, but when they were completed much later, the cultural and political transformation that had occurred disassociated them from Prost's initial vision.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, modern Turkish history has been rewritten by scholars from various disciplines. This trend provides a large number of opportunities, which previously did not exist in the official historiography, to re-assess and to better understand the social, cultural, political and other aspects of the early republican period of Turkey. Despite the increased number of well-structured and scholarly-presented analytical studies in other areas, the urban redevelopment of Istanbul, both in the early republican era and the 1950s, still remains a neglected subject in the area of urban and architectural history of Turkey. While several scholars have produced some fascinating writing relating to early Republican Architecture and the creation of Ankara, the transformation of Istanbul still needs a detailed analysis.¹ Today, a limited number of journal and newspaper articles, a large number of academic or professional panel submissions, mostly unpublished, and several descriptive studies provide accounts of the urban transformation of Istanbul in a chronological manner. Such accounts, however, have failed to give a critical analysis of the developments of urban planning in the early

Architectural Theory Review

republican era and the processes which brought them about.²

Given the above, this paper aims to examine an important period in the modernisation and westernisation of Istanbul that is conventionally associated with the work of the French urbanist, Henri Prost. At the end of the Ottoman domination of Turkish political life, by which time sentiments had already changed to welcome a westernisation of formerly cherished Ottoman principles and processes, the republican era swept away the remnants of the Empire. It was at this time that Prost was invited, despite not being the winner of the urban design competition conducted for the purpose, to develop a master plan for Istanbul.

Today, after decades, fascinating questions remain. Why did the regime choose Prost from amongst others, some seemingly more skilled in strategic planning? Why did it tolerate and encourage work over many years that was, in the end, largely cosmetic, and which achieved little in terms of the modernisation of Istanbul? Why did the outcome and implementation of many of Prost's plans wait for decades to be put in place? Prost is conventionally portrayed as a visionary figure in the westernisation of Istanbul, and a major player in the physical transformation of the city into a modern and secular one. It is possibly that he was acceptable to the republican elites and the peasantist ideology that supported it, as one who would beautify the city and made it more motor car friendly, but did not put in place wholesale interventions nor any substantial modernisation projects, apart from the demolition of some traditional areas to make way for proposed boulevards and plazas. It was subsequent changes in the economic and political structures of Turkey that rekindled an interest in his, at that time dead, projects for the modernisation of the city of Istanbul. When the projects were subsequently completed, the cultural and political transformation that had in the meanwhile occurred disassociated these projects from Prost's initial vision.

Kemalist Reforms and Ottoman Resonances in the Redevelopment of Istanbul

The First World War concluded with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the invasion by British, French, Italian and Greek forces of some parts of Anatolia, the only remaining part of the former Ottoman Empire under Turkish control. A national struggle against the invaders was organised under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, a celebrated member of the Ottoman Army. Following a successful resistance by his forces, the occupying powers were forced to leave Turkey, and subsequently the new modern Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29th October, 1923. With this event the modernisation of Turkey that began in the late-Ottoman period embarked upon a new era, establishing a program of transformation to change totally the institutional structure of Turkish society. The major aims of these reforms were the destruction of the political figures and institutions of the Ottoman Empire, and, perhaps most significantly, the construction of a Turkish nation.

The political reforms had started prior to the proclamation of the Republic, with the abolition of

the Ottoman Sultanate in 1922. The Caliphate was abolished in 1924, religious schools and courts were closed, and the juridical role of the *mufti*, the religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, was abolished. Members of the Ottoman dynasty were forbidden to live in the new Turkish republic, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations was abolished. Legislative reforms included the adoption of the Swiss civil legal code, the Italian penal code and a new commercial code based largely on the German and Italian commercial codes.³

The republican modernisers, like their Ottoman ancestors, aimed at a top-to-bottom program of social transformation. It was to be carried out by a Turkish elite led by Mustafa Kemal, in which the exiting social order, based on traditional Islamic institutions, was seen to be the major reason for the backwardness of the country. "Achieving the level of contemporary civilisations" (*Muassır Medeniyetler Seviyesine Erişmek*) and "shaking off the oriental malaise" (*Şarklıktan Kurtulmak*) were the two major ideological targets and motivations behind the Kemalist reforms.

The model of reform was based on modern Western civilisation, and similar to other modernisation processes experienced throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries elsewhere, the adoption of recognisable symbols of Western civilisation, such as dress, lifestyle, eating habits and the participation of women in daily social life, became the primary tools of the Turkish modernisers in the late-1920s and early 1930s. These changes included replacing the old lunar calendar with the Gregorian Calendar, abandoning the use of Arabic script in favour of the Latin alphabet, introducing metric measures, introducing a new law that forced all Turkish citizens to adopt surnames, instituting Sunday as the official day off instead of the Muslim Friday, opening public beaches to women and inaugurating the first Miss Turkey contest. Yet perhaps no other reform represents the iconoclastic nature of the republican reforms as much as 'The Hat Act' (*Şapka Kanunu*) of 1925. As a result of the implementation of this law, traditional and religious attire such as the fez and the turban were outlawed.⁴

Both architecture in micro-scale and urban design in macro-scale were among the most important visual indicators of cultural modernisation in the early republican period. A new architectural language based on the international Modern Movement and the reorganisation of urban spaces in accordance with the new secular social order, were the key areas to which the republican regime paid great attention. The creation of Ankara, the so called 'heart of the nation' (*Ulusun Kalbi*), as the modern capital city of the young republic, was amongst the primary concerns of the government. This, it must be said, was also one of the reasons for the decade-long inaction surrounding the redevelopment of Istanbul.

In contrast to Istanbul's sacred character as the centre of the now abandoned Caliphate and Sultanate, Ankara became the symbol of the heart of the new, secular and republican nation. Ankara was the city of the future, whilst Istanbul, with all its imperial and dynastic traditions and cosmopolitan character, was seen as the city of the past.⁵ Its cul-de-sacs, crooked street pattern, timber buildings and cosmopolitan character, symbolised the physical and social corruption and degradation of the old system, whereas Ankara, with its modern buildings, wide boulevards, parks, and most importantly, a silhouette without

Architectural Theory Review

minarets,⁶ was the symbol of the modern and secular hub of the new Turkish nation. In this political climate, the Kemalist regime paid its full attention, and enthusiastically directed all its resources, toward creating its new capital city.

Following an international design competition, a German planner, Hermann Jansen (1896-1947), was commissioned to prepare a new city plan for Ankara.⁷ Influenced by Camillo Sitte's planning principles and the English Garden City movement, Jansen's plan projected major axes and open public spaces for Ankara. The creation of several substantial public spaces including large parks, entertainment venues, modern hotels and other outdoor activity places, were the most significant characteristics of the planning process of the new capital. Gençlik Parkı (Youth Park), 19 May Sports Stadium, Atatürk Orman Çiftliği (Atatürk Model Farm and Forest) and the Çubuk Dam picnic areas were major public recreational areas which were developed in the 1930s, and had important ritualistic functions to represent the youth and healthy nature of the republic.⁸ In particular, the Youth Park of Ankara became a 'social school' in terms of transforming the nation in accordance with modern and secular codes.⁹

At the same time, Istanbul lost the political privileges that had developed during its 2000-year history, closely followed by the loss of its administrative and governing functions, and a sharp decline in its economic power. Under the nationalistic rhetoric of the new regime, non-Muslim merchants and bankers, who were responsible for the majority of the commercial activity in the city, began to leave Istanbul. This change in the socio-economic and demographic structure of Istanbul was in harmony with one of the major aims of the Turkish Republic: the creation of a national bourgeoisie.

Competition for Visions of Istanbul

Following the creation of modern Ankara, the Republican Government turned its attention to rebuilding Istanbul according to Kemalist ideology. The Government organised a limited international competition in 1933 to select an urban planner to transform Istanbul into a modern city;¹⁰ this agenda was partly already well advanced through the transformation of values in Istanbul as a result of the cultural exchange it had experienced with the West during the Ottoman era. Following an extensive investigation, four Western urban planners were chosen by the Government. Donald Alfred Agache, Jacques-Henri Lambert, Hermann Ehlgötz and Henri Prost were invited to compete.¹¹ Prost, who was the Chief of the Planning Bureau of Paris, declined the invitation, but the other three planners prepared proposals for the city. The conservation of monuments, improvements in hygiene and the establishment of an effective urban transportation network were the common objectives of all three urban designers.¹² Of the three schemes, Ehlgötz's proposal was the least intrusive in terms of the demolition of urban fabric in the historical core of the city; the other competitors proposed major demolitions to open large boulevards. Ultimately, Ehlgötz's proposal won the competition, but it was not implemented.¹³

Separately from the urban design competition organised by the government, Le Corbusier made a

submission to the Turkish Embassy in Paris in 1933 expressing his interest in creating an urban plan for Istanbul. A book and several preliminary design sketches accompanied his application. The originals of his submission, such as the covering letter that he claimed he had written to Atatürk, and other attached documents have unfortunately been lost. The official correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Presidency of Republic of Turkey, however, give some important hints about the details of Le Corbusier's application.¹⁴ He emphasised the significance of the old city, its character and the importance of its preservation. According to Le Corbusier, the old city within the city walls should have been preserved as it was, with new development areas located outside the Theodosius Walls towards the west. His suggestion was contrary to the principles proposed by the three candidates of the urban design competition, in terms of their vision for the historic core of Istanbul. While three winning contestants (with the exception of the Ehlgötz) proposed large-scale interventions, with proposals to open large boulevards within the historic peninsula, Le Corbusier advocated the conservation of the existing pattern and street structure of historic central Istanbul.

Although Le Corbusier's proposal was seen as inappropriate in relation to the government's agenda, no evidence survives of the government's response to the legendary French architect and urbanist. Le Corbusier himself later explained the reasons for the rejection of his proposal, namely, that the conservation of the character of the old city, without any intervention, contradicted the spirit of the Republican regime, which was trying to break traditional loyalties and create a secular and modern nation-state.¹⁵

Martin Wagner, a prominent German architect, urban planner and theorist, was another important figure of urban planning in Istanbul in the 1930s. His special interest was the production of low-cost housing, ameliorating the social and hygienic requirements that were lacking in the speculative building typical of large nineteenth century cities such as Istanbul. After the urban design competition in 1933, Wagner was invited to Istanbul by the Government to provide his recommendations on solving the urban problems of the city.

In parallel with his previous work and interests, Wagner focused on Istanbul's main problems, including traffic, financial resources and the relationship of the city centre to its hinterland. He prepared a report and submitted it to the Municipality of Istanbul, and published a series of articles in the journal of *Arkiitekt* regarding the problems of Istanbul.¹⁶ He also gave a lecture, titled "Economic and Technical Aspects of Urbanism," at the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul. He proposed to employ principles derived from his previous practice and theoretical experience in Berlin in proposals for Istanbul. Unlike his predecessors, who advised the late Ottoman governments, and in particular Henri Prost who followed him, an analysis of the urban problems of Istanbul, together with its environs, based on population, transportation statistics and maps, were a major aspect of his contribution (Fig. 1).

Wagner's report and predictions had the potential to engage directly one of the most serious problems of development in Istanbul, and one already in evidence in the late Ottoman period, that is, the flow

of population from the agrarian lands of the countryside into the city, with its attendant impacts on services, amenity and existing building stock. His proposals, however, as others before it and since, remained on paper.




Figure 1, Wagner's inner-city circulation analysis
(Source: *Arkitekt*, 1937)

The Prost Era: 1936-50 Plans without Resolutions

Neither the proposals that emerged from the urban design competition, nor Wagner's predictive works relating to the impending population pressures on Istanbul, were apparently accepted by the government as an appropriate approach for transforming Istanbul into a modern metropolis. The official reasons for the rejection of Ehlgötz's proposal were never declared. It is possible that, like Le Corbusier's suggestion, his proposal, which made provisions for preserving the historic character of the city and limited its effects to only relatively minor alterations to the existing city pattern, was also found to be contradictory to the ideology of the Kemalist regime.

Given that the government had now turned its attention to the modernisation of the greatest city in Turkey, and apparently rejected the relatively benign proposals of Le Corbusier and Ehlgötz as far as their impact on the historical peninsula was concerned, it seemed that the time was ripe for a more radical approach. Henri Prost, who had declined to participate in the urban design competition of 1933, was invited once again by the personal directive of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to prepare the master plan for Istanbul.¹⁷ On this occasion he accepted the commission.

Prost, a graduate of the Ecole Nationale de Beaux Arts de Paris, participated in a large number of city planning projects in various cities across Europe. He also received the 'Prix de Rome' in 1902, and studied at the French Institute in the Villa Medici between 1903 and 1907.

During his time in Rome, he visited Istanbul in 1904 and worked on the Hagia Sophia, preparing surveys of the building. Prost, together with Agache and several young architects, participated in the master plan work of Paris under the supervision of Hénard Eugène. His first professional success as an urban designer was the first prize awarded to him for the international design competition for the city of Antwerp in 1910. Subsequently, between 1913 and 1924, Prost prepared urban planning designs for a number of French colonial cities in North Africa including Casablanca, Fez, Rabat, Meknes and Marrakech. He participated in several urban design projects on the Cote d'Azur, including those for the cities of Toulon, Saint Tropez and Saint Raphael in the mid-1920s. In 1928 Prost returned to Paris as a member of a new urban planning committee. Under the guidance of Prost and Raoul Dautry, this committee prepared a master plan for Paris in 1934, which was approved in 1939.¹⁸

Prost arrived in Istanbul on 15th May, 1936, and stayed in his post as the Chief Planner of Istanbul until the Municipality of Istanbul terminated his contract following the elections in 1950. During his fourteen year stay in Istanbul he prepared a master plan for Istanbul, a master plan for Galata/Beyoğlu districts in 1939, a master plan for the Asiatic side of Istanbul in 1940, a beautification project for Büyükdada in 1941 and a number of projects for several other parts of Istanbul.

Prost started his work by preparing a series of notes on and sketches of the city. He prepared a total of fifty-one notes between 1936 and 1938, with the purpose of analysing the problems of the city and informing the government officials about these problems.¹⁹ Subsequent to a preliminary assessment period, Prost completed his Master plan for Istanbul in 1937 (Fig. 2). The Master plan, in accordance with the direction of President İnönü, was endorsed on 30th June, 1939, by the Directorate of Construction and Development of the Ministry of Public Works.²⁰ The principal features of Prost's proposal provided for a modern road network, industrial sites on either side of the Golden Horn and an archaeological park, in addition to other parks and public promenades.

In fact, the general character of Prost's plan was consistent with the previous proposals prepared during the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire started seeking to expand its experience and contact with the West and to pursue the modernisation of Ottoman institutions, administration and the built environment. Like previous planning attempts, the creation of wide boulevards to connect the major centres of the city was also a primary goal of Prost's master plan. In this regard, Prost projected several large boulevards in the manner of Haussmann's Paris, in addition to viaducts, bridges and tunnels, in order to establish a modern road network that was based on vehicular transportation (Fig. 3). All these large boulevards were projected for a city that had, in 1937, a total of only 959 private motor vehicles.²¹ Prost described the nature of his Master Plan for Istanbul as follows:



Figure 2, Prost's Master Plan
(Source: Mimar Sinan University,
Department of Restoration Archives)



Figure 3, Atatürk Boulevard
(Source: *Güzelleşen İstanbul, İstanbul, 1943*)

The approved Plan for the redevelopment of Paris establishes public transportation of six million people by auto-routes. My proposal for Istanbul is more modern. Because according to this plan the city will be networked by motorways.²²

Beside this, the wide boulevards, free recreation areas and public promenades (*espaces libres*) represented the other significant aspect of Prost's Master Plan. This was a new terminology in Turkish urban planning context. In the traditional Turkish urban pattern, public spaces were quite limited in extent and mainly formed around the great mosques. Although Istanbul had a couple of squares and grassy places for picnics, their function in Turkish social life was limited and different than in the Western tradition. The parks and public promenades projected in Prost's plan, however, aimed to provide open spaces for the public in parallel with the secular character of the new Republic. In contrast to the traditional Islamic social structure, Prost's plan was aiming to provide open spaces in which both sexes could participate equally in the new social life of secular Turkey.

Despite Prost's long-term service as the sole urban planner of Istanbul, the provisions of his Master Plan were only partly executed during the period between 1939 and 1950. Except for the construction of several roads, parks and the demolition of some of the old areas to create public squares, the remaining principal works that were proposed in Prost's Master Plan were not implemented until the time of the Democrat Party administration between 1956-1960.

It is interesting to note that even the partially executed work was celebrated and promoted by the Government in the name of the modernisation of the city. The demolition of the Eminönü Square appears as a very cogent example in this context. Prost's proposal for this new square was not fully

implemented: the demolitions were executed, but the new modern blocks remained only as proposals. At the end of the project the 'ugly buildings' around the Yeni Mosque were removed and a large space was created. Yet the space was not a square, as it is understood in the Western context, as it was not defined by any sort of architectural or urban elements. Nevertheless, it was promoted in the official propaganda materials published by the Municipality as a great success in the name of the modernisation of Istanbul (Figs. 4, 5 and 6).



Figure 4: Prost's proposal for the Eminönü Square
(Source: Mimar Sinan University, Department of Restoration Archives)



Figure 5: The areas to be demolished in Eminönü Square
(Source: *Güzelleşen İstanbul*, İstanbul, 1943)



Figure 6: The Eminönü Square after the demolitions
(Source: *Güzelleşen İstanbul*, İstanbul, 1943)

Architectural Theory Review

Financial difficulties during World War II played an important role in the delay or lack of implementation of Prost's plan. The majority of the works prescribed in the Master Plan were costly projects, and neither the Municipality of Istanbul nor the Government was able to finance them under the economic conditions of the war. The Mayor of Istanbul, Lütfi Kırdar, explained the reasons for the delay in a press conference held in 1945:

The World War that started on 1 September 1939 ended on 2 September 1945—on its sixth anniversary. It over-turned the life and order of the whole world. The countries that did not enter the war were also affected by this six year long tragedy. . . . In this context, naturally, the city of Istanbul was also damaged by the war. At the beginning of the last month of 1938, when I was appointed as the Governor and Mayor of Istanbul, we had to either postpone or only partially execute the work that we have imagined for this city, which is the largest in the homeland and the most beautiful in the world. For this reason I am sure you understand that I feel a deep anxiety and grief.²³

Severe financial restrictions, however, were not the only reasons for the delay of the implementation of Prost's plan. The preliminary and unfinished nature of the Master Plan and other documents prepared by Prost were other important reasons for the delay. Some of the proposed roads, for example, were neither well designed nor feasible. In particular, the topography of the city was not always considered, and the execution of some of the proposed roads would have required extensive and unnecessary demolition, which was almost impossible to carry out under the difficult economic conditions of the 1940s. The quality of the documentation, in particular many working drawings that were to be the basis of construction, suggests that a considerable number of the projects making up the total plan package were still at a rudimentary stage, almost hypothetical in conception. Why was this so? The evidence suggests that despite the long tenure of Prost as a highly experienced urbanist at the helm, many of the details of his plan were still contested, or at least, not supported politically.

As has already been noted, previous planning for Istanbul had considered the issue of increasing population, but the Master Plan was not based on any sort of statistical analysis or data. During his fourteen years of duty, Prost did not use any basic calculation for the population growth of Istanbul. Perhaps more importantly, even though an extensive road network was the most significant feature of his Master Plan, Prost did not use any analytical data or estimation for the population trends or the demand for transport in the city. These shortcomings were also harshly criticised by the Revision Commission established by the Democrat Party administration after the 1950 elections to revise Prost's Master Plan. The Master Plan was found to be 'immature,' that is to say, unable to be implemented because of deficiencies in its strategic foresight.

Prost appears to have possessed all of the necessary skills as an urbanist, and had previously produced a substantial body of work, and had extensive experience in various contexts, particularly in the modernisation of traditional Muslim cities in French colonies. In Istanbul, by contrast, he worked for

fourteen years, and had only produced a very modest amount of work, most of which had little impact in terms of actual implementation. An explanation to be explored here is whether this may have been as a result of tensions between the rhetoric of the Republican regime regarding urban transformation, and another of its powerful institutions, the Peasantist ideology and its critique of urbanisation.

Competing Visions and Tensions: Prost's Plan and the Peasantist Ideology of the 1930s

Despite the economic conditions vis-à-vis implementation, it remains open to question why Prost's Master Plan did not go beyond a partly executed beautification project. Prost's Plan included establishing an extensive motorway network, destruction of the traditional urban pattern and providing secular public spaces in the city. The important question to be answered is: Why did the Government favour Prost, giving him an unprecedented opportunity to transform Istanbul in line with their political and social aspirations for the city? The first likely reason was Prost's previous experience in transforming traditional Islamic urban centres into modern and secular cities. His previous work in a number of North African cities under French mandate provided him with extensive experience in dealing with problems of the transformation of traditional cities. This was an important skill for the Kemalist regime, in line with their secular and iconoclastic practices.

As in Ankara, wide boulevards, parks, public promenades, entertainment venues and modern buildings were seen as the icons of the national ideals that were to be created by the republican regime. The slogan of the republic promoted the idea of being 'young' and 'healthy.' For the Kemalist ideology, these ideals were also the principal parameters for planning in Istanbul. Prost had the skills to bring Kemalist ideals to fruition in the built environment; the overall political and economic tendencies of the Kemalist Republic played an important role in commissioning Prost to carry out the re-development of Istanbul. Why then was Prost so ineffective in bringing this desired re-development about?

In the context of this period, there is a potential explanation for the ambiguous role and lack of effectiveness of Prost in the physical transformation of Istanbul into a modern city. This can be attributed to the pervasive Peasantist ideology of the 1930s, embraced by the Kemalist regime, but which was at the same time in fundamental conflict with urbanisation. This tension, and the ambivalent role of the government in supporting Prost's appointment, while providing insufficient support for implementing his plan, may help to explain why the plan languished until economic and political environment changed in the 1950s, along with the abandonment of Peasantist theories.

Peasantist Conservatism

In the 1930s, Turkey was overwhelmingly an agrarian country, with more than 80% of its population living in rural areas. Despite the efforts of the Kemalist regime to transform Turkey from a religious-oriented traditional society into a modern and westernised one, the influence of the regime's politics

in shaping society was limited, and only a small part of Turkish society living in the big cities was committed to supporting the new regime. The larger, remaining part of Turkey's populace was not aware of the Kemalist reforms, and was still deeply connected with traditional ways of life. The network of institutions and loyalties, especially religious ties that were created during the five centuries under Ottoman rule, remained strong among the majority in Turkish society.²⁴ This socio-cultural nature of Turkish society forced the Kemalist regime to take some essential measures to transform the country through applying a holistic approach. In Sibel Bozdoğan's words the "colonisation of the countryside" became one of the primary targets of the "civilizing mission" of the Kemalist regime.²⁵

The unexpected success of the opposition Free Party (*Serbest Fikra*), which was banned and then reinstated in 1930, and the Menemen incident²⁶ clearly showed the antagonism toward the Kemalist revolution in Turkish society at large. This was a significant warning to the Republican People's Party (RPP), the political party established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923. In response to these social developments, the RPP consolidated the mono-party system and took some social and political precautions against a counter-revolution at its third congress in 1931. The establishment, a year later in 1932, of so-called 'People's Houses' (*Halk Evleri*) was one of the measures decided at this congress. The regime needed an institution to propagate its principles and to educate the nation with the aim of "achieving the level of contemporary civilisations," associated with societies existing in the West. Under the strict authority of the RPP and in the name of 'unifying forces,' the Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocakları*), founded in 1912, which at that time in Turkey was the most important autonomous intellectual and political institution in existence, was disbanded and replaced by the establishment of People's Houses. The People's Houses were established as a propaganda institution to teach and spread the principles of the Kemalist revolution to the people.²⁷ They served as adult education centres, similar to state institutions in Germany, Italy and other European countries.²⁸ One of the central aims of the establishment of the People's Houses was to provide a modern and secular institutional replacement to the social role that the mosque had traditionally played in Turkish society.²⁹ The education of the nation, in the light of Kemalist principles, had thus begun to be implemented.

In 1940 the government established the 'People's Rooms' (*Halk Odaları*), a smaller version of the People's Houses, which were set-up in villages to provide educational facilities that would otherwise not be available in rural areas. The Peasantist Division (*Köycülüük Kolları*) was the most important amongst the nine different branches of the People's Houses. Their stated aim was "the development of social, medical, and aesthetic aspects of villages, while establishing mutual respect and solidarity with the dwellers."³⁰ Members of the Peasantist Divisions of the People's Houses organised visits to villages to spread the spirit of the regime.

A Classless society of Peasant Heroes, the Peasantist Critique of Urbanism and Promoting Agrarian Utopias

Apart from the rhetoric of the creation of a classless nation, one of the defining socio-political movements of the early Republican period of Turkey occurred amidst the reactionary political climate being championed by Peasantist ideology. Despite its significant impact on Turkish political thought in the 1930s and 1940s, the Peasantist movement is often neglected by scholars of the social and political history of Turkey. In this regard, and in the absence of detailed analytical socio-political studies, it may be difficult to comprehend the impact of Peasantist ideology in Turkish politics in the early Republican era, but as the political and social literature of the 1930s clearly point out, the Peasantist movement, at least at the intellectual level, was rather influential among the ruling elites of the RPP.

Turkish literature of the 1930s provides significant evidence of the importance of the ideals of Peasantist and classless society in Turkey. In the absence of a fully-fledged modern media, the republican novel became the most influential device in the 1930s for spreading the ideologies of the regime. In this perspective, the Kemalists used the novel extensively as a propaganda tool to strengthen its modern and secular policies among the varied strata of Turkish society. Accordingly, the Turkish novel in the early Republic *Ayaşlı ve Kiracıları* (Ayalı and His Tenants), written by novelist and Secretary-General of the RPP, Mahmud Şevket Esenal, successfully portrays the ideological atmosphere of Ankara in the 1940s. In this novel, which was awarded first prize in the RPP's novel competition, the longing for classless socio-cultural relationships is illustrated vividly. In the novel, despite their different socio-cultural backgrounds, a bureaucrat, a medical doctor, a shopkeeper and a working-class family live in harmony in an apartment block in 1940's Ankara. Similarly *Köy Hekimi* (The Village Doctor), a novel written by Burhan Cahit Morkaya in 1932, idealised an imaginary peasantry and their associated village life in line with the dominant rhetoric of the Peasantist movement in 1930's Turkey.

Apart from literary works, political writings in the 1930s provide another piece of evidence about the popularity of the Peasantist outlook among the political elites of early Republican Turkey. In particular, the articles published in *Ülkü*, the official publication of the Ankara People's House, and at the same time one of the most influential political and intellectual journals of the Kemal era, vividly illustrates the importance of the Peasantist phenomenon.³¹ Contributors to *Ülkü*, who were mostly leading members of the RPP and officials of the government, published a large number of articles regarding the benefits of a classless society and the importance of the village and peasantry in the development of the nation throughout the 1930s. The social and productive importance of the village and its contribution to national development were often expounded in the official declarations and political propaganda of the Turkish Government. In this respect the rhetoric of Mustafa Kemal, which proclaimed "the peasants are the real masters of the nation," was among the most used political slogans in the early Republican era.³²

Nusret Kemal Köymen, who was a prominent Peasantist ideologue of the Kemal era, portrayed the

importance of the village and its relation to the creation of a classless society in the following way:

Kemalism sees the village and the peasant as indispensable elements in society, while considering cities as the centre of districts, and it prioritises the development of social order among its other ideals. By not allowing the abuse of villagers and agriculture by cities and industry, by aiming to establish harmony and unity between agriculture and industry, and by trying not to cause conflict between the village and the city and agriculture and industry, Kemalism is the leading, and at the same time the most sophisticated, type of regime, which is progressing in the most positive way towards achieving a classless society.³³

Similarly to the aim of achieving a classless society, the criticism of urbanisation appears as one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Peasantist ideology. According to Turkish Peasantists, cities were the places of all kinds of degeneration, including class struggles, cosmopolitanism, unemployment, economic depression and social uprisings. As with other peasant-favouring ideologies, such as that of National Socialism in Germany, urbanisation was seen as the primary reason for all such social problems. Köymen argued that cities were the sources of all sorts of social, economic and political degeneration. The following passage from one of Köymen's articles in *Ülkü* vividly crystallises the Peasantist outlook:

The materialist viewpoint that scorched the world in the twentieth century with great elan after its emergence in the nineteenth century, is entirely an 'urbanist' idea. Its aim is based on the termination of villages, heaping people into big cities and organising them in highly complex collaborative divisions of labour. These divisions will be so complicated, that akin to millions of cogwheels in a factory, an individual's place in society will have no specific character. Similarly, a complex bureaucratic and technocratic hierarchy will manage the entire administrative and productive mechanism of the economy, and individuals will obey the orders that are given to them like soldiers in a great army. Work will be so complicated and power will be held by such a few people, that there will literally be no possibility for the phenomenon called 'democracy.' Though people will have plenty of spare time, there will be no spirit to benefit from it.

Although this urban utopia that is portrayed by materialism is completely imaginary, it should be noted that humanity currently follows this path in accordance with today's materialistic civilisation. Big cities such as London, New York, Moscow, Leningrad, Berlin, Vienna and Paris, which have gradually become metropolises, are, consciously or not, currently approaching this target in some ways.

On the other hand, at this point it should be noted that the latest economic misery (the Great Depression), and in particular the latest drought, have shaken all metropolises to their roots and have started to create a longing for villages and a craving for the smell of soil in the spirit of city dwellers.

Leaving aside for a moment the metropolises that are inspired by materialism only, big cities are currently providing ample captivity and suffering for their inhabitants. A great majority of the inhabitants of big cities who are open-minded and who have a clear conscience, complain. Their complaint is that there is no financial security in cities; there is always a risk of hunger and of being unemployed; souls are being blinded as people have become so distant from the tranquillity, quietness and beauty of nature; as a result of social control within the complex and crowded nature of the city being extremely limited, moral corruption is becoming common; children being forced into work at an early age weakens the family bond and control; the busy working style and noisy atmosphere of cities distort people's spiritual and physical health; the city dwellers who are bounded by financial and administrative ties are not always able to be independent and honest democratic citizens; the class distinction in cities has decreased the power of many capable people, and has given rise to dangerous conflicts; cities are enabling citizens to earn a living without being productive or doing a decent job; in big cities the expenses of transport, roads, water and sewerage, electricity, telephones, construction, maintenance, security and administrative services go beyond reasonable limits, and are causing tax rates to increase; city life causes many unnecessary costs and miseries...³⁴

In contrast to this portrayal of the city as a place of chaos and corruption, the Peasantists were portraying a utopian and imaginary picture of village life. According to the Peasantists, villages were genuine symbols of the noble, unharmed, intelligent and pragmatic character of the Turkish nation, and they were the essential motivator behind the development of Turkish identity. Therefore rural towns and villages should benefit from the same rights and privileges as those afforded to cities. There should be a common playing field between the living and learning standards of the cities and villages.³⁵ They believed that the living conditions of the villages should be improved to increase the productivity of villages and peasants. In this respect the Ottoman Empire was most criticised for favouring cities at the expense of villages. According to the Peasantists, there was a correlation between urbanisation and anti-national policies, and the Ottoman Empire was the symbol of this trend, which resulted in the loss of national culture.³⁶

In the light of the anti-urban bias of Peasantist ideology, keeping the peasants in their villages was a primary concern. Immigration from rural areas to the cities needed to be discouraged and prevented.³⁷ The attractions of city life and its ability to displace the peasants from their villages was seen as something that needed to be eliminated. In this respect, the Kemalists saw education as the most important factor in achieving their aspirations, yet they considered that the nature of this education should be different to that provided in the cities. In this ideological climate, a distinct style of education was formalised to provide children in the villages with pragmatic, practical knowledge through special educational organisations called the 'Village Institutes' (*Köy Enstitüleri*), as opposed to the classical education imparted to students in the cities.

It is an undeniable fact that the Village Institutes played an important role in the development of

Architectural Theory Review

the villages and peasants in the early Republican period. The major aim of these institutes was the development of the village, but this aim was to be achieved through an elitist perspective.³⁸ Keeping peasants in their villages and educating them in Kemalism were the major concerns of the Village Institutes. In other words, the aim was to develop the countryside, but the sub-text of the policy was that peasants should not leave their villages. In order to achieve this goal, special legislation was passed to prevent the immigration of peasants to big cities. The teachers of the Village Institutions, for example, were selected from the peasantry and were assigned to work for a minimum of twenty years in their designated villages. This aspect of keeping peasants in their villages has been heavily criticised by some Turkish writers. Kemal Tahir, for instance, denounced the Village Institutes in his novel *Bozkırdaki Çekirdek* in the following way:

It is not beneficial for us to change the village. It violates our harmony. Even though we wouldn't have been able to prevent its (the village's) transformation totally, we should have delayed it. We should have continued its self-contained nature for a while by keeping it away from modern technology as much as possible. These institutes would even have stopped villagers' visits to small towns; even those who usually go to the town to hoof their horses or cattle had to go to the teacher to ask for permission. If the German-Italian alliance had won the war, we would have instituted this system regardless of the villagers' wishes. It would have been perfect.³⁹

The End of the Peasantist Utopia

Despite the Peasantist ideologies of the 1930s and early-1940s, Turkey embarked upon a new political era after the end of the Second World War. Turkey did not participate in the war, but suffered from all its adverse impacts. The severe economic measures taken under the strict conditions of the war on the one hand, and the extreme secular practices of the government on the other, caused social dissatisfaction with the government amongst the various classes of Turkish society. As a result of this dissatisfaction, from 1946 onwards the RPP began to reconsider its economic and social policies.

First, the Party carried out a series of economic reforms in order to integrate Turkey into the post-war international economic system. The economic model based on absolute state intervention was abandoned. Consequently, in 1946 the Turkish Lira was devaluated 117 % against the US Dollar and imports were liberalised to a large extent.⁴⁰

Another important result of these liberal reforms of the Turkish economy was the increased economic and political relationship with the United States.⁴¹ In 1947 Turkey was granted US\$100,000,000 in loans for military purposes. Subsequently, Turkey became a member of both the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the International Monetary Fund in 1948 under the Marshall Plan. In July 1948, Turkey entered into a special agreement with the United States and started to receive American economic aid. Turkey's responsibility in this economic recovery programme was the improvement of its agricultural productivity so that it could supply crops to Western European

countries. The modernisation of agriculture and the establishment of an affective transportation network to increase accessibility to rural areas became the two major planks of the economic program supported by the Marshall Plan.

The introduction of modern farming techniques and especially the increase in the number of tractors being used in Turkish villages changed the demographic pattern of the countryside. The modern farming techniques thus introduced lessened the importance of manpower in villages, and in return the superfluous labour migrated to the big cities, in particular to Istanbul. As a result, Istanbul's population increased by 47% in the ten years between 1945 and 1955.⁴²

The economic reforms were accompanied by a group of radical socio-cultural reforms. These were mostly a reversal of the previous strict secular cultural practices of the Kemalist regime. The Village Institutes began to be criticised by the state and RPP officials as being nests of Communists, and from 1946 onwards began losing their distinctive status. The strict secular character of the regime was softened. Religious education was incorporated on a voluntary basis into the curriculum of primary schools, and finally, a faculty of theology was inaugurated at Ankara University in 1949.

These reforms signalled the collapse of the Peasantist utopia that had been created by the Kemalist intelligentsia in the early-1930s. The altered international geo-political reality and the war deeply affected Turkish society and the internal socio-economic life of the nation. As a result of these changes, Turkish peasants could not be persuaded to remain in their villages. Consequently, in the 1950s Turkey started to experience a rapid and unplanned migration from rural areas to the big cities. This rapid change in the demographic structure of Turkish society resulted in a series of problems, such as a housing crisis and the unbridled occupation of public land for shanty houses on the fringes of big cities, particularly in Istanbul.

In addition to these social and economic changes, Turkey also began to change its political structure in favour of introducing a multi-party system. The triumphant victory of Western democracies over the dictatorships of Germany and Italy in Europe and Japan in the Far East was echoed in Turkish politics: the RPP decided to allow opposition parties to function in the Turkish political system. This decision resulted in the victory of the Democrat Party at the polls in the May 1950 election. As a result of this victory, a new era began in Turkish political life, and the RPP, which was established by Mustafa Kemal and which had retained power for twenty-seven years, was removed from office. These political changes had far-reaching consequences for the stalled redevelopment of Istanbul.

Prost Under the Microscope

The duality of the rhetoric of progress and development in the city, and the simultaneous conservatism of the agrarian utopianism of the countryside, are part of the cultural landscape of Prost's involvement in Istanbul and his association with the Kemalist government. Although Atatürk died quite soon after Prost

was first appointed, Prost continued with his work for another twelve years. During that time Peasantist sentiments grew stronger, and it is possible that they played a part in limiting the implementation and perhaps even the development of initial plans for parts of the city. While the few examples of completed work were promoted by the government as examples of the triumphs of modernisation, it is probable that their impact on the general population was modest, and in the countryside, minimal. Simultaneously, the population of the city was growing out of control, despite the Peasantist rhetoric and educational programs that sought to prevent it. Prost's lack of knowledge of, or else his inability to use, information about projections for the demand for services and transport caused by emigration into the city led to a perception that his contribution to transforming the capital had failed.

Following extensive discussions, the General Assembly of the Municipality of Istanbul decided not to renew Prost's contract at its meeting on 26th December, 1950. This occurred soon after the elections of 1950 when the RPP lost the political struggle against the Democrat Party, the new political power in Turkey in the late-1940s and 1950s. The incomplete nature of his Master Plan after a fourteen-year period caused deep disappointment among the counsellors of the Assembly, and this played a key role in the termination of Prost's contract. Most of the members of the Assembly claimed that Prost had been commissioned for a period of three years only, but even after fourteen years he could not complete his tasks. It was considered, therefore, that granting an extension of his contract one more time would not bring any favourable outcome for the city.

Before the final decision, Prost was given a chance to speak in the meeting of the Assembly. In fact, it was not an invitation but a response to a request by Prost. Gökay, the new Governor and Mayor of Istanbul, claimed in the meeting that Prost had requested that he be allowed to talk to the Assembly to explain why he could not successfully implement the provisions of his Master Plan, and to explain the bureaucratic barriers that he had come across during his fourteen-year tenure in Istanbul. In his address, Prost generally complained about the lack of a special legislative framework for Istanbul. Prost argued that although he requested a modification in the existing Building, Roads and Expropriation Act of 1937, the Government did not take his request into consideration, and according to Prost, this was the main reason why his Master Plan did not achieve its desired outcomes.⁴³

At the end of the meeting, after listening to Prost, the Assembly overwhelmingly decided not to renew his contract. Only three out of the total of thirty-two members of the Assembly voted for an extension of his contract. By this resolution the Prost era that had lasted fourteen years ended and the French urban designer who was appointed by a special invitation of Atatürk was ejected from his post.

Modernisation, but later: Opportunites Lost

It can be argued that one of the major aims of Peasantist policy was the continuation of the overwhelmingly agrarian character of Turkish society, and from this perspective it is evident that urban planning policy was based on the discouragement of rural emigration to the cities. Even though there

is no direct evidence, it is likely that other proposals that were based on the estimation of Istanbul's future population of approximately 2.5 to 3.5 million were not seen as a sympathetic proposal by the political elites who were deeply influenced by Peasantist ideology.⁴⁴ In the political and ideological climate of the 1930s it is evident that, according to Kemalist ideology, Prost was preferable to Wagner or Lambert. But neither Prost nor the ideologists of the RPP estimated or properly foresaw the future development of Istanbul.

From the RPP's point of view, Prost's plan entirely avoided a consideration or even a calculation of a massive influx of emigrants to Istanbul, while at the same time it was shackled in effecting any radical transformation of the old city. The Master Plan, however, satisfied the rhetoric of the primarily urban Kemalist republicans. Whether the bureaucratic barriers that Prost claimed were thrown up against him were real, deliberate or implicit is not proven. However, by the end of his fourteen-year tenure, it had become clear that processes out of the control of the RPP's political capabilities had already transformed Istanbul. The Prost plan, even if implemented in its rudimentary form, could not have coped with the influx of population that Wagner foresaw, even though that was itself an underestimation.

In summary it can be speculatively argued that by appointing Prost, who executed a beautification project rather than a comprehensive urban plan, a critical opportunity was missed to establish a master plan for the city that was capable of absorbing mass migration from rural areas. If a proper urban redevelopment strategy based on an acceptable level of increase in the population of the city had been developed, Istanbul would have been better placed to solve the problems experienced in the 1950s, in a smoother manner and without significant damage to the heritage significance of the city. Prost's involvement in the redevelopment of Istanbul must be seen in the context of a contested vision for both Istanbul and the agrarian countryside of Turkey, politically dominated as it was by the RPP, who in turn determined what resources, support and power would be vested in Prost.

Notes

1. For a detailed history of the Republican Architecture see: Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001. For the urban history of Ankara see: Ali Cengizkan, *Modernin Saati. 20. Yüzyılda Modernleşme ve Demokratikleşme Pratiğinde Mimarlar, Kamusal Mekan ve Konut Mimarlığı*, Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği ve Boyut Yayın Grubu, 2002.
2. Despite the general negligence of the re-development of Istanbul, a recently completed PhD thesis provides a thorough account of the urban re-development of Istanbul in the 1940s and 1950s. For information on Prost's work in Istanbul see: İpek Akpınar, *The Rebuilding of Istanbul after the Plan of Henri Prost, 1937-1960: from Secularisation to Turkish Modernisation*, unpublished PhD thesis, Bartlett School of Graduate Studies, Department of Architecture, University College London, 2003.
3. For detailed information about the political events following the Turkish National War of Independence see: Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford, 1961.

4. Mustafa Kemal personally introduced the Hat Act in his famous Kasatmonu speech in August 1925 and later rationalised the reasons in his celebrated five-day speech in the Republican People's Party Congress in 1927: "Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a symbol of ignorance, fanaticism, abhorrent to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world, accordingly, among the other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilised mankind". Mustafa K. Atatürk, *Nutuk (A speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927)*, Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1963, p.738.
5. Ankara was portrayed as the new modern and secular centre of Turkey in many official publications. Most interesting examples of this representation were published in *La Turquie Kemaliste*, the official propaganda publication of the Government in English, French and German languages. One of its issues published in 1943 the contrast between Ankara and Istanbul was described in the following lines: "The average visitor who has spent a few days rushing from Hagia Sophia to the Great Walls and quickly around the old Hippodrome goes home to tell the folks about Turkey. He is no better equipped than the stay at homes who get their ideas out of novels about the sultans. For in Istanbul he has probably eaten Russian food, got his views on the government from a Greek porter, been guided by an Armenian courier, and concentrated exclusively on the relics of a past now intentionally forgotten by the average Turk, who looks ahead to better days. He who really wants to know the Turkey of today and tomorrow should take the first train for Ankara." "Ankara-Istanbul", *La Turquie Kemaliste*, 47, (1943): 38-39, cited in Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.67.
6. One of the visual characteristics of the new capital, as described by contemporaries in the 1930s, was the image of "the city without minarets." Ankara had not built a new mosque throughout the 27 year of the Kemalist rule, and the Hacı Bayram mosque which is located in the old city, remained as the single mosque of the city until the 1950s. This situation was changed by the construction of the Maltepe mosque under the Democrat Party regime after the elections in 1950. For a detailed information see: Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 91.
7. Professor J. Brix from the *Charlottenburg Technische Hochschule* in Germany, Leon Jaussely from the *École de Beaux Arts* in Paris and Herman Jansen, the winner of Berlin urban plan competition in 1928 were invited to the urban design competition of Ankara. For detailed information see: G. Tankut, "Jansen Planı: Uygulama Sorunları ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisinin Kent Planlama Yaklaşımı", in Y. Yavuz (ed), *Tarih İçinde Ankara*, Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 2001, pp.301-316.
8. Similar to other nationalist regimes of the 1930s, for example Italy and Germany, being youth and healthy were the symbols of the republican culture. In contrast to old, corrupted and unsound nature of the Ottoman Empire the young and healthy face of the republic is idealised by creating such public spaces. For detailed information about this symbolic spatial representation see: Bozdoğan, S., *Modernism and Nation Building*, pp.75-79.
9. Zeynep Uludağ, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Rekreasyon ve Gençlik Parkı Örneği", in *Bilanço '98: 75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı ve Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1998, pp.65-74.
10. To finance the expenses of the international design competition TL25,000 were transferred from the budget of the central government on 30 April 1933.
11. Although it has not been checked in any other sources, Pierre Pinon argues that another French planner Lamerquesquer was also invited to Istanbul but he did not participate in the competition. He cites this

- information from M. Eginard, "Pour un nouveau plan d'Istanbul, ou comment Jaques-Henri Lambert a pu participer au projet d'aménagement d'Istanbul in 1933" unpublished document, mentioned in Pierre Pinon, "Urban Transformation Between the 18th and 19th Centuries", *Rassegna*, 19. 72 (April, 1997): 52-61.
12. For the proposed schemes in the competition see: Alfred Agache, *Büyük İstanbul Tanzim ve İmar Programı*, İstanbul, İstanbul Belediyesi, 1934; Herman Ehlgötz, *İstanbul: Şehrinin Umumi Planı*, İstanbul, Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1934; Jacques Henri-Lambert, *İmar Raporu*, İstanbul: Milli Neşriyat Yurdu, 1933.
 13. For a detailed assessment of the jury for the urban design competition see: "İstanbul Şehir Planı, İmar Komisyonu Raporu", *Arkitekt*, 1 (January, 1935): 61-68.
 14. For the official correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Presidency see: Enis Kortan, *Le Corbusier Gözüyle Türk Mimarlığı ve Şebirciliği*, Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 1991, p.93-96.
 15. "If I had not committed the most strategic mistake of my life in the letter I wrote to Atatürk, I would be planning the most beautiful city of İstanbul, instead of my biggest competitor Henri Prost. In this notorious letter, I stupidly suggested to the greatest revolutionary hero of a new nation to let the city live as it was, in the dirt and dust of centuries". Published in Şemsi Demiren, "Le Corbusier İle Mülakat," *Arkitekt*, 19,11-12, (1949): 230-31. Le Corbusier's this statement has also been confirmed by Turgut Cansever in my interview with him. Cansever claims that in 1950, Le Corbusier made a similar kind of statement to Cansever in his office in Paris about his desire to undertake the master plan of İstanbul.
 16. *Şehir İnşaatında Sermayenin Rolü* (The role of the capital on the development of cities), *Şebircilikte Sermayenin Yanlış İdaresi* (The mismanagement of capital in urbanism), *İnşa Etmeyen Millet Yaşamıyor Demektir* (The nation does not construct means dead), *İstanbul Nüfusunun Yayılışı ve Münakele* (The distribution of İstanbul's population and transportation), *Cadde İnşaatı* (Construction of streets), *İstanbul'un Yol Meselesi* (The road problem of İstanbul), *Zelzele Mıntıkası İçin Düşünülmüş Mukavim Ev Projeleri* (The strength house projects for earthquake areas), *İstanbul Şehrinin Düzeltilmesi Meseleleri* (the Problems of the City of İstanbul's Rectification), *İstanbul'un Seyrüsefer Meselesi* (the Transportation Issue of İstanbul), *İstanbul'un Münakale Tarihi* (the History of İstanbul's Transportation), *İstanbul'un Nüfus Meselesi* (the issue of Population of İstanbul) and *İstanbul Havalisinin Planı* (the Plan of İstanbul and its Hinterland) were the titles of Wagner's articles published in *Arkitekt* between 1937 and 1937.
 17. Although it is mentioned that Atatürk personally wrote a letter to invite Prost to İstanbul in several sources, the way of his invitation has not been confirmed by archival documents. My search in the Republican Archives did not reveal a document to support this idea.
 18. For a detailed information about Henri Prost and his works see: Louis Hautecoeur. *L'Œuvre De Henri Prost, Architecture et Urbanisme*, Paris: Académie d'Architecture, 1960.
 19. The majority of these 51 notes were translated into Turkish and were published in two volumes by the Municipality of İstanbul in 1938 see Prost Henri, *İstanbul Hakkında Notlar*, İstanbul: İstanbul Belediye Matbaası, 1938.
 20. The Master Plan was presented to President İnönü on 5 June 1939 at a meeting at the Ministry of Public Works, and İnönü personally ordered for the approval of the Master Plan. It should be noted that there are a difference between the approval dates of the Master Plan Report and Maps. The master Plan Report was approved on 30 June 1939. However approval date on the maps indicates that it was approved one month earlier than the Report on 30 May 1939.

Architectural Theory Review

21. Martin Wagner, "İstanbul'un Münakele Tarihi," *Arkitekt*, 5-6 (1937): 145.
22. Henri Prost, *İstanbul Nazım Planını İzah Eden Rapor*, İstanbul: İstanbul Belediye Matbaası, 1937, p. 9.
23. Lütfi Kırdar, *Harp Yıllarında İstanbul'daki Faaliyetler, İstanbul Valisi ve Belediye Reisi Dr. Lütfi Kırdar'ın Eylül 1945 Basım Toplantısındaki İzabati*, İstanbul: İstanbul Belediye Matbaası, 1945, p. 3.
24. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 61.
25. Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p.51.
26. A religious based reactionary uprising occurred in 23 December 1930 in Menemen, a small town in Western Anatolia.
27. For detailed information about People's Houses see: Neşe G. Yeşilkaya, Halkevleri, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: 2 Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp. 113-118.
28. In the 1930s many Turkish intellectuals and officials were sent to Europe to visit and examine such adult education institutions. Accordingly it was claimed that the formation of the People's Houses was strongly influenced by both Soviet and Fascist Italian practices. For detailed information see İlhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey 1920-1940*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968.
29. Yeşilkaya, *Halkevi*, p. 114.
30. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey*, in *Turkey Before and After Atatürk*, Sylvia Kedourie (ed), London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, p.70.
31. In Turkey, the emergence of the peasantist activities goes back to the early twentieth century in the late Ottoman era. In parallel with the emergence of nationalistic political movements in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-18) in the Ottoman Empire, the peasantist activities took root as an ideological movement to support Turkish nationalism. In these years the curiosity for the villages and peasants started to be emphasised in the *Türk Yurdu*, one of the influential journals of the late Ottoman period. Yusuf Akçura and Helfand Parvus, who was one of the leaders in the activities of both the Russian and German Social Democratic Party, were prominent figures who emphasised the importance of the peasant support for the nationalist ideology in the *Türk Yurdu*. The *Köycüler Cemiyeti* (the Society of Villagers) established by a group of medical doctors to educate peasants in their struggle against the difficulties of village life and to provide medical assistance was the first peasantist organisation established in the late Ottoman Empire. Dr. Reşit Galip, who was among the founders of this association, became the Minister for Education in the RPP government in the early 1930s.
32. This reminds the peasantist rhetoric in the Third Reich Germany. According to Darré, the well-known Agricultural Minister of the National Socialist administration of Germany, the German peasants were the cornerstone of the German State and they were the most faithful sons, the strongest custodians and bearers of the healthy and spiritual inheritance of the German nation; Gustavo Corni, *Hitler and the Peasants*, Oxford: Berg, 1990, p.28.
33. Nusret K. Köymen, "Kemalizmin Hususiyeleri". *Ülkü*, 4, 42 (1936): 418.
34. Nusret K. Köymen, "Köyçülük Esasları", *Ülkü*, 4, 20 (1934): 149.
35. Nusret K. Köymen..., "Halk Seferberliğine Doğru", *Ülkü*, 1, 5 (1934): 355.
36. Ali, "Halkevleri Yıldönümünde," *Ülkü*, 1, 2 (1933): 108-109; Kadri K., "Anadolu'nun Doğusunda Dil Meselesi," *Ülkü*, 1, 5 (1933): 406; Abdullah Ziya, "İnkılap Kürsüsünde İsmet Paşanın Dersi," *Ülkü*, 3, 14 (1934): 83.
37. Abdullah Ziya, "Köy Mimarisi", *Ülkü*, 2, 7 (1933): 38; "Ülkü'nün Yazı Bölümleri," *Ülkü*, 3, 13 (1934): 79.

38. Asım Karaömerliođlu, *Köy Enstitüleri*, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: 2 Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p. 290.
39. Kemal Tahir, *Bozkırdaki Çekirdek*, İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976, p.33.
40. Zvi Yehuda Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968, p.144.
41. Economic and military were not the only areas that Turkey entered into special agreements with the USA, Turkish government increased good relationship with the United States in all areas, a Fulbright agreement, for example, for the exchange of scholars was signed between the government and the US on 27 December 1949; *Middle East Journal*, 4, (1950):218.
42. İstanbul's population was 860,538 in 1945. This figure reached 983,041 in 1950 and 1,268,771 in 1955 respectively. In other words İstanbul's population increased 47% in ten years between 1945 and 1955. It should be noted that the figure was 741,148 in 1935 reached 860,558 in 1945. Between 1935 and 1945 the population of the city increased only 20%. Source: *İstanbul Şehri İstatistik Yıllığı*, vol. 9 1947-1951, İstanbul Belediyesi.
43. Prost had already published the reasons of delay and difficulties of urban renewal of İstanbul in one of his report in 1948. In his report, similar to his answers in the Assembly meeting, the lack of sufficient numbers of technical personnel and the necessity of modifications in the legislative system were the main grounds of incomplete nature of his works in İstanbul. This report was re-published by the Municipality of İstanbul under the Democrat Party regime in 1951. For detailed information see: *İl ve Şehirde Geçen Yılda Neler Yapıldı ve Bu Yıl Neler Yapılıyor 1950-1951*, İstanbul: İstanbul Belediye Matbaası, 1951, pp. 45-47.
44. Lambert estimated İstanbul's population in the mid-term future as 2.5 million. Lambert, "İmar Raporu", p. 194. Similarly Wagner estimated the future population of the city approximately 3.5 million.