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To cite this article: Tim Jacoby (2006) Agriculture, the state and class formation in Turkey's First Republic (1923–60), The Journal of Peasant Studies, 33:1, 34-60, DOI: 10.1080/03066150600624454

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150600624454

Published online: 16 Aug 2006.

Article views: 252

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Agriculture, the State and Class Formation in Turkey’s First Republic (1923–60)

TIM JACOBY

This article examines the extent to which social change in Turkey’s First Republic (1923–60) conforms to, or deviates from, patterns of European development outlined by the sociologist Michael Mann. Of primary interest is the role that the state played in the changes which emerged from the industrialisation process. The particular focus here is on the political and economic responses by the different Turkish regimes to issues arising from labour organisation and class formation.

During the period of the First Republic (1923–60) in Turkey, enormous changes took place. Inter-war industrialisation followed by post-war agricultural mechanisation significantly altered the composition of Turkish society. While an extensive literature exists concerning this period, few studies seek to understand it through the deployment of comparative social theory, and none thus far has utilised the historical sociology of European development. To this end, Michael Mann’s historiography of the West is used as an analytical framework to evaluate the continuities and changes in Turkey during these years.

The presentation is organised into three sections. The first considers the agrarian sector, and the way that its composition was transformed during the period in question. In particular, it traces the relationship between the Turkish state and large rural estates. It will be argued that Ankara’s attempts to penetrate the agricultural sector tended to empower decentralised groups and, ultimately, reduce the control exercised by the state bureaucracy. The second part concerns the relationship between workers and the middle-classes. Using Mann’s model of working class formation, it offers an account of the limited growth of the power of organised labour in Turkey during this period. The third section examines the different strategies used by the state to...
counteract the potential emergence of worker organisations, and compares such developments with Mann’s account of the European trajectory.

RURAL CLASS IN TURKEY: THE RELEVANCE OF MANN

As Roderic Davies writes, ‘there are certain periods when political reform in Turkey took on a new elan, or became concentrated and comparatively rapid, and we might inquire what . . . stimuli were present on each occasion’ [Davies, 1964: 94]. Turkey’s first republic was just such a time, and it is the purpose of this article to analyse some of the stimuli that were present at that conjunction. The republic itself emerged from an era of Ottoman history marked by considerable socio-economic transformation. Up until the nineteenth century, Ottoman production was largely defined by state intervention. Unlike Europe, it was artisans and peasants, not merchants and property owners, who benefited from the dissolution of mercantile oligarchies and restrictions on what employers could extract from their labour. The movement and sale of produce was also controlled, usury was punished in the courts and excessive wealth generated from trade investments could be seized.

In this way, the state maintained an authoritarian influence over its agents, and minimised the possibility of an intermediary class developing. Further restraints on wealth generation were imposed by a prohibitively high export tariff of 12 per cent, aimed at ensuring that Ottoman traders – already constrained by the limitations of pre-modern transportation – did not develop extensive networks of decentralised economic power. For this reason, the Ottoman economy consisted largely of self-sufficient production units trading predominantly with the state. This imposed lack of interdependence, coupled with the maintenance of a rarefied state vernacular largely unintelligible to the masses, and the institutionalised localisms of millet organisation, ensured that the rural population remained not just segmented but also (and therefore) in effect excluded from any centralised system of rule.

During the nineteenth century, this structure broke down, and the late Ottoman state became increasingly subject to the interests of an intermediary class, composed of local elites from the imperial periphery. These consisted of landowning interests combined with a modernist vanguard in sections of the civil service itself [Mardin, 1973: 178]. The agrarian sector was a key topic of debate within political circles, and opinion was divided between ‘advocat[ing] a programme of Ottoman liberalism and decentralisation . . . [and] Turkish nationalism and centralisation’ [Dodd, 1969: 14]. During the early part of the twentieth century, the latter gained the upper hand and, amid considerable chaos, established the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Once in government, they pursued an etatist policy of Turkification coupled with a ‘government-controlled “national” or “welfare” economy’ [Özbudun,
Military failure in the First World War, subsequent territorial losses under the punitive Treaty of Sévres, Moscow’s disclosure of the Sykes-Picot arrangements, and Allied invasions at Izmir and Antalya in May 1919, had the dual effect of leaving the Turks as a more dominant ethnic group in the region and radicalising nationalist sentiment.

Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), the hero of the Dardanelles and former commander of the Ninth Army, was representative of emergent forces within the imperial periphery who favoured a centralised, nationalist response to Ottoman collapse. Originally from Salonika, he had been involved in the 1908 takeover, and had been appointed to commands in eastern Anatolia during the war. In 1918, he emerged as leader of a movement made up ‘of military commanders and their staffs, country notables and of intellectuals’ \[Izzet Paşa quoted in Rustow, 1966: 119\]. For this reason, he was careful to launch his war of independence under a political banner of religion, rather than antagonism to the existing property structure.³ Victory and the establishment of a government in Ankara provided Kemal with the opportunity to delegate power to his rural allies, but the perceived ‘need build a new order [meant that] . . . “Turkishness” would become the basis for a new national identity’, an ideology that would replace previous loose imperial attachments with the tighter unifying bonds of a ‘modern’ political community \[Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 94\].

To this end, Kemal announced, there would be ‘the intervention of the state in all spheres, whenever the general interests of the nation are involved’ \[quoted in Dumont, 1984: 39\]. This was intended to install the nascent republican state (created under a new constitution declared in 1923 and implemented in 1924) as ‘the ultimate basis of authority’, and ‘to legitimate the single party as the sole representative of all elements of society’ \[Sunar, 1974: 54; Weiker, 1981: 6\]. It was also a key part of a broader effort ‘to suppress the class or strata differences and to replace them with a social structure composed of occupational groups’ \[Ziya Gökalp quoted in Dumont, 1984: 32\].

In many ways, then, the period of the first republic represented a culmination of a long-standing process: the continuous attempts by the state to incorporate its periphery, and bring it closer to the power at the centre. More than a century of Ottoman endeavour to establish a controlled, top-down method of nationalising the empire in response to growing Western encroachment had accelerated during the chaos of the 1908 revolution and the catastrophe of the First World War. The inherently a-national political nature of the ancient cleric/soldier/clerk triumvirate that constituted the Porte (the Ottoman government) had long made it an unsuitable vehicle for what might be termed a defensive modernisation. To replace its complex structure of linkages with the periphery, the new republican state continued the late-Ottoman method of attempting to establish a Durkheimian organic unity based
around the economic interdependence of capitalist production. In order to comprehend the dynamics of this process and to account for the rise of the peripheral merchant, embodied in Turkey’s first elected leader—Adnan Menderes, it is important to understand how this imported (and in many ways contrived) development model relates to comparable changes in western Europe.

It is in this regard that the comprehensive account by Mann [1993] of European social change is helpful. He builds on, and synthesises, the path-breaking work of Fröbel, Heinriches and Kreye [1980], Westergaard and Resler [1975], and a great many others, to offer a sophisticated account of class/state relations that goes beyond simple economic reductionism to include the conceptually distinct role of political and ideological networks of power. The capacity of the latter to operate and be organised by non-state actors on either a central or a decentralised basis, produces a space for contestation, thereby giving rise to forms of struggle and consciousness that dilute class. According to Mann, while capitalism had ‘created potentially extensive, political and (occasionally) symmetrical and dialectical classes’, this did not necessarily lead to collectivities which defined themselves specifically (and only) in terms of a shared economic position [Mann, 1993: 27]. Classes, he argues, did not emerge as ‘pure’ features of modernity. Instead, they were transected by other identities and social networks that arose from, and were reproduced, by both existing relations of production and other non-economic forces.

Building on the work of Harry Braverman [1974], Mann identifies two kinds of collective identity that co-existed with class, arguing that the tendency of capitalist development to homogenise labour skills was less pronounced than Marxists believed. The first of these stems from the fact that work relations between labourers and an employer are interdependent. This may be the case where their skills are highly specialised, developed through in-house training, or scarce in the general job market. In these conditions, workers are not easily able to leave and seek comparable positions elsewhere, and employers are more reliant on their existing workforce as the costs of recruiting replacement staff are high. As a result, ‘employees become segregated from the mass of workers outside, and conflict becomes employer-specific, not generalizable to a class’ [Mann, 1993: 511].

Workforce segmentation may also occur through the restructuring of the labour process by capital utilising deskilled workers. Historically, this has involved peasants driven off the land by the application to agriculture of more advanced productive forces, an effect of which was to expand the industrial reserve of labour. The same process in manufacturing – increasing the level of the productive forces – means that certain kinds of skilled worker can be replaced with deskilled and cheaper forms of labour-power (such as migrants
from the countryside) whose skills are transferable. This dual pattern, which has followed the application of Green Revolution technology to the agrarian sector in many Third World contexts, exerts a very different form of influence in terms of worker organisation; the first tends to strengthen worker unionisation, whereas the second may undermine it.

The second form of non-class collective identity occurs in situations where labour may be organised on the basis of occupation or trade. This can be used to restrict the supply of skill and to oppose employers without recourse to the mobilisation of other sections of the working class. In Britain, for example, mid-nineteenth century trade unionism was subject to these restraints. As unions moved their power base from the artisan trades to engineering, factory-floors and smelting works, they sought to avoid state harassment under conspiracy legislation by retaining what Mann calls ‘privileged craft sectionalism’ instead of a more general and broader class identity [Mann, 1993: 536]. Although many trade unionists began to view society as an economic totality within a broader capitalist system, collaboration with middle-class reformers and employers remained the norm, with violent confrontations mainly restricted to the mining industry. In all, Mann concludes that, in many cases, ‘identity with the sectional trade and with the segmental enterprise strengthened more than identity with class’ [Mann, 1993: 536].

Employing the work of Wolf [1969] and Paige [1976] on developing countries as well as Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens [1992], Mann identifies three broad agricultural classes that were also subject to these kind of divisions; large landowners, landless labourers and peasants (or farm proprietors). The first, the landowners (gentry and commoner), made up a fundamental element of both the old and the new ruling European regime. They include unproductive proprietors extracting rent as well as commercial farmers producing crops for the domestic and/or export market. In both instances, Mann proposes that ‘their interests and powers were straightforward. . . . Everywhere they organised conservative “parties of order”, dedicated to preserve property relations and oppose democracy’ [Mann, 1993: 694]. While divided by employment status, the power relations of the second group – the landless labourers – were, for the most part, similarly straightforward. Exploited and segmented both by the landlord and by the wealthier, market-orientated peasant farmer, they were, Mann suggests, generally unable to develop organisational links to any significant degree, and consequently remained members of a class-in-itself rather than a class-for-itself.

The second group, the peasantry, was more complex. This category includes cultivators who do not own the land on which they work, such as sharecroppers and labour-service tenants, as well as those proprietors who – because their holdings are insufficient to provide them and their families with a livelihood – sell mainly their labour-power rather than the product of their
labour. This pattern is itself made more complicated by the process of rural class formation. As is well known, Marx (and other Marxists) famously argued that the relational variations within and fragmented nature of smallholding cultivation (‘sack of potatoes’) meant that peasants did not form a class, and thus did not organise as such. By contrast, Mann – building on the theory of Weber, Tilly and Kautsky – maintains that what he terms ‘the global commercialisation of agriculture’ did, in fact, lead to the ‘proletarianisation’ of the European peasantry [Mann, 1993: 697]. Here the category most affected by capitalist penetration of agriculture was the notionally independent, self-sufficient smallholding peasant – a petty commodity producer operating a peasant family farm, in other words. While a few in the top stratum of this category prospered during good harvest years, and rose into the ranks of small agrarian capitalists, the majority lost out, especially in bad harvest years, and joined the ranks of agricultural labourers, or the rural proletariat. It was because of this dynamic, as well as the changing employment requirements of industrialisation and improvements in transportation, that class formation took place in many European contexts from the nineteenth century onwards [Kane and Mann, 1992: 425–8].

The more successful peasant farmers specialised, organised distribution networks and competed with the larger estates, while others were threatened by foreclosure and forced into crop liens. Both called for improved credit terms, greater financial regulation, a standardisation of seed, fertiliser and machinery supply, and an end to the collusion of urban corporations and rural capital. Mann argues that, on the one hand, this tended to pit ‘the “people” against corporate capitalism, potentially uniting peasants and workers with similar opponents in a Leftist alliance’ while, on the other, it also increased market competition and intensified sectional divisions [Mann, 1993: 698]. Moreover, greater specialisation and interdependence made rural producers more vulnerable to the effects of agricultural depressions, natural disasters, regional technological advances, and state protectionist policies, and therefore more inclined to form local organisational networks based around their own cultivation. This meant that – like large commercial farmers and landless agricultural labourers – the peasantry remained divided from other similar cultivators outside their immediate environs. In many parts of western Europe, the localised nature of the resulting agrarian identity led to a more general sectoral divide between town and countryside encouraged by the rural influence of clerical traditionalism and landowners. Mann concludes that industrial development produced both the potential for populism, and thus a reinforcement of localism and segmentation. As shall be seen below, this approach is particularly relevant to an understanding of early republican Turkey, where a pronounced tension existed between a reforming and intervening political centre faced with antithetical objectives. That is, on the one hand attempting to
foster a Western model of capitalist development, and on the other seeking to restrict ideological resistance to this from traditional elements located on a predominantly agrarian periphery.

AGRICULTURE IN TURKEY’S FIRST REPUBLIC

Like many European economies, Turkey was heavily reliant on agricultural exports as a means of paying for imported capital goods during industrialisation. While only 15 per cent of the total workforce in Britain during the 1870s was employed in agriculture, the equivalent figure in most European countries was around, or over, 50 per cent [Mann, 1993: 693]. With between 78 and 81 per cent of its labour force employed in farming, of which an estimated 97 per cent was carried out on holdings of less than 50 hectares, Turkey possessed a roughly comparable rural structure [İşikli, 1987: 312].

Faced with a similar problem of penetrating an agrarian sector dominated by smallholders whose capacity to withdraw from the market and engage in subsistence cultivation enabled them to defy policies emanating from the centre, the newly-established Turkish republic followed the western European development model, and attempted to bridge core/periphery divides by fostering accumulation in rural areas [Aktan, 1957: 274–5]. For much of the 1920s, therefore, the economic policy of the Turkish state was twofold: to increase the numbers of export-orientated, large landowners operating in the domestic market, and simultaneously to integrate them into world markets.

Wide-ranging plans to reform land ownership in pursuit of a more equitable distribution were shelved following the establishment of the republic, and legislation was either poorly implemented (the 1930 Land and Settlement Law for instance) or, as in the case of the 1934 Settlement Law, used to undermine the power of landowners (mainly in the east of the country) who resisted attempts by the centre to commercialise their holdings. Instead, tax burdens on rural capital were decreased with the abolition of the land tithe in 1925, and profitable estates belonging to Greek farmers recently expelled from the Aegean region were frequently allocated to existing and politically loyal landowners [McCarthey, 1980: 70]. The creation in 1924 of the Ministry of Agriculture resulted in increased levels of lending – through its partnership with the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) – to this sector, from 17 million lira in 1924 to 36 million in 1930, a measure which favoured those large landowners with reserves that could be used as collateral [Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 273; Keyder, 1983a: 140]. In order both to facilitate closer ties with the state bureaucracy and to improve transportation links, and thus export efficiency, a rail (4,000 to 6,000 kilometres) and road (22,000 to 30,000 kilometres) construction programme was announced over the same period. Since carriage included subsidised rates for large commercial farmers,
it was they who benefited most from this development [Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 286, n.7].

With the exception of the drought year of 1927–28, this modernisation process had the effect of raising agricultural output from 245 million liras in 1923 to 521 million liras in 1929, thereby commercialising production on the largest and most profitable rural estates [Keyder, 1981: 38–42]. In helping to cohere and enrich the agricultural elite, this increase in the level of the productive forces also generated class differentiation, widening inequality in the countryside. ‘With growing agricultural production and greater integration into national and international markets’, this began a process similar – but not identical – to that associated by Mann with western European development [Hale, 1984: 163]. In both Turkey and western Europe, therefore, it is clear that in promoting rural economic growth, the centralising political power of the state played ‘a very substantial structuring role in the development of civil society and its classes’ [Mann, 1993: 30].

Following the 1929 crash, it became clear that commercial agriculture had established itself firmly only in those ‘western and coastal parts of Anatolia which had a continuous relation with the world market and which were equipped with railway networks…. The relation of the peasants [as a whole] was only tied to the purchase of necessary consumption goods’ [Aydınl 1990: 171]. With a halving of the value of Turkey’s total export revenues during the 1930s, the state took on a much greater agricultural role by moving away from its previous focus on large landowners [Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 273]. In order to secure agricultural supplies and offset the contraction in the domestic economy, Ankara shifted its support from export crops (such as cotton) and towards cereal production, a sector dominated by smallholders [Okyar, 1965: 99]. In a continuation of Ottoman policy, the government aimed to provide investment and, in return, sell any surplus generated. As a result of its price support policy, therefore, the Turkish state became, through its network of purchasing stations, the main buyer of the wheat, barley and oats. Thus, ‘by cutting down on imports and controlling commodity exchange in general, the state put the large farmer at a disadvantage’ [Birtek and Keyder, 1975: 452]. Rather than focusing on a mechanised agriculture, by importing tractors and diesel, the Turkish government restricted speculative investment and redistributed barely viable plots of land more suited to the labour intensive inputs of small-surplus peasants [Hershlag, 1968: 78–9].

Such emphasis on a dispersed pattern of peasant farming enabled the state to determine its own purchasing prices, to insulate the peasantry from the volatility of the market, and to control the all-important relationship between agrarian producer and urban consumer. This protectionist approach to agriculture marked a partial dismantling of the free trade stipulations in the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and tended to obstruct the kind of trend towards proletarianisation that Mann identifies in nineteenth century Europe. Rather, an etatist policy was adopted in Turkey, which favoured ‘direct state participation, ownership and planning of the economy’ [Mehmet, 1983: 52; Seddon and Margulies, 1984]. This was influenced by the Soviet model of central planning, and a loan of US$18 million offered by Moscow in 1933 on very favourable terms [Thornburg, Spry and Soule, 1949: 26–7]. Intellectual currents within Turkey also favoured greater state planning. The periodical Kadro (first published in 1932), for example, called for a small sagacious elite to take charge of the development process [Okyar, 1965: 100]. This was effected, at least in part, under the first Five Year Plan (inaugurated in 1934), which established public investment and state-led enterprises as the principal mechanism of industrialisation. Although the Turkish state was at pains to stress that this did not represent an attempt to eliminate private enterprise, it resulted in ‘a non-competitive, closed economy dominated by state monopolies that were…managed primarily for the benefit of a privileged elite controlling the state apparatus’ [Mehmet, 1983: 53].

The entrenched position of the state bureaucracy within the Turkish economy during the 1930s succeeded largely in arresting the depopulation – the main effect of rural class formation – that had emerged during the 1920s and consolidated anti-capitalist and anti-urban localism. In contrast to western Europe, where the extension of state infrastructures during industrialisation continued to create the potential for a narrowing of the rural/urban divide, the Turkish agrarian sector remained over-shadowed by the patrimonial etatism of the bureaucracy [Hale, 1984: 155]. Without the kind of peasant resistance to state economic intervention that Mann identifies as a salient feature of European class structures, the formation of what Korkut Baratav was later to call ‘petty commodity production’ was to some degree obstructed [quoted in Seddon and Margulies, 1984: 29]. Primitive accumulation by an intermediary class of moneylending traders, which in the 1960s Baratav identified as the merchant capital that had long been present in and dominant over agrarian production in western Anatolia, certainly received a boost during the 1920s from state intervention in the rural economy. The bureaucratisation and protectionism of the 1930s, however, slowed the progress of capital penetration into the agrarian sector, as the Turkish state moved away from attempting to counteract the power of existing feudal relations through the commercialisation of agricultural production.7

During the Second World War, however, the role of the bureaucracy in Turkish agriculture came under increasing stress. High wartime inflationary pressures, a shortage of consumer goods (which pushed up the general price index by 450 per cent), and government policy of fixing its purchase prices for agricultural commodities at pre-war levels, all meant that market-orientated
peasant farmers suffered a sharp fall in their living standards [Birtek and Keyder, 1975: 459]. As a result, surpluses were withheld from the state, and agricultural production declined from an index of 100 in 1939 to 70.4 in 1944 – approximately the same level as 1929 [Alexander, 1961: 474]. This reduced the availability of foodstuffs, leading to internal terms of trade favourable to agriculture between 1939 and 1943 and producing conditions that were ‘particularly conducive to the expansion of rurally based merchant capital’ [Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 277]. Thus, commercial farmers owning large amounts of land, whose substantial surpluses already allowed them better to withstand the acquisitive infrastructure of the Turkish state, were able to generate significant profits, both by monopolising urban supply chains and by speculating on the international exchange of staple commodities. Through associated networks of traders and intermediaries, these agricultural agents of mercantilism brought rural production closer to industrial capital, and in economic terms reduced the urban/rural divide which characterised the 1930s.

To the members of this nascent capitalist alliance, the rigid corporatist controls of etatism were seen as unduly restrictive, corrupt and – from their point of view – an inefficient means of allocating their taxes [Wålstedt, 1980: 76–7]. Similarly dissatisfied were the burgeoning professional classes which the state had promoted (partly through a quadrupling of the literacy rate from 6 per cent in 1927 to 23 per cent by 1945) to support bureaucratic control of the provincial economy [Rustow, 1967: 19]. Lawyers, doctors and teachers in Turkey saw that by combining politically with emergent rural capitalists, they – unlike their counterparts in western Europe, whose autonomy was subject to government restraint (see below) – could develop ‘a formidable alliance’ against state intervention [Mardin, 1980: 42]. As the war went on, and Turkish national income declined, this coalition extended its base by forming clientelistic links with peasant smallholders who had experienced losses as a result of the ending by the state of price supports.

Such an extensive multi-class alliance was quite different from the polarisation – rural proletarianisation on the one hand, enduring localised deference on the other – which Mann finds amongst much of the European agrarian sector during industrialisation. Although a similar alliance involving large landowners, commercial farmers, and urban capitalists occurred in western Europe as in Turkey, the size and strength of the Turkish bureaucracy nevertheless led the Turkish peasantry to regard urban representatives of the state as their main opponents, thereby strengthening town/countryside identities and reducing consciousness of class. Rather than generating a coalition of impoverished peasant smallholders and urban workers opposed to capitalism, state economic policy in Turkey gave rise to a multi-class alliance that was ‘mobilised and integrated into the economy, yet left most
vulnerable to the economic downturns, and hence readily motivated to play a role in the political sphere’ [Birtek and Keyder, 1975: 460].

The breakdown of bureaucratic control over an emerging bourgeoisie can be seen in the reasons behind President İsmet İnönü’s decision not to appoint candidates for six by-elections held in June 1945. This was followed in September by an announcement sanctioning the establishment of an official party in opposition to the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or RPP) which had monopolised constitutional politics since the inception of the republic [Eroğul, 1987: 102–3]. While İnönü was successful in ensuring that loyal members of the RPP without leftwing sympathies formed the rival party – the Demokrat Parti or DP – he was unprepared for the instant popularity it commanded, especially among the provinces. In what Ergun Özbudun describes as ‘a typical centre-periphery issue’, the DP, led by Adnan Menderes (a wealthy farmer from the rich agricultural area of the Meander basin near Izmir), ‘advocated less strict government controls and a greater reliance on market and/or local forces – in other words more power for the periphery’ [ Özbudun, 1980: 58]. The RPP, on the other hand, remained dominated by bureaucrats and dissociated from the political interests of large landowners and commercial farmers.

Given the DP support base within rural capital, it was unsurprising that it was the large landowners and commercial farmers who benefited most from the arrival of this party in government during 1950 [Berberoğlu, 1982: 71 and 83, n.12]. By installing mechanisation financed in part by the state, rural capitalists were able to increase the size of their landholdings by an average of 31 per cent throughout the 1950s [Aktan, 1957: 277]. As a result, by 1957 large farmers were probably operating between 18 and 20 per cent of the entire cultivated land in Turkey, despite constantly underreporting holdings because of their enduring fear of land reform [Keyder, 1987: 131]. This had two important consequences. Firstly, participation in the national and international market increased markedly within the Turkish agricultural sector, thereby limiting the capacity of peasant smallholders to revert to subsistence production. Secondly, those peasant smallholders who were unable to commercialise their production methods ‘were driven to bankruptcy, losing their land to big landowners and joining the ranks of the rural unemployed and underemployed or migrating to urban centres in search of work’ [Berberoğlu, 1982: 71].

In other words, the commercialisation of the Turkish agricultural sector during the 1940s began to follow the European model, in which large commercial farmers penetrated the new regime and continued to obstruct progressive land reform initiatives. The resulting intensification of rural capitalist exploitation therefore tended to produce the type of dialectic that Mann identifies as a key feature of agrarian class formation in western
Europe. On the one hand, it intensified the capacity of agrarian capital to segment the workforce through greater specialisation and more exposure to market fluctuation, thereby reinforcing localisms that typified agrarian society. On the other hand, however, it brought rural producers closer to urban consumers, both through supply networks and forced migration born of growing rural differentiation. Unlike in most of Europe, however, these proletarianising effects were not evenly spread. On the large commercial farms of south-eastern Anatolia, exponential growth in mechanisation increased the average size of the enterprise by 43 per cent during this period. This, coupled with the traditionally highly labour intensive sharecropping methods of the region, disproportionately damaged small farmers from the south-east [McDowall, 2001: 399]. As Mann argues, and as the next sections will explore in more detail, such uneven development tends to limit the infrastructural impact of the state and frequently produces or exacerbates destabilising non-economic differences.

UNIONISATION, CLASS AND THE BOURGEOIS STATE

The middle classes of nineteenth century Europe were, Mann suggests, also fractured by sectional and segmental divisions. While relatively insulated from the workers by the gradual collapse of the artisan sector, their commitment to capitalism ensured a varied degree of loyalty to the state. The petty bourgeoisie (the first of three middle class ‘fractions’ which Mann, following the work of Giddens [1973], Dahrendorf [1959] and others, identifies) was composed of owners and controllers of their means of production (typically as a family or non-contractual association), and as such experienced little exploitation. He suggests that, for the most part, they participated voluntarily in the process of accumulation. They saved hard, acquiesced in the dominant political order, and laboured in order to pass property on to their children. Although certainly threatened by the rise in corporate power and the deflation of price indices which accompanied European industrialisation, they were, so Mann argues, rarely subject to harsh exploitation [Mann, 1993: 552]. Discontent was minimal and their conservatism, which helped to defeat the Chartist movement in Britain for instance, persisted throughout the nineteenth century.

The second middle-class fraction, labelled by Mann ‘the careerists’, generally consisted of salaried employees in corporate or state bureaucracies. Some were managers, others (predominantly women, ex-manual workers and young men) clerks and sales assistants. All were caged within disciplined, segmented and graded hierarchies which simultaneously provided career mobility and constrained collective action. From 1870 to the First World War, they were also the fastest growing section of the middle classes within
industrialising Europe. Their reliance on corporate hierarchies for progression tended to furnish them with conservative values based on organisational loyalty, individual achievement and perpetual vulnerability. The third fraction of the middle classes was composed of the professionals. Theirs was ‘a “learned” (involving technically and culturally valued knowledge) occupation requiring special education, whose practice [wa]s formally licensed after negotiation between the state and an occupational organisation’ [Mann, 1993: 564]. The success of the state in controlling qualification processes (and thus, with the exception of the medical profession, occupational access) and establishing regulatory supervision in most sectors restrained the autonomy inherent in their quasi-capitalist partnerships and price-fixing monopolies. Consequently, they were usually loyal allies of capital. While their elite education may have instilled a moral or philanthropic liberalism, ‘their interests [lay] with the wealthy, the secure, the work-controlling, the well educated. Over property ownership, they resist[ed] collective controls’ [Mann, 1993: 569].

In keeping with Mann’s account of European development, the Turkish middle-classes maintained, for the most part, a fundamental conservatism. Like their European counterparts, they tended to reject what might be termed an aggressive rightism in favour of a broad commitment to loosely state-affiliated voluntary associations. Some within professional circles, however, also demonstrated an interest in labour issues and, with a rise from 241,000 to 412,000 in the daily circulation of newspapers between 1948 and 1951, forged some links with careerists and the literate sectors of unionised labour [Lewis, 2001: 304–5]. So, while state-affiliated organisations such as the Turkish Air League, the Parent Teachers’ Association and the Red Crescent were significant in distinguishing between mobile and lower social strata in Turkey during the 1950s, craft associations, guilds and trade organisations were also an important ‘instrument of expression for the middle class’ [Neyzi, 1973: 138–9]. Consequently, decentralised literary networks with a broadly progressive agenda began to proliferate within urban, lower middle-class groups [Karpat, 1966: 177–8]. Like European social novelists who ‘searched for authentic “use values” amid the “degraded” materialism of a capitalism concerned only with exchange values’, this tended to highlight and ennoble the struggle of Turkey’s disadvantaged and, with urban male literacy as high as 72 per cent in some cities, started to inform a burgeoning media industry [Mann, 1975: 286; Karpat, 1960: 153–68].

In this sense, then, the effects of such cross-class formations were twofold. On the one hand, the spread of labour sympathies within the middle classes strengthened opposition to the DP’s economic liberalism. On the other hand, however, the state, in keeping with Mann’s model of ‘nationalised’ European
labour organisations, utilised these as an attempt to extend bourgeois influence within the trade union movement, to reduce the potency of the left and to nurture a client base close to the masses. As Mann notes of Europe, such ‘pragmatic alliances’ with bourgeois pressure groups (such as feminists, ethnic or religious minorities and anti-clericals) were promoted by the state, thereby ‘moderating socialism [and] increasing calculative at the expense of proletarian notions of politics’ \[Mann, 1995: 21\]. In Turkey, as in Europe, therefore, such a ‘dilution’ of working-class consciousness had a significant effect on the formation of labour organisation. Indeed, Mann suggests that, in order for a unified and effective proletarian movement to emerge, four components (what he terms the IOTA model) must be present. Here, he builds on Harry Braverman’s earlier characterisation of class-consciousness as expressed *absolutely* (in terms of a ‘pervasive and durable attitude on the part of a class towards its position in society’) and *relatively* in response to the slowly (tradition, education, experience, organisation and so on) or rapidly (moods, sentiments, stress, conflict) changing conditions in which it emerges \[Braverman, 1974: 30–31\].

Firstly, Mann writes, a shared ‘identity’ must materialise between working-class members. Secondly, where this identity emerges, it must give rise to a perceived ‘opposition’ to other class interests. Thirdly, the first and second components must combine to form a ‘totality’ that defines working-class members’ social situation and society in general. And last, a clear and uniform ‘alternative’ to the existing power relations must be formulated and disseminated. In Europe, Mann suggests that conflict between mass-membership unions and governments mostly dominated by conservative interests produced extensive, albeit impure, class identities directed against a definable class opponent and based on a shared notion of a capitalist totality \[Mann, 1993: 614–15\]. Of his IOTA model, only labour’s perception of a viable alternative to the prevailing relations of production was fragmented by cross-class European party politics.

In Turkey, however, four additional factors connected to the issue of bourgeois ‘dilution’ further restricted working-class power. The first was the regional nature of industrial development. The post-war expansion in the private business sector was focused largely on western Anatolia (63 per cent of the 401 projects the Industrial Development Bank helped to fund between 1950 and 1960 were in the Marmara region alone) \[Bianchi, 1984: 58\]. With the bulk of state investment, public enterprise and market-orientated agricultural estates located in western Anatolia, such selectivity exacerbated uneven development in the economy and strengthened peripheral resistance to Ankara’s etatist and tutelary policies \[Weiker, 1981: 233\]. ‘In this “enclave” path of development’, which Mann identifies amongst the West’s later industrialisers, comprador ‘classes may seek to keep their own state
weak and ally with foreign capital’ retarding the emergence of a nationalised identity within the working classes [Mann, 1993: 492].

In Turkey, patterns of urbanisation and rural displacement transferred regional particularisms to each of the four largest cities in Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana) sustaining an average growth rate of more than 5 per cent per annum during the 1950s [Saran, 1974: 329]. Since the majority of migrants originated from the rapidly mechanising farms of the east and moved westwards, these conurbations quickly became ‘permanent strongholds of Kurdish identity’ in which ‘social lines came to be drawn along geographical differences’ reinforcing both solidarities in the labour market and political rivalries [McDowall, 2001: 402; Keyder, 1987: 206]. Working-class identity was therefore fragmented, preventing the emergence of a uniform concept of ‘selfhood’ and perceptions of ‘otherness’ based on class, as well as — for the most part — thwarting attempts to construct and promote an alternative vision of socio-economic relationships. Just as European factories had, in Mann’s view, become ‘the industrial equivalent of the medieval manor’ during the late nineteenth century, so Turkey’s urban labour market became segmented by pre-existent, non-economic identities imported from rural areas [Mann, 1993: 540]. In contrast to Europe, though, these divisions were reinforced rather than gradually reduced by industrialisation, thereby preventing the Turkish proletariat from coalescing into the ‘macro-community’ which, for Mann, characterises the development of class formation in western European countries [Mann, 1995: 19]. Consequently, inter-war Turkish industrialisation failed to level the socio-economic distinctions and reduce provincialism to the same degree as had been the case with western European development.

The second reason for the limited growth of working-class organisation in Turkey was the restricted spread of unionisation. Although this increased by 500 per cent between 1948 and 1958, the Turkish labour movement did not become large enough to compel the government to solicit its support. A membership base of 283,000 in 1960, compared to 4.1 million in Great Britain’s ‘new unions’ alone in 1914, did not, in other words, represent a significant challenge to the DP’s main constituency, large estate producers in the agrarian sector [İşikli, 1987: 317; Mann, 1993: 609]. The government, for its part, was further able to restrain worker organisation by assuming control of union finances which were based on a fund distributed by the Ministry of Labour. Since most union members were too impoverished to subscribe dues themselves, the fund ‘was generally used by the government as a means for keeping the unions dependent and under control’ [İşikli, 1987: 317]. This was quite different from Mann’s characterisation of the attitude of many western European states to the question of labour representation. There, he suggests, the growth of the manufacturing sector during the end of the nineteenth
century tended to push retail prices down, increase weekly salaries and produce wealthier, and therefore more influential, workers’ organisations. These became conduits through which working-class notions of identity, opposition, totality and alternative could be developed and diffused.

Although many European regimes did attempt to curtail union finances (for example, the Taff Vale judgement of 1902 in Britain), few matched the supervisory power of the Turkish state. This was strengthened by the compulsory grouping of workers into a single Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions (Türk-İş), a process driven by the piecemeal closure of provincial labour offices. Although this ran the risk of spreading dissent—a collective consciousness—nationwide (a feature which emerged strongly during the 1970s), it was felt that such a centralised body would be (and in fact proved to be) easier to influence. By offering lobbying access to the state, the DP was, like the courting by European conservatism of ‘respectable’ (i.e. collaborationist) trade unions, able to co-opt workers’ representatives [Mann, 1993: 538–9]. As a result, the Turkish state resisted progressive reform by developing a corporate relationship with union leaders. Diverging from earlier European examples, therefore, the Turkish state continued to exert a ‘strong control over the development potential of labour’ throughout the industrialisation process [Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 714].

A third factor restricting the growth of working class organisational power was DP policy towards the incumbent bureaucracy. This took two forms: firstly, allowing civil service salary levels to drop while, secondly, employing significant numbers of party sympathisers [Turan, 1994: 114–15]. As in Europe, these accompanied large increases in public sector employment. Between 1950 and 1960 central government personnel alone rose from 174,000 to 314,000, by which time only the top seven of the 14 career grades could be considered middle-income [Neyzi, 1973: 132]. This was in keeping with more general patterns of industrial development. In much of pre-First World War Europe, for example, Mann notes that the spread of literacy, growing numbers of female employees, a predominantly higher-status private sector and increasing ‘routinisation’ combined to proletarianise state-employed white-collar careerists. Within the Turkish civil service, the emergence of comparable processes was exacerbated by the DP’s policy of nepotism and clientilism. These two features meant that Turkish civil servants remained what Metin Heper calls ‘patrimonial-legalists’, and did not develop the ‘rational-productive’ orientations required to institutionalise a neutral, apolitical public service [Heper, 1982: 47]. As such, there developed an acute discrepancy between the bureaucracy’s ‘manifest’ values (e.g. exemplified by an ostensive commitment to Kemalist reformism born of endemic political patronage) and more traditionally conceived and conservative ‘operational’ values based on perennial salary and status concerns.
This tendency of the state bureaucracy, coupled with its disproportionate adherence to state-reinforcing nationalism, helped to fragment labour identities, to obstruct the growth of oppositional discourses, and to dilute notions of solidarity.

A fourth reason for the limited growth in Turkey of working-class consciousness was the DP’s policy of subjecting those that continued to press for concessions ‘to repression and persecution’ under legislation proscribing strike action, collective bargaining with employers and ‘associations based on class’ [İşikli, 1987: 315; Hershlag, 1958: 288]. In 1951, new laws were introduced which increased government control over the press and strengthened the penal code permitting the arrest of large numbers of labour activists [Eroğul, 1987: 108–9]. This had the effect of further unifying the interests of the DP and those of capital. Indeed, with 14 per cent of industrialists originating from market-orientated farming backgrounds (this may be much higher if marriage linkages are also included), a pronounced pattern of productive investment in land and the establishment of farmer-owned commercial organisations, the DP’s constituency of large commercial farmers began to overlap with the upper strata of urban capitalists [Sunar, 1974: 110]. This, combined with the DP’s success in re-establishing the corporatism of the etatist years, meant that industrialisation in Turkey did not follow the western European model of a developmentalist middle class struggling against the oligarchic power of rural landlords. Rather than pressing for agrarian reform and a minimum income for the peasantry in order to expand their internal market the Turkish middle classes were, in general, more concerned with maintaining political stability and continuing their profitable relationship with their political patrons [Öncü, 1980: 466–7]. This, the DP’s inimical approach to labour relations and enduring regional, ethnic and religious divides, meant that, while industrial capitalism produced the potential for an extensive and coherent working-class consciousness during the 1950s, Turkish labour remained fundamentally fragmented.

STATE STRATEGIES: MODERNITY, POPULISM, NATIONALISM

In Europe, states responded to the emergence of organised labour in three ways [Mann, 1995: 27–35]. Firstly, party lists began to reflect the decline in the political power of the old regime. A ‘modern’, more secular brand of conservatism appeared in much of protestant Europe, one that stressed the greater economic value of the existing relations of production. Political organisations hitherto dominated by elite interests increasingly emphasised their members’ vocational aptitude to manage a modern economy, and professional fractions of the middle classes gained mass influence as political
representation became more bourgeois. This brought with it approaches to ‘welfare and labour conciliation programmes that they claimed were less “ideological” than socialism’s’ [Mann, 1995: 32].

Secondly, religious affiliation was tacitly promoted as a means of challenging the appeal of worker organisations. The Catholic social welfare associations of rural Europe were, for instance, particularly effective in maintaining peasant deference. While some propounded progressive, self-help agendas and others a strongly internationalist flavour, most tended to reinforce the social order despite their comparatively broad recruitment base. The result was a conflicting set of motives aimed at preventing the spread of socialism, and the sponsoring of localised redistribution which ultimately offered a divisive ‘“third way”’ between capital and labour’ [Mann, 1995: 29].

Thirdly, a state-reinforcing brand of industrial-capitalist nationalism emerged. Predicated on the idea of the internal enemy, and propagated by ‘top-down’ semi-authoritarian ruling-class regimes, it was primarily extended through expanding state bureaucracies. This was particularly true in Germany during the early years of the twentieth century, where it was used by the old regime to bring ‘the middle classes into the edges of the state in order to keep labour and the ethnic minorities well outside it’ [Mann, 1993: 584]. Unlike countries that were more subject to the control of mass political parties, Germany and, to some extent, Austria developed highly statist, anti-proletarian fractions of the middle classes. Since few within the petty bourgeoisie supported the higher levels of state extraction advocated by the authoritarian right, it was largely within state-affiliated careerist and professional groups (those, in other words, who had received the most extensive state education) that support centred [Mann, 1993: 585–6].

The Turkish state also deployed these three strategies during the First Republic. Firstly, policy was frequently marked by an emphasis on the greater technocratic expertise of the civil service. During the single-party years, for instance, a secular brand of conservatism emerged which stressed the business acumen of the state’s administrators as well as the ‘modernity’ of the existing relations of production. Central to this was the promotion of the types of ‘organic’ modifications within the agricultural sector through the state bureaucracy discussed earlier [Ulman and Tachau, 1965: 154]. To a significant degree, such policies were facilitated by senior Kemalist ideologues’ ability to absorb many of the key positions of power in the National Assembly. Up to 46 per cent of Turkey’s deputies elected between 1920 and 1950 were, for instance, from a state bureaucratic background, despite making up only between 3 and 6 per cent of the country’s economically active males [Boratav, 1981: 170]. As a result, the civil service was, to a large extent, ‘left unhindered to formulate the ideology underlying the new role of the state’ during the 1930s, thereby diminishing the political
influence of rural elites as part of the state’s switch to the patronage of small-scale cereal producers [Keyder, 1979: 35].

A second strategy used by the state in Turkey during the First Republic was the DP’s promotion of a populist brand of Islam (Islam milliyetçiliği) [Lewis, 1952: 44]. This was due, in part, to a recognition that the secularising reforms of the 1920s and 1930s had penetrated the Anatolian countryside very little [Stirling, 1965: ch.12]. It was also a similar strategy to what Mann calls the ‘Social Catholicism’ adopted by conservatives in parts of Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century [Mann, 1995: 28–9]. As Niyazi Berkes suggested some time ago, the efficacy of Kemalist populism was partially a result of its capacity to harness the idea of constitutionalism and technological advance and to equate these with notions of modernity that were part of a wider project of Islamic civilisation [Berkes, 1964: 262–3]. As in Bismarckian Germany, then, religion was, as a classic populist strategy, integrated into, not excluded from, the process of economic development that occurred in Turkey’s First Republic.

However, while an agrarian populist discourse did have some success in uniting peasants and workers, the result, contrary to Mann’s prediction, was not a viable leftist alliance. By privileging national, ethnic and, in some senses, religious identities, agrarian populism tended to displace consciousness of class, as happened throughout Europe – particularly the Balkans – during the 1920s and 1930s (see, for example, the very useful analysis by Jackson [1974]). Together with repressive legislation, this is perhaps one of the main reasons why the Turkish left was not more successful in gaining mass working-class support. It also helps to explain why, on occasions, sections of the left have adopted a national/ethnic mobilising discourse – as in the case of the Turkish Kurds [Vanley, c.1971] – that, by its very nature, has been politically exclusionary, and thus divisive.

In these ways, and as in western Europe generally, the Turkish peasantry exhibited its Janus face – looking sympathetically towards the working class but also to capitalist development in agriculture. Politically and culturally, smallholders were encouraged to maintain traditional identities. To this end, the DP reinstituted the call to prayer in Arabic, reopened of the tombs of Sufi ‘saints’ and established a large-scale religious education programme [Shankland, 1999: 27–38]. Nonetheless, the government was careful to keep such sentiment broadly within the Kemalist tradition, by asserting that ‘those who helped the nation win the day of salvation [i.e. the general elections] of 14 May 1950, are the religious, patriotic, genuine, pure Turks . . . loyal to the revolution of Atatürk and to the Muslim religion’ [Halit Ziya Atatü˘g quoted in Rustow, 1957: 103]. The overtly instrumental reasoning behind the government’s courtship of the Islamic vote, plus ‘the unflinchingly hard stand it took to anti-Atatü˘rk activities of some religious orders, attest to
the claim that the DP would never tolerate the autonomous and self-sustaining development of religious forces’ [Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1994: 258]. New legislation in July 1953, for instance, ensured that religion could not be used for ‘political’ ends, and that secularism remained the dominant paradigm of Turkish administration [Ahmad, 1977: 368–9]. So, while Islam did provide the administration with a vote-winning means of appealing directly to the peasantry, organisationally outflanking the bureaucracy and fragmenting class loyalties, it was not, unlike the mass mobilisation of Catholicism in Europe, deployed as a means of political legitimisation [Mardin, 1971: 204].

The third strategy deployed by the State during the First Republic was to imbue industrial capitalist development with nationalism [Jacoby, 2004: Ch.4]. While, as a method of governance, it was successful in generating cross-class support, such ideology was especially directed at labour and minority ethnic groups. Both in Turkey and in much of Europe, it was especially pronounced amongst public sector careerists. This was reinforced in the case of Turkey by being ‘normalised’ politically, that is by the ‘strongly patriotic education with chauvinistic overtones’ which had been established by Kemal during the 1930s and used extensively to train the civil service [Mardin, 1980: 40]. Its influence can be seen in legislation, introduced in 1935, 1936 and 1938, which effectively criminalised strike action and prohibited the formation of trade union movements and workers’ groups [Keyder, 1987: 199]. Organisations based on a specific ethnicity were similarly targeted – a particular difficulty for peasants in the predominantly Kurdish-speaking provinces of south-east Anatolia. In June 1934, for instance, Law 2510 was enacted giving the state extended powers to evacuate all regions defined as non-Turkish [Mardin, 1980: 43].

During the 1950s, public-sector careerists’ increased material insecurities within the civil service consolidated their conservatism and relatively low tolerance for ‘democratic political life’ [Heper, 1977: 75]. As Kemal Karpat notes, many ‘sought legitimation in the unfulfilled social promises of Kemalism’ through an expanded interpretation of its more nationalist principles [Karpat, 1966: 179]. Similarly, European careerist values, as characterised by Mann, were typified by an abiding commitment to the hierarchy into which the bureaucrat is embedded. In this sense, the recruitment of officials from lower socio-economic strata under the DP’s public sector expansion programme appointed ‘persons who [we]re even less secure and so need[ed] even more to reinforce their own sense of status’, thereby offsetting any increased empathy these non-elite groups might have had with their ‘clients’ [Weiker, 1981: 34].

As part of a greater trend towards populism, therefore, the DP – in contrast to Kemal’s closed authoritarianism – encouraged the emergence in the state
bureaucracy of a more powerful and entrenched vision of national identity. For, as Mann notes, ‘in any country where the right claimed traditions of past imperial greatness, conservatives could invoke “genuine” leadership of a nation to which most people, including most workers, felt they belonged’ \[Mann, 1995: 33\]. However, even this process of extending a controlled populism, coupled with partially subjugating the Kemalist bureaucracy to the local interests of the DP’s constituency, was a step too far for the armed forces. That the latter had anyway experienced a decline in status and remuneration merely contributed to the military coup of 1960, as a result of which Prime Minister Menderes and two of his senior ministers were executed, and the first republic was brought to an end.

CONCLUSION

During the first years of the republic, the Turkish state concentrated on attempting to commercialise the agricultural sector by encouraging and financially supporting linkages between local merchants, urban capital and farmers owning large amounts of land. This was intended to increase domestic production, improve the balance of payments by exporting agricultural commodities, and bring the periphery of the nascent republic under the closer control of the centre. Rural socio-economic differentiation certainly increased, but without an extensive and decentralised urban middle class both the peasant mobility and proletarianisation that characterised western European development were heavily restrained. This was further reinforced by the collapse in agricultural prices and subsequent global turn towards protectionism following the 1929 economic crash. Henceforth, the Turkish state moved away from the promotion of large farms and towards a much more interventionist policy of support for small-scale cereal producers. Accompanied by a considerable growth in the size and power of the state bureaucracy, this focused primarily on the etatist control of the urban sector and the sponsorship of state economic enterprise.

While in economic terms the influence of the state in managing social change in Turkey during industrialisation was significantly more profound than in much of Europe, a similar dialectic between centralised attempts to promote economic growth and the emergence of decentralised notions of popular sovereignty appeared. In this sense, during both periods of the Turkish republic state-led networks of social organisation have, as Mann finds of Europe, ‘welded solidarities among these economically heterogeneous fractions, strata and segments’ incorporating numerous elements from outside the immediate relations of production \[Mann, 1995: 29\]. This led to the emergence of class formations similar to those in western Europe, but without the accompanying organisational power.
Centralised political power also served to fragment class-consciousness. Indeed, in all four variants of Mann’s IOTA model, the state continued to play a divisive role, and succeeded at least partially in preventing the emergence of perceptions of identity, opposition, social totality and possible political alternatives based on class. Of the three state responses to class organisation which Mann locates in western Europe, Kemal’s administration clearly deployed two: secular conservatism and ‘Islamic nationalism’. These combined an emphasis on the technological efficacy of the bureaucracy with an attempt to forge a populist anti-socialist ideology, based on a blend of rural Islam and national identity. As such, industrial development in Turkey tended to perpetuate, and, in some cases, reinforce the types of pre-modern centre/periphery divide which industrialisation in Europe gradually diminished. In this sense, middle-class expansion was not sufficiently free of state control to provide the levels of mass political participation necessary to ‘nationalise’ the Turkish polity. Consequently, the political impact of inter-war economic development was, in contrast to the more bourgeois pattern of European change, principally focused on ‘the consolidation of the modernist beachhead within the ruling elite’ [İşikli, 1987: 313].

Instead of helping to institutionalise mechanisms of political representation, therefore, industrialisation in Turkey gave rise to a form of social mobility which was largely dependent on ‘participation in the expansion of the Kemalist state’ [Birtek, 1994: 225]. Exacerbated by wartime changes in wealth distribution, this provoked an acute tension between the imperatives of economic growth and the constraints of bureaucratic management. Put another way, the state, while attempting to penetrate and centralise the Turkish economy, also empowered networks of economic exchange (particularly between rural capital and the professional fraction of the middle class) that were opposed to bureaucratic intervention. The strength of bourgeois resistance and the narrowness of the single-party regime’s constituency were manifestly demonstrated by their failure to reform land tenure and to compete with the rising electoral power of rural capital empowered by increasing agricultural prices during the Second World War.

Once in government, the DP pursued a strategy similar to that of the social Catholicism identified by Mann as the third of the responses by European regimes to class formation. As such, the efficacy of religion was consolidated and given a more prominent role in ‘official’ state-reinforcing nationalist discourses – particularly amongst careerists and the ranks of the bureaucracy. Agricultural modernisation also followed the western European model, and began to generate a process of differentiation in which smallholding cultivation was either commercialised or pushed back into subsistence production. The resulting uneven development across rural Turkey perpetuated, exacerbated or – in some cases – created regional disparities
that further undermined the emergence of a broad consciousness of class. This, low levels of urban unionisation, the burgeoning ranks of a proletarianised, yet staunchly Kemalist, bureaucracy and the DP’s repres- sively anti-labour legislation, all combined to prevent the unification of the workforce employed in rural and urban sectors, and thus to obstruct the emergence of labour organisations along western European lines.

NOTES

1 Owen Lattimore estimates that animals used to transport food would have to eat the contents of their load every one hundred miles [Lattimore, 1962: 476–85].

2 The Ottoman notion of the millet was, although later to denote a specifically non-Muslim community, mainly used to refer to one of the great number of distinguishable ‘peoples’ within the empire [Karpat, 1973: 38]. While differences between the social organisation of the various ethnic, cultural and religious groups ruled by the Ottomans have often been over-emphasised, it is clear that the state did take an active hand in maintaining and organising this diversity. Members of the different millets were, for example, discouraged from wearing clothes characteristic of another millet. The result was that they remained relatively atomised [Findley, 1980; Mardin, 1967: 129–30].

3 Kemal’s war of independence was, in many respects, couched in the traditional terms of jihad. Within the countryside, this remained the only salient mobilising force (some would say it still does). To Mustafa Kemal, already experienced in tribal diplomacy from his war-time appointment in Aleppo, the ideological relationship between Muslim peasant and Islamic state, traditionally conceived, was to be the basis for co-opting tribal leaders into the resistance movement and in mobilising peripheral loyalty [Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 84–5]. From its inaugural conference in Erzerum in July 1919, Kemal’s Society for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia argued that ‘all Islamic elements (i.e. ethnic communities) living in this area are true brothers . . . of the same religion and race as ourselves whom it is impossible to divide’ [cited in Mango, 1999: 8]. The importance of Islamic legitimisation within the independence movement can be seen in the background of the delegates to the conference – 21 out of 56 were connected to the ulema [Toprak, 1981: 64]. Similarly, with the establishment of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara during April 1920, more than one-fifth of the deputies were clerics [Rustow, 1957: 73].

4 For instance, Article 1 of the January 1921 Law on Fundamental Organisation declared that ‘sovereignty, without any preconditions’, belongs to the nation and Article Three stated that the national executive would be ‘the governing body of the state of Turkey’ [Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 93]. This represents a significant departure from the multi-national ideology of the Ottoman empire. Moreover, Kemal increasingly emphasised the 1,500-year-old history of the Turks, as opposed to the 700-year-old Ottoman empire, and in November 1922 he announced the removal of the Sultanate and the creation of the Turkish Republic. Having solidified the borders and status of the new Turkish state at Lausanne in July 1923, Kemal abolished the Caliphate. This was followed by the de-legitimisation of religious instruction in favour of a centralised and secular Ministry of Education and the replacement of the Arabic script with öztürkçe. In what, for Metin Heper, ‘was to resemble the Protestant tradition that placed emphasis on the absolute privacy of individual conscience . . . all public displays of religious observation were discouraged’ and the clergy was incorporated into the civil bureaucracy [Heper, 1981: 351].

5 The effect of an improved transportation system was, generally speaking, twofold. First, to integrate the rural and the urban economy within given nation states, and second, to reduce the time and cost of trade between countries themselves.

6 The exact make-up of the agrarian sector during the 1920s and 1930s is not known in any significant detail [Karaömerlioglu, 2000: 122].
It should be noted that writers such as Muzzaffer Erdost, who strongly opposed Boratav’s characterisation of Turkish agrarian sector as dominated by merchant capital, continue to emphasise the importance of feudal relations in the countryside. For a wide-ranging analysis of this debate, see Seddon and Margulies [1984].

In the UK, for instance, prices decreased by 20 per cent and salaries grew by 20 per cent between 1870 and 1890 [Feinstein, 1976].

Migration has also played an important part in the emergence of more extreme forms of nationalism in Turkey and western Europe. Although, as Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack [1973: 40; see also Paine, 1974] point out, Turkey is known as a major supplier of labour-power (having concluded a recruitment treaty with Germany as early as 1961), the internal movement of Kurds from the south-east to the western Anatolia conurbation has been a major source of chauvinist sentiment [Jacoby, 2005]. Both these factors resulted largely from the rapid rate of agricultural development. A rise in financial credits for mechanised inputs from 3 million lira for the period 1945–50 to 9.7 million for 1950–56 helped to increase the number of tractors in use (from 1,756 in 1948 to 31,415 in 1952) and the number of combine harvesters (from 268 to 3,222 over the same period) [Aresvik, 1975: 19; Aktan, 1957: 276]. This exerted a strong influence over the entire agrarian economy, with the south-east being the area of greatest labour displacement [Danielson and Keles, 1980: 285].

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