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“CITIZEN, SPEAK TURKISH!”: A NATION IN THE MAKING

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This article analyzes one of the attempts to broaden the use of the Turkish language during the first two decades of the Turkish Republic in order to create a homogeneous nation-state. The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, which aimed to put pressure on non-Turkish speakers to speak Turkish in public, shows that a state-centered analysis is inadequate to explain the nation-building process in Turkey. This article demonstrates how the official Turkification policies were supported, recreated, and implemented by a social network composed of those who considered themselves the state’s missionaries. It also discusses the debates and conflicts among the nationalists, both at the state and social level, about the boundaries of the Turkish nation.

Introduction

In 1928 a local newspaper of İzmir in Turkey wrote: “Citizen, do not make friends with or shop from those so-called Turkish citizens who do not speak Turkish. We request from our lady citizens who work as telephone operators: Please immediately cut off conversations in Greek and Latino.”¹ In these years, such appeals for Turkish citizens to speak Turkish in public or to take an active stance against non-Turkish speakers were common in the newspapers. Five years after the Turkish Republic was founded, the question of the boundaries of the Turkish nation was the subject of a hot political debate. Although the Armenian deportation in 1915 and the Greek-Turkish population exchange in 1924 had greatly homogenized the population within the borders of the new state, a considerable number of linguistic and religious minorities still lived in Turkey. According to the first population census of the Republic, conducted in 1927, Turkey’s population of 13.6 million held around 2 million people for whom Turkish was not the native language.² This article analyzes the “Citizen, Speak

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Turkish!” campaign, which promoted the speaking of the Turkish language in public. The campaign aimed to eradicate the public visibility and audibility of non-Turkish languages and it was one of the important initiatives of the Turkification attempts in the early years of the Turkish Republic. This campaign demonstrates that it is not the state alone that defines and promotes a national identity, but social actors outside the state also actively contribute to the creation and dissemination of this identity in tense alliances with the state.

I argue that a state-centered analysis of nation-state formation in Turkey fails to recognize the crucial role played by social actors, who considered themselves the missionaries of the new regime, in the creation of the Turkish nation. This article aims to shift our attention from state coercion to the role of a social network, composed of intellectuals and students, in the enforcement of national homogenization. As Erik Zürcher notes, “the Kemalist leadership did inspire a great many people—mostly writers, teachers, doctors and other professionals, and students—with its vision of a modern, secular, independent Turkey. These people, who saw themselves as an elite, with a mission to guide their ignorant compatriots, often worked very hard and with great personal sacrifice for their ideals.”³ First, the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign shows how the mobilization of these Kemalist missionaries created a movement forcing non-Muslim minorities to assimilate to the majority language community or exit. This movement incited other Turkish speakers to closely watch and listen to their fellow citizens to detect and condemn any use of a non-Turkish language. Second, the debates during the campaign and the conflicts which took place between the student groups and the government reveal the competing visions among the nationalists, both at the state and social level, about the boundaries of the Turkish nation and Turkification strategies. I argue that we should not see the content of nationalist ideology as fixed and monolithic; rather we should conceive of it as something that is in continuous construction by different groups within the state and society.

This article is divided into five parts. First, I provide a brief overview of state-centered approaches to nationalism and explain why they remain inadequate to understand the nation-building process in Turkey. In the second part, I give an account of the “Citizen, Speak Turkish” campaign based on the national and

local newspapers of the early Turkish Republic. In the third part, I explain why the campaign mainly targeted the non-Muslim minorities, and specifically Jewish citizens, and show that the language movement was closely related to demands for upward social mobility and changing the economic hierarchy in the country. In the final two parts of the article, I analyze the conflicting relationship of the state with its missionaries and how the campaign led citizens to think more on questions about the boundaries of the Turkish nation and the means of Turkification. The result of this deliberation was the emergence, within official circles as well as within society, of contending notions—not just a monolithic idea—of who can become a “Turk.”

Literature Review

States' role in the making of nations is extensively discussed in the literature on nationalism. This model, which is known as “state-led nationalism”⁴ or as “state-building nationalism,”⁵ sees the emergence of nationalism and its spread among the masses as a process that is directly linked to modern state formation. According to the model, state rulers use nationalism as a tool to consolidate their rule over the society for two primary reasons. First, successful transition from indirect to direct rule necessitates increasing the homogeneity of the population over which the state rules because a homogeneous population lowers the costs of state-building by making uniform administrative arrangements feasible. Second, a nationalist ideology provides state rulers with a claim to rule in the name of the people. The decline of the idea of divine ordination and the hereditary right to rule, the growing state intervention into the daily lives of the people, and the increased mass political participation required a new form of loyalty to the state, which is provided by nationalist ideology. State rulers used the idea of nationalism to legitimize their rule, to transfer people's loyalty from the local centers of power to the central state, and to exercise effective social control.⁶

State-centered explanations of nationalism see the formation of a national consciousness among the people living within the state's boundaries and their cultural homogenization largely as an outcome of a state's large-scale and coercive nation-building process. States define and categorize people into mutually exclusive

groups and attempt to fix identities. They define the nation by determining who is included and who is excluded, by shaping the form of a nationalist ideology, by making the rules of conduct for the society, and by identifying the national norms and culture.⁷ Mass compulsory education and military service play the key roles in this process, as explained by Eugen Weber in his classic study of the policies of nation-formation in France at the end of the nineteenth century.⁸ Weber shows in detail how the state intended to replace the regional dialects with standardized French and to impose a sense of Frenchness and patriotism on the population by introducing compulsory education and conscription. States also use other means to make people imagine themselves as part of the same nation. They write official histories, invent national flags, symbols, holidays, and anthems, and open museums and exhibitions to display the national heritage.⁹ In short, the state-centered approach conceptualizes nationalism “as a movement outward from the state’s centers of power, in which the state incorporates territory by coercive means and attempts to assimilate culturally alien groups into a unified, national consciousness, likewise by force.”¹⁰

We should not overlook the state-centered approach’s contribution to the discussions of nationalism. Such an emphasis on the role of the state in the formation of nations calls into question primordialist approaches and shows the malleability and contingency of national identities. The state-centered approach is especially helpful in understanding the emergence of nationalism outside of Western Europe, where the emergence of nationalist ideologies preceded industrialization, capitalism, and increased literacy and communication among people. The state-centered approach, however, falls short in explaining the complex nature of the dissemination of a nationalist ideology to the population and the homogenization process. This failure is mainly due to its simplistic understanding of the relationship between state and society. While this approach portrays the state as all-powerful and coercive, it depicts society as either passive and submissive or reactionary and rebellious. As Nugent suggests, the academic discussions on nation-building imply an “oppositional model of state-society relations.”¹¹ Nugent argues that these approaches portray state and society as two independent entities, with fixed boundaries. In the end, the state-centered approach does not take

into account the varying responses of the society and the social groups' active involvement in the nation-building project. State-centered explanations disregard the mutual interdependence of state and society and "how each helps create, construct, and enable (or not enable) the other according to specific material-political interests and cultural conceptions that are contingent in time and through space."¹² In addition, the state-centered approaches contribute to the mystification of the state, depicting it and its ideology as unitary and monolithic. This article proposes a different framework. My contention is that neither the state nor its ideology and practice should be understood as coherent and unchanging. As Joel Migdal argues, "The state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of aims, as it engages other social forces."¹³

Within the past decade, the academic literature on Turkish nationalism and the formation of Turkish national identity has grown extensively. These studies challenged the main assumptions of the official Turkish history and discourse, and opened up a fertile debate about the definition of Turkishness and the nature of Turkish nationalism. As opposed to the official discourse, which claims that Turkish national identity is defined in civic-territorial terms, recent studies have shown how actual state practice reflected an ethnic nationalist view.¹⁴ These studies analyzed various Turkification policies in detail and demonstrated the Kemalist state's attempts to inscribe a common national look on a diverse society. This literature focused on the official discourse and policies of Turkification and based its analysis extensively on legal texts, parliamentary debates, and the writings and speeches of the state elite. In other words, this literature has predominantly taken a state-centered approach, emphasizing the managerial role of the state in its project of creating a homogeneous nation. This article aims to focus on another dimension of the nation-building experience of Turkey. I argue that a state-centered approach or one solely analyzing the legal texts and official practices limits our understanding of the evolution of Turkish nationalism and how Turkification was implemented in the early years of the Turkish Republic. By focusing on the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, I aim to show how some citizens considered themselves the state's missionaries and worked with great devotion to spread the Kemalist ideals among citizens. By working in the grey area

between state and society, the missionaries were effective in winning support for their cause from the ordinary people and in enforcing nation-building policies. My argument is that the state's centers of power did not alone create and implement the projects of social engineering but the state's missionaries contributed to the process of nation-building by reproducing, enriching, and carrying these projects out.

As the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign shows, the mobilization of university students, teachers, intellectuals, and journalists to create a homogeneous Turkish nation in accordance with the state's aim has facilitated the Turkification process and contributed to the reproduction of Turkish nationalism. Nevertheless, this cooperation between the state and those who perceived themselves as the state's missionaries coexisted with tension and conflict. The campaign revealed disagreements over the definition of the Turkish nation and led to occasional conflicts between the state and its missionaries. Who would be included and excluded, what would be the main norms to bind the diverse people together as a nation-state, how people would regard themselves as Turks, and what should be the methods of Turkification were the main questions of the time and there was not a consensus on the part of the nationalists about the answers.

The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" Campaign

On 14 January 1928, the Law Faculty Students' Association of Istanbul University initiated a campaign with the motto of "Citizen, Speak Turkish!". The students announced their commitment to the spread of the Turkish language and stated that they would post signs in the public spaces of Istanbul to remind people to speak Turkish in public. In those years, Istanbul contained a considerable number of people whose mother-tongue was not Turkish. According to the national census of 1927, Turkish was not the native language of around 28 percent of the city's population. Out of 794,000 people in the city, 92,000 spoke Greek, 45,000 spoke Armenian, 39,000 spoke Judeo-Spanish (Ladino),¹⁵ 6,000 spoke French, and another 6,000 spoke Albanian. The remaining 31,300 spoke a profusion of other languages, including Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Circassian and Bulgarian, as their

mother-tongues.¹⁶ In their congress, the students claimed that speaking in a language other than Turkish meant not recognizing Turkish law and sentiments and that those who do not speak Turkish could not be regarded as good citizens. Within the association, they formed a separate committee for the organization of the campaign, which started officially after the Ministry of Interior granted permission.¹⁷ In the following days, the Turkish Hearths¹⁸ invited the leaders of the students to discuss the campaign, and they formed a "Commission for the Protection and Expansion of Turkish Language" within the Hearths to teach Turkish all over the country and to inspect schools to ensure that there was proper Turkish education.¹⁹ On 26 January 1928, the Commission decided to arrange meetings with the owners of newspapers published in foreign languages to ask for their support. Celal Sair Bey, a member of the board of directors of Turkish Hearths, met with the mayor of Istanbul who promised to help the campaign.²⁰ The Ministry of Education offered 1000 Turkish liras in support of the campaign.²¹

As the state's support of the campaign indicates, the students' initiative was in conformity with the official language policy. The spread of a common and standardized national language had been one of the main concerns of the state elite from the beginning of the Republic. First, a common language was a crucial symbol of national unity. The Republican People's Party, the single ruling party, aimed to build a nation in which "unity in language, unity in feelings and unity in ideas" would constitute the strongest link among citizens.²² The state elite thought that a common language was necessary to make people think and feel alike. During the first two decades of the Republic, the state enacted a series of Turkification policies to ensure linguistic homogeneity. In 1924, the Law on the Unification of Education brought the schools under the control of the government and imposed a common state curriculum on all. The following year, teaching the Turkish language for at least five hours in minorities' schools was made mandatory. Later the parliament decided that Turkish should be the native language of all the teachers in these schools. In 1926, the parliament passed a law that made use of the Turkish language compulsory in all correspondence among corporations.²³ In 1931, the state required all Turkish children to have their primary education in Turkish schools. In the 1930s

the state's Turkification policies radicalized. The Settlement Law of 1934 relocated some Kurdish speakers from the eastern parts of Turkey to the West to make them learn Turkish and assimilate into Turkish culture. The law also banned those whose mother tongue was not Turkish from setting up villages or districts.²⁴ Second, the state elite used the Turkish language as a potent symbol of political and social transformation. They saw linguistic engineering as a way of inscribing a secular national "look" on the population. The official language policy aimed at purifying the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian vocabulary, replacing foreign words with Turkish vocabulary collected from popular language and old texts, and creating new words from Turkish roots.²⁵ The new language would signify a complete break from the Ottoman and Islamic past. For this purpose, in 1928, the state adopted the Latin script and prohibited the public use of the Arabic alphabet. The following year it removed Arabic and Persian classes from the curriculum.²⁶

The campaign, however, was largely the work of Kemalist missionaries, those who embraced the new regime and mobilized to spread the Kemalist message to the society at large. Their zealous activities demonstrate how nation-building in Turkey was not a process that originated solely from the state's center and that was imposed through coercive legislation. As the details of the campaign show, the mobilization of Kemalist supporters outside the official channels and their efforts to implement the Turkification policies had been quite effective in giving shape to the nation-building process in Turkey. One such group was the university students, who were staunch nationalists, sometimes to an extreme level that would necessitate the state's intervention. The students saw themselves as the educated, modern Turkish youth who had a duty to enlighten the others. Throughout the 1930s, the National Union of Turkish Students [Millî Türk Talebe Birliği], which was composed of student associations in Istanbul University, would be highly active in sponsoring other nationalist activities, ranging from encouraging the use of domestic products to educating the villagers about Kemalist principles.²⁷ Another group that embraced the new regime's project of nation-state building was a group of intellectuals who wrote extensively on the issues of national identity and the boundaries of the Turkish nation. These intellectuals worked to sway public opinion to

support the ideals of the new regime and played a crucial role in popularizing the campaign through their writings in the newspapers. As Benedict Anderson argues, "Everywhere, as literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along."²⁸ It was not a coincidence that the campaign found most of its support in the big cities of Western Turkey, which contained the most educated part of the population. This support for the "The Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign confirms Sibel Bozdoğan's statement that "Turkey's modernist vision was more popular than is typically suggested by other cases of high modernist social engineering 'forced upon' traditional societies."²⁹

The campaign soon spread to other cities on Turkey's western coast and Western Thrace. These were the areas that contained high numbers of non-Muslim minorities and Muslim immigrants from the Balkans whose mother tongue was not Turkish. In cities like İstanbul, İzmir, and Edirne, the Law Faculty Students' Association and the Turkish Hearths hung signs reading "Citizens! Let's speak Turkish. Speaking Turkish is a national duty. A Turk speaks Turkish"³⁰ inside public transportation vehicles, theatres, and restaurants. Other student associations also formed committees for the spread of the Turkish language. For instance, the students of the Teachers' College [Muallim Mektebi] in İzmir declared that they would inspect shop signs and advertisements to ensure that they were written in proper Turkish. They also promised to give lectures about the potential dangers of foreign schools and to warn parents who sent their children to them.³¹ The campaign also led the Turkish Hearths to offer Turkish classes.

The conflicts during the campaign indicate that the Kemalist missionaries had popularized the slogan and attracted support for their cause from the population, at least in major cities. People began to warn, in some cases to intimidate, the non-Turkish speakers on the streets and forced them to speak Turkish. The newspapers were filled with reports on such conflicts between non-Turkish speakers and those who warned them. Two Jews and two Greeks were caught tearing down the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" signs in İstanbul.³² Cumhuriyet wrote that speaking Turkish was a duty toward the Turkish nation. The newspaper

added that those who intended to tear down the signs would expose themselves to physical attacks.³³ A few Jews beat up a child who had warned them to speak Turkish on a boat. An Armenian knifed a Turk in a hotel for a similar reason. On the streets people warned those who read newspapers in foreign languages. They intimidated even non-Turkish citizens and took them to the police. A military school student insulted a civilian-dressed Turkish army officer while he was talking with a foreign officer in German. According to Rifat Bali, speaking in a language other than Turkish had become nearly impossible in public during the campaign because of the risk of verbal harassment and even physical attack.³⁴ One newspaper, *Vakit*, asked young Turks not to allow anyone to speak in a foreign language for the sake of the blood of Turkish soldiers shed during the Independence War.³⁵ This growing tension led Yunus Nadi, the owner of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, to write an article titled "Citizen, Don't Fight!" in his editorial column. Nadi argued that if such a good campaign caused violent confrontations and provocations, the result would not be worth it. He argued that the spread of the Turkish language could be achieved over the long term, through education, persuasion, and legal means, not through yelling at people to speak Turkish.³⁶ Falih Rifkî Atay wrote that the decision of the student association should not be interpreted in such a way as to legitimize violations against the freedom of people to speak in different languages. According to Atay, the dissemination of the Turkish language could not be the result of repressive policies but of the passage of time, out of people's needs to communicate with the majority of their fellow citizens.³⁷

The style of the campaign and its targets confirm that language can be highly functional in "binding elite material interests to mass concerns," as Donald Horowitz states.³⁸ According to Horowitz, language accomplishes two functions. First, the status of language symbolizes group dignity and prestige, especially for those who are uncertain about their own. Elevating the status of language has direct implications for the construction of social hierarchy. Second, the status of language has implications for the prospects of social mobility and career opportunities.³⁹ As a more detailed account of the campaign will show, these psychological and material functions of language played an important role in

popularizing the campaign among Turkish speakers and linked the state's concerns with social interests.

"Passport Turks": Non-Muslims as Victims

The main targets of the campaign were the Greek, Armenian, and particularly the Jewish citizens. During the four months of the campaign, the national newspapers directed most of their criticisms against the non-Muslims. The clashes on the streets took place between Turkish speakers and non-Muslims, and the campaign found its greatest support in cities with the highest number of non-Muslims. An article in a local İzmir newspaper demonstrates the tolerance shown to the non-Turkish speaking Muslims. The columnist argues that while the Cretan immigrants, who did not speak Turkish, might be forgiven for not speaking Turkish, the Jews should not be. It is striking that he called the Cretan immigrants "Turks." According to the author, these people had to speak Greek because they did not know the Turkish language. He advised his readers to be helpful to these immigrants in teaching them Turkish. However, the Jews refused to speak Turkish and this could prove that they were disloyal to the Turkish nation. "We do not expect anything from them," he wrote, "but we only want them not to howl that dirty language in our ears in these revolutionary days."⁴⁰

The resentment against non-Muslims was openly expressed in newspaper articles and reports during the campaign. One dominant theme was that non-Muslims continued to live a closed "communal life" [*cemaat hayatı*] as in the days of the Ottoman Empire and did not want to mingle with Turks. The newspapers argued that as long as the state recognized them as minorities with certain minority rights and allowed them to have separate schools, orphanages, and charitable foundations, their inclusion into the Turkish nation would be impossible.⁴¹ This was a direct critique of the articles in the Lausanne Treaty that secured linguistic and religious rights for the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Especially those who resented Mustafa Kemal's secularization reforms⁴² were enraged by the religious rights guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty to the non-Muslim communities. Many criticized the missionary activities, religious education in foreign and minority schools, and charities in churches and synagogues.

Furthermore, many suspected non-Muslim minorities of being disloyal to the Turkish Republic. A columnist referred to non-Muslims as “Passport Turks” and warned his readers that non-Muslims would not hesitate to leave the country by using their enemy passports in case of another war. He went so far as to argue that it would be impossible to make minorities speak Turkish unless they were subjected to Turkification by force such as through resettlement.⁴³ The newspapers suggested different methods to pressure minorities to speak Turkish in public. One columnist called for boycotting shops owned by non-Muslims.⁴⁴ A local İzmir newspaper warned people not to buy anything from street vendors who did not speak Turkish.⁴⁵ Moderate suggestions included the closure of minority and foreign schools and the establishment of more Turkish schools and language classes.⁴⁶

During the campaign, however, most newspapers singled out and attacked primarily the Jewish minority. Many commentaries specifically addressed the prospects for the Turkification of the Jews. Most expressed a deep pessimism about Jewish integration into the Turkish nation. They accused the Jews of not speaking Turkish on purpose and ridiculing the Turkish language and culture. One newspaper claimed that the main enemy of Turks, the Armenians, used Turkish more often than the Jews, and it asked the Jews to leave the country.⁴⁷ A columnist asked, “We would not give non-Turks the right to live in this Turkish nation. We expelled the Greeks. Why did we let the Jews stay here?”⁴⁸ In Edirne, a city that contained a relatively dense Jewish population, a local newspaper wrote, “One of the conditions of Turkish citizenship is to know and speak the official language of Turkey. Those whom we accepted into citizenship should know about this. They owe their comfort and freedom, their fortunes and everything to the Turks whose language they do not want to speak. . . . If you do not want to speak Turkish and show respect to Turkishness and its language, what are you doing in this country? You are free to go to wherever you want.”⁴⁹

When we take into account the Jewish minority’s highly conciliatory attitude about Turkification, these attitudes against the Jewish population appear more puzzling. As Sarah Stein points out, from the 1890s onward the Jewish community had been debating whether the community should focus on learning the Turkish language. Turkish was crucial for entering the

Ottoman bureaucracy that was open to non-Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century. However, because of the high prestige of French, the lack of interest in careers in the civil service among young Jews, and the lack of fluent instructors of Turkish in Jewish schools, the pro-Turkish lobby had failed to spread the Turkish language among Ottoman Jewry. In 1927, in the first population census of the Turkish Republic, 85 percent of the Jews in European Turkey marked Ladino as their mother tongue.⁵⁰ The establishment of the nation-state, however, confronted Jews with the necessity of learning Turkish. During the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, Jewish opposition was not fueled by resistance to adopting Turkish. The resistance was to the style of the campaign and the discourse and accusations of the newspapers. Prominent Jewish intellectuals of the time, although critical of the violent behavior against non-Muslims, supported the adoption of the Turkish language by the Jewish community. In 1928, Avram Galanti, a Jewish professor in Istanbul University, wrote a short book titled "Citizen Speak Turkish" in which he explained the historical reasons why a large majority of the Jewish community did not speak Turkish. He argued that the only means to linguistic assimilation was to introduce Turkish instruction in minority schools and to open public schools in places with dense minority populations.⁵¹ Another important figure was Moiz Kohen, more commonly known by his Turkish name of Tekin Alp. In his book, "Turkification," Kohen called on Jews to Turkify their names, to speak Turkish, to send their children to Turkish schools, to pray in Turkish, and to socialize with Turks. With other Turkish and Jewish intellectuals, he also founded the "National Cultural Union" [Milli Hars Birliđi], which aimed at disseminating the Turkish language and culture. The Jewish community in Ankara founded the "Association for the Turkification of the Jews" [Yahudileri Türkleřtirme Cemiyeti]. Other Jewish communities in various cities formed similar associations and committees and opened night classes to teach Turkish to their members.⁵² In a statement to a newspaper, the principal of the Beyođlu Jewish High School argued that the native language of the Jews should be the language of the country that they lived in. He added that speaking the Turkish language was the duty of every Jewish citizen. To use Turkish was also in accordance with the interests of the Jewish community because any career, especially in commerce,

necessitated fluency in the Turkish language.⁵³ In short, the Jewish community's leaders and intellectuals supported the adoption of Turkish, and they did not resist integration into the Turkish nation. No matter what assurances the Jewish community gave, however, the general tone of the Kemalist missionaries did not change.

Why did the "Citizen Speak Turkish" campaign turn mainly against non-Muslims, and specifically against the Jews, even though the Turkish language was not the native language of 1.6 million Muslims at the time?⁵⁴ The national newspapers did not report any violent events between Turkish speaking and non-Turkish speaking Muslim groups. This is surprising since a considerable number of non-Turkish speaking Muslims lived in the cities where the campaign was effective. This finding supports a well-known paradox within the definition of "Turkishness."⁵⁵ As many studies on Turkish nationalism indicate, "Turkishness" came to be determined first and foremost by Muslim identity despite the fact that one of the main pillars of Kemalist ideology was secularism. A close reading of the official texts and state policies of the period demonstrates that Turkish citizenship and Turkishness were different categories and that not every Turkish citizen was considered a Turk. Muslimhood was central to the definition of Turkishness. The assaults against non-Muslims during the campaign indicate that such an understanding of Turkish national identity had a robust social base. The pervasiveness of bias against non-Muslim minorities in Turkey was an important factor that precluded the creation of Turkish national identity based on secular principles. The campaign was emblematic in showing that the formation of Turkish national identity not only was the result of the state elites' ideology and practices but had an important social dimension as well. For the majority of people living in Turkey, Turkishness signified a Muslim community. The social and economic transformations within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century and the long years of war that finally led to the Empire's disintegration sharpened the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims and transformed religious identities into national ones.

Language movements are closely related to concerns about economic advancement, social status, and political power.⁵⁶ The campaign was first and foremost an attempt to mobilize for the

creation of a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie by curbing the power of non-Muslims in the economy. The expansion of the Ottoman economy and its increased integration with the world economy in the nineteenth century gave the non-Muslim communities of the Empire the chance to expand their wealth and social status. As a result of growing ties and alliances between the Ottoman Christians and the European states, the Christian subjects of the Empire could secure considerable economic and political privileges. The Capitulations gave the citizens of European powers the right to be exempt from paying taxes and from being tried in Ottoman courts. The consuls of European states helped many Ottoman Christians enjoy the same privileges by granting them citizenship. This led to the formation of a very wealthy class of Christian traders enjoying the benefits of dual citizenship.⁵⁷ The growing integration of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire into the world economy and their increasing Westernization drew the Muslim and non-Muslim communities apart and hampered attempts to create a common Ottoman identity during the nineteenth century. As Çağlar Keyder points out, "Not only religious practice, but also schools and community organization, patterns of consumption and levels of Westernization, material culture and lifestyles increasingly diverged."⁵⁸ As a result, at the beginning of the Republic, the economy was largely in the hands of foreigners and non-Muslim citizens. One reason why the campaign singled out the Jewish minority was the community's specific position in the Turkish economy. After the expulsion of Greeks and Armenians, the Jews increasingly filled the void left in commerce and finance; thus becoming the new targets of economic Turkification. During the first years of the Republic, the nationalization of the economy and the creation of a Muslim-Turkish group of industrialists and traders were important concerns of the nationalists.⁵⁹ It was not a coincidence that the campaign found most of its support in the big port cities, which were the commercial centers.

The war reinforced the economic rivalry in creating the bitterness that the Muslims felt against their non-Muslim fellows. The exemption of the non-Muslim populations from military service during the long years of war, the collaboration of some Armenian groups with Russia during the First World War, and the Greek occupation of the Western coast during the War of

Independence made non-Muslims enemy agents in the eyes of the Anatolian Muslims. They accused Jews of living a closed communal life and cooperating only with other Jews and foreigners in business. The newspapers frequently dwelt on the themes of Jewish affluence versus Muslim poverty and Jewish profiteering from the war. Avner Levi also points out that it was easier to attack the Jews because they were a tiny minority without any international support. Attacks on the Armenians and Greeks, however, could cause European reaction.⁶⁰ What determined the direction of nationalism was the feeling of “ressentiment” that resulted from “suppressed feelings of envy and hatred.”⁶¹ The campaign became an outlet for the nationalists to express all the bitterness felt against the non-Muslim minorities and an attempt to create a new social and economic hierarchy.

My contention is that the emphasis on the Jewish community during the campaign also reflected the nationalists’ internal disagreement about whether the Jews could be part of the Turkish nation. With regards to the Armenians and Greeks, the nationalists had already settled the question: they were not Turks and they could never become so. According to Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, a parliamentarian and a leading Turkish nationalist, Greeks and Armenians could not be Turkish; but it was possible for the Jews to become Turks so long as they accepted the Turkish language and culture.⁶² In 1924, when the state allowed the Jews who left the country during the war to return to Turkey, it did not grant the same privilege to the Armenians and the Greeks.⁶³ Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü from time to time emphasized the Jewish community’s loyalty to the Turkish nation-state and expressed a hope to see them part of the Turkish nation.⁶⁴ The Jews had a unique position among the non-Muslim communities of Turkey. Unlike other non-Muslim populations, separatism had never become a popular movement among the Jews of the Ottoman Empire. Aron Rodrigue writes that Zionism, which emerged among Turkish Jewry at the beginning of the twentieth century, did not favor the break-up of the empire and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine: “The interests of the Jews were well served by the continuation of the empire as a multi-ethnic entity.”⁶⁵ The Jewish community at large also supported the Independence War and was loyal to Mustafa Kemal’s forces.⁶⁶ They could not be held responsible for the disintegration

of the Empire. In other words, the Jews occupied an ambivalent position compared to the Greeks and Armenians in terms of their eligibility to become members of the Turkish nation. As Mesut Yeğen argues, for the state elite Muslimhood was not the most important criterion to achieve Turkishness: "... openness to Muslims was mostly due to their actual or assumed 'loyalty' to the Ottoman-Turkish state and ... closedness to non-Muslims was due to their actual or assumed 'disloyalty'. In other words, I believe that loyalty to the state was more inclusive than religious identity in the assessment of the Turkish state as to who may or may not achieve Turkishness."⁶⁷

The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign revealed the missionaries' disagreement with the official view of the Jews' prospects for inclusion into the Turkish nation. The campaign generated a conflict between the two factions of nationalists. For the state, the Jews could integrate into the Turkish nation as long as they acquired the Turkish language. The missionaries, however, saw Muslimhood as an indispensable component of Turkishness, and the fact that the majority of the Jews did not speak Turkish gave them the opportunity to justify the exclusion of Jews from the Turkish nation. Their demand that Jews immediately change their daily language habits was not an invitation for assimilation but a demand for exit. The missionaries turned the campaign into a lobby for the exclusion of the Jews.

Kemalist Missionaries against the State

The Kemalist missionaries' commitment to the ideological principles of the state did not mean that they enjoyed smooth relations with the state and always secured official backing. On the contrary, the political mobilization of Kemalist missionaries created an ideological contest over the definitions of Kemalist nationalism and a conflict over who has the right to interpret and implement Turkification policies. A group of nationalist students in Edirne took the campaign to its extreme. This incident gave clear signs of conflict between the state and its missionaries.

The people who led the campaign in Edirne targeted the Jewish community, which constituted around 4 percent of the city's population. They wrote messages under the signs of "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" threatening Jews that they would be thrown out

of the country if they did not speak Turkish. In some mosques, the imams asked people not to have any contact with the Jews and to boycott Jewish artisans and merchants. The governor of the city, who understood that these developments could result in violence, ordered the removal of the signs. However, a group of students were encouraged by their teachers and reposted the signs on the same day. This time the governor ordered that the signs be removed and student leaders detained. Around 300 students wanted to demonstrate against the governor's orders but were dispersed by the police. The following day the Interior Ministry sent a decree to the provinces stating that public order should never be violated, and that the police should interfere in case of a threat or a provocation to this order in the name of the "Citizen Speak Turkish" campaign. The Ministry of Education ordered teachers and students not to be involved in similar incidents.⁶⁸ The state put the director of the local newspaper, *Edirne Postası*, on trial for printing provocative articles.⁶⁹ A primary school inspector detained by the police was the first to inform the press about the events in Edirne. In his telegraph printed in the newspapers, he criticized the governor for impeding the expression of nationalist sentiments among young people: "Even if the signs should be removed, this could be done at night. It was horrifying that they were pulled off while the Jews were watching," he wrote. "We are trying to boost Turkish youth's national sentiments and the removal of the signs is against this country's interests. The governor's warning to one of our journalist friends and his demand to stop writing about the Jews is incompatible with the freedom of the press."⁷⁰ The campaign lost its momentum and came to a sudden halt after the events in Edirne. Rifat Bali writes that in one day all the signs and posters were removed from public places.⁷¹ The events that took place in Edirne intensified the debate on what Turkification means and how it could be achieved.

The *Milliyet* newspaper reported these events with the headline: "In Turkey only the laws of Turkish Republic are supreme. No power or initiative can overrule the laws of the Republic." These sentences were taken from the Interior Ministry's statement sent to the newspapers. It was a warning signal that the government would not allow the growth of collective action which could exceed the limits set by the state. The newspaper commented that although the speaking of Turkish by every citizen was expected,

this demand should not be expressed by force. It added that every citizen's first duty is to abide by the laws of the country and that events like those in Edirne should not be tolerated.⁷² Mehmet Asım in *Vakit* wrote that the foreign press was reporting on the excessive and frenzied behavior of the Turkish nationalists. He called attention to the need for developing foreign trade and added that these events could turn foreign public opinion against Turkey.⁷³ Gıyas İshak in *Cumhuriyet* argued that the campaign was pointless and doomed to failure because Turkification intended not only to make people speak Turkish but more importantly to entice them to identify themselves with the Turkish nation. According to İshak, Turkishness should be disseminated by education, especially through good education in Turkish schools, rather than by shouting "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" or taking foreign newspapers from people's hands.⁷⁴ In a statement printed in the newspapers, the Turkish Hearths announced that it did not approve of the use of violence to make citizens speak Turkish. It also added that there were no connections between the Turkish Hearths and the violence that took place during the campaign.⁷⁵

The government's intervention frustrated the students. The law students' association took a defensive attitude by claiming that if the events during the campaign were evaluated objectively, the responsibility of the minorities would be clear.⁷⁶ The language commission of the students' association stated that they were disappointed by the press's critical attitude and expected the same kind of support that they had received during the first days of the campaign.⁷⁷ Türkmenoğlu Zeynel Besim, a columnist in İzmir's local newspaper *Hizmet*, sided with the students. He argued that although one could not condone the students' violent acts, to find the cause for this violence one should not overlook the Jews' determined refusal to speak Turkish. He asked the government to find legal measures to force non-Turkish speakers to speak Turkish and added, "Should not those Turkish citizens who do not speak Turkish encounter legal consequences just like those citizens who attacked them for not speaking Turkish?"⁷⁸

Although the campaign in 1928 came to an end after the events in Edirne, the slogan "Citizen, Speak Turkish" did not lose its popularity, and the public debate on the prospects for the Turkification of non-Muslim citizens continued in the following years. These pressures obliged the non-Muslim minorities, especially the

Jews, to continuously confirm their loyalty to the Turkish nation. Several Jewish communities endorsed the dissemination of the Turkish language in the community by starting up Turkish classes or by forming committees to encourage the speaking of Turkish in their neighborhoods.⁷⁹ The public pressure the campaign created continued and expanded during the 1930s together with the rise of fascism in Europe.

Radicalization of Turkish Nationalism: The National Union of Turkish Students

In the following years the university students' nationalist activities were carried out under the umbrella of a larger organization called the National Union of Turkish Students [Milli Türk Talebe Birliği], which was composed of various student associations of today's Istanbul University. During the 1930s the rise of fascism in Europe influenced many intellectuals and state elites. The student union became one of the centers that showed considerable interest in fascism. The Union's journal published articles that praised the policies of Hitler and Mussolini,⁸⁰ and the Union established contacts with German and Italian student organizations. Their activities led to more conflict and tension with the state. In 1933, at a time when the Turkish language debate heated up once more, the newspapers reported that the Italian manager of the French railroad company, Wagon Lit, fined a Turkish employee because he did not speak French with a customer in the office. The employee reportedly told the manager that the official language of Turkey is Turkish and that no one could force him to speak in a foreign language.⁸¹ The next day, hundreds of students gathered in Taksim Square and walked to the company's office in Beyoğlu. After giving speeches in front of the office, they attacked it with stones and sticks and broke its windows and signs. The students and the police clashed in the streets. In the end, the police took in many students for interrogation.⁸² In their statement to the newspapers, the students argued that their activity should not be considered against the rule of law because nationalist excitement and agitation have a distinctive logic that was superior to the state's law.⁸³ Only a month later, another demonstration the Union organized to condemn the desecration of a Turkish cemetery in Bulgaria brought a harsher government reaction.

Mustafa Kemal's letter to the students was a clear message that the Union had overstepped the state's limits in its nationalist activities: "One of our main wishes is to raise a hardworking, sensitive and nationalist youth. The youth should be careful to abide by the laws of the Republic and the procedures and rules of the Republican forces. Trust the justice of the laws and the judicial powers and be assured that the Republican government knows its duties on national matters."⁸⁴

In August 1934, the governor of Istanbul closed down the student's monthly journal *Birlik* [The Union] for publishing political articles.⁸⁵ In October 1936, after the Union organized a demonstration to advocate the unification of Alexandrette with Turkish territory, the government closed it down.⁸⁶ According to Okutan, the main reason for the conflict between the government and the Union was the latter's growing emphasis on racist Pan-Turkism.⁸⁷ A rift gradually opened up during the 1930s between the state and the Union over who had the right to speak for the nation. As Kenneth Lawson argues,

Precisely because there is rarely a real consensus regarding the particular content of nationalism—that is, the particular way of life that a given nation claims to value—there are often struggles as to who really represents and speaks for the nation and its unique way of life. If we think of the state as a social network with a multiplicity of nodes and competing understandings, it seems plausible that the boundaries are fluid in terms of defining what is a core national value and what is marginal. Moreover, the official agents of the state are themselves likely to be dependent on these networks to generate and reproduce the social boundaries of nationalism.⁸⁸

The state's intervention in the campaign in particular and the tension between the state and the student union in general, demonstrate the state's official disapproval of extremist nationalism and of the use of force and intimidation to spread the use of the language. This does not mean, however, that the official policies for language spread took a consistent and moderate path. During the 1920s and especially the 1930s, many municipalities imposed fines on those who did not speak Turkish in public.⁸⁹ The municipalities of İzmir and İstanbul announced that the municipal police would impose fines on street vendors who shouted in languages other than Turkish.⁹⁰ The Law of Settlement in 1934,

which aimed at facilitating the assimilation of Balkan Muslims and Kurds by settling them in areas populated with Turkish-speakers, banned those whose mother-tongue was not Turkish from establishing towns, villages, and worker or artisan units. The state changed the names of cities, towns, and villages into Turkish, and the Law of Surnames of 1934 required all citizens to take Turkish surnames. The state, however, did not pursue a consistent and comprehensive policy of compulsory language unification. Proposed bills in parliament that aimed at making the speaking of Turkish compulsory in public did not pass.⁹¹ Rıfat Bali writes that the Ministry of Interior sent a notice to the municipality of Istanbul ordering it not to impose any fines on non-Turkish speakers, adding that the municipalities did not have the authority to fine people for their language use. Nevertheless, many municipalities continued this practice.⁹² Especially in the eastern provinces, where the Kurds constituted the majority of the cities, the state banned the use of Kurdish in state institutions and public spaces.⁹³ In short, the state apparatus sent mixed messages to the Kemalist missionaries, as it had to the student organization, about what means it accepted officially for the spread of Turkish.

The state's relations with its missionaries during this period indicate that even at the time of authoritarian single party rule, the state apparatus did not operate as a monolithic entity. Different components and individuals within the state had different opinions about how to create a monolingual society. Under the umbrella of the single party, different opinions were expressed. While there were parliamentarians, such as Sabri Toprak, who insisted on the necessity of a law to punish those people who did not speak Turkish in public places, there were other parliamentarians, such as Falih Rıfkı Atay, who criticized such proposals and the use of force in general to make people speak Turkish. As Joel Migdal points out, the state may not generate a single response to an issue or problem. "Rather, its outcomes—the formulation and implementation of its policies—are a series of different actions based on the particular calculus of pressures that each engaged component of the state faces in its particular environment of action . . . The outcome can just as likely be a sum of ill-fitting responses that stem from the different components of the state as they respond to their various arenas of domination

and opposition."⁹⁴ Rather than taking state practice and ideology as fixed and unchanging, it is more useful to conceptualize these as being in continuous flux responding to the specific conditions of the day and influenced by the negotiations and discussions at the social level. The increased radicalization of nationalism in Turkey during the 1930s was closely related to the rise of fascist and authoritarian regimes in Europe as alternative models and the impact of the 1929 the world economic crisis on the intensification of economic nationalism in the country. The attempt to mold society into a homogenous Turkish nation took shape through complex and subtle interactions and debates between various social actors and different components of the state. As Zachary Lockman emphasizes, "Nationalism (or national identity) is not a thing but a set of relations and forces that in each particular case unfolds and takes shape within a specific historical conjuncture, social context and discursive arena. It is moreover always the object of struggles among various sociopolitical forces over its meaning and over what is to be done with it."⁹⁵

Conclusion

The "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign, although a comparatively minor event in the history of the Turkish Republic, gives us significant clues about the nation-building process in Turkey. It shows that a state-centered approach that solely analyzes the state's performance and discourse would not be adequate to understand this process. First, the mobilization of certain social actors, who considered themselves the guardians of the new regime, was effective in creating strong public pressure on the non-Muslim minorities. This shows that the push towards homogenization did not come solely from the state. There was considerable support and active involvement in favor of linguistic homogenization within non-official circles. During this period, language acted as a tool that linked the state's aims with social interests. Second, the campaign's turn against non-Muslims demonstrated that despite the founders' obsession with the creation of a secular society, the definition of a "Turk" was predominantly determined by Muslim identity. Armenians and Greeks were never considered part of the Turkish nation. Whether Jews could enter into the

boundaries of the Turkish nation, however, was controversial and remained a hot topic of discussion during the entire single party era. The formation of Turkish national identity was not only the result of the state elites' formulations and practices but had an important socio-cultural dimension as well. Finally, there were conflicting responses towards the issue of spreading the Turkish language coming from different parts of the state. Therefore, in this article I argued that the official nationalist ideology and practice should be conceived as something contingent, evolving and shifting according to the new challenges, conditions, and debates of the day. They were in continuous construction by different institutions and individuals within the state as well within society.

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Notes

1. "Vatandaş Gözün Aydın," *Hizmet*, 30 Jan. 1928 (author's translation).
2. Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar* (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999), p. 157.
3. Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 189.
4. Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23 (Feb. 1994), p. 133.
5. Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
6. For more on modern state formation and nationalism see Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975) and David Laitin, *Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
7. See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University

- Press, 1996) and Ana Maria Alonso, "The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 23 (1994), pp. 379–405.
8. Eugen Joseph Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
 9. Tilly, p. 140.
 10. David Nugent, "Building the State, Making the Nation: The Basis and Limits of State Centralization in 'Modern' Peru," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 96, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 335.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
 13. Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 112.
 14. Some examples of this literature are Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000); *Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press: 2004); M. Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004); and Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
 15. During the 1920s very few Turkish Jews were familiar with Hebrew and almost all spoke Judeo-Spanish (Ladino).
 16. Dündar, p. 157.
 17. *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Jan. 1928; *Milliyet*, 16 Jan. 1928.
 18. Turkish Hearths was the organization that aimed to disseminate nationalist ideas among the Turkish people. It was financially supported by the single party (RPP) but had a private status. By 1930, Turkish Hearths had 257 branches and 32,000 members all over the country. For more information see Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17 (Winter–Spring 1963), pp. 55–67. An extensive study of Turkish Hearths was made by Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912–1931)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997).
 19. *Milliyet*, 21 Jan. 1928.
 20. *Milliyet*, 27 Jan. 1928.
 21. *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Jan. 1928.
 22. Quoted in Soner Çağaptay, "Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 69.
 23. For more on Turkification policies see Yıldız.
 24. For the text of the Settlement Law see *T. C. Resmi Gazete (The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey)*, 21 June 1934, n. 2733; also see Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 1–22 and Çağaptay, pp. 67–82.
 25. John R. Perry, "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1985), p. 299.

26. For more on language reform see Yılmaz Çolak, "Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov. 2004), pp. 67–91.
27. M. Çağatay Okutan, *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) 1916–1980* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004).
28. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London/New York: Verso, 1991), p. 81.
29. Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 11.
30. *Vakit*, 5 Feb. 1928.
31. *Hizmet*, 28 March 1928.
32. *Vakit*, 18 Feb. 1928.
33. *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Feb. 1928.
34. Rifat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni 1923–1945* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), pp. 136–7.
35. *Vakit*, 29 Feb. 1928.
36. Yunus Nadi, "Vatandaş Kavga Etme," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1928.
37. Falih Rıfki, "Türkiye'de Türkçe," *Milliyet*, 24 Jan. 1928.
38. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 222.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–22.
40. Orhan Rahmi, "Türkçe Görüşmeliyiz," *Ahenk*, 4 Sep. 1929 (author's translation).
41. *Hizmet*, 22 Feb. 1928; *Ahenk*, 15 Jan. 1928.
42. The most important secularization reforms were: the abolition of the Caliphate, religious schools, and Sharia courts; the closure of religious brotherhoods, dervish orders, and sacred tombs; the placement of religious affairs and education under the control of the state; and the ban on wearing the fez and religious attire.
43. Türkmenoğlu Zeynel Besim, "Türkiye'de Türkçe," *Hizmet*, 22 Feb. 1928.
44. Halil Halid, "Türkçe Konuşuyorlar mı?" *Vakit*, 18 Feb. 1928.
45. *Hizmet*, 30 Jan. 1928.
46. Mehmet Şevki, "Lisan Mektepleri Lazım," *Ahenk*, 21 Jan. 1928.
47. *Hizmet*, 5 March 1928.
48. Türkmenoğlu Zeynel Besim, "Evamir-i Aşre," *Hizmet*, 13 March 1928 (author's translation).
49. Cited in Bali, p. 144 (author's translation).
50. Sarah Stein, *Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian and Ottoman Empires* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 70, 78–9.
51. Avram Galanti, *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçe'nin Tamimi Meselesi, Tarihi, İctimai, Siyasi Tetkik* (İstanbul: Hüsn-ü Tabiat Matbaası, 1928).
52. Bali, pp. 150–52, 158.
53. "İspanyolca Yerine Türkçe," *Milliyet*, 29 Nov. 1932.
54. Dündar, p. 157.

55. For a more detailed discussion, see Ahmet İcduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarı, "What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 35. No. 4 (Oct. 1999), pp. 187–208; Mesut Yeğen, "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov. 2004), pp. 51–66.
56. Paul R. Brass, "Elite Interests, Popular Passions, and Social Power in the Language Politics of India," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May 2004), p. 360–61.
57. Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (London/New York: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 80–81.
58. Çağlar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 36.
59. The state took a series of initiatives for the Turkification of economic life. In 1923, 50 percent of the foreign companies' employees were required to be Turks. At that time 90 percent of the employees in foreign companies were non-Turkish citizens and non-Muslims. See M. Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 214. In 1926, the parliament approved a law that required all companies to use the Turkish language in their correspondence. According to Ayhan Aktar, the aim of the law was not to put pressure on those who did not know Turkish to learn Turkish; its aim was to put pressure on the foreign companies to employ Muslim-Turks and increase their number in the private sector. Aktar, p. 117.
60. Avner Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992), p. 30.
61. Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, "Nationalism and Aggression," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1994), p. 84.
62. Bali, pp. 103–4.
63. M. Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*, p. 120.
64. Bali, pp. 40, 109.
65. Aron Rodrigue, "From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jewry," in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 254.
66. Bali, p. 34.
67. See Mesut Yeğen, endnote 43. The immigration policies also support Yeğen's claim. Those ethnic groups that had independent states and strong nationalist movements, such as Albanians and Arabs, were not allowed to immigrate to Turkey because they were considered difficult to assimilate. However, stateless Balkan Muslims, such as Pomaks and Bosnians, were allowed to immigrate since they were thought to be loyal to the Turkish state. See Soner Çağatay, p. 75.
68. *Vakit*, 9 April 1928.
69. Mehmet Mithat, "Bir Millet'in Hakimiyeti Hars ve Lisan Hakimiyetidir," *Hizmet*, 3 May 1928.
70. *Milliyet*, 9 April 1928 (author's translation).
71. Bali, p. 147.

72. *Milliyet*, 9 April 1928.
73. Mehmet Asım, "İfratkar Olmayalım," *Vakit*, 9 April 1928.
74. Gıyas İshak, "Gayri Türkler Nasıl Türkleştirilebilir?" *Cumhuriyet*, 28–29 April 1928.
75. *Vakit*, 9 April 1928.
76. *Milliyet*, 9 April 1928.
77. *Milliyet*, 11 April 1928.
78. Türkmenoğlu Zeynel Besim, "Edirne Hadisesi," *Hizmet*, 10 April 1928.
79. Bali, pp. 157–164.
80. M. Çağatay Okutan, *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, p. 36.
81. *Cumhuriyet*, 24 Feb. 1933.
82. *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Feb. 1933; *Milliyet*, 26 Feb. 1933.
83. *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Feb. 1933.
84. "Büyük Gazi ve Gençlik," *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1933 (author's translation).
85. *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Aug. 1934 and 15 Aug. 1934.
86. Muammer Taylak, *Türkiye'de Öğrenci Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Hamle Yayınevi, 1997), p. 183.
87. M. Çağatay Okutan, *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, p. 84.
88. Kenneth G. Lawson, "Belonging or Not: Rossland, British Columbia, during the Great War," in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 177.
89. Bali, pp. 108, 277.
90. *Cumhuriyet*, 7–8 March 1933.
91. Bali, pp. 108, 142. The last of these bills was proposed by Sabri Toprak, a parliamentarian from Manisa in 1937. He suggested that Turkish citizens who did not speak Turkish in public should either be jailed or fined. For details see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1938, v. 26, 5th session. This bill led to another extensive debate in the press about the means to spread the Turkish language. However, the parliamentary commission did not pass the bill. For more see Bali, pp. 295–301.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
93. Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), p. 373. The state's policies towards the Kurds confirm that the state considered loyalty to be more important than Muslimhood for achieving Turkishness. The Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s led the state elite to conclude that the state should keep a close eye on the Kurdish population and that assimilation of the Kurds by using the force of the state is necessary.
94. Migdal, pp. 116–17.
95. Zackary Lockman, "Arab Workers and Arab Nationalism in Palestine", in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.) *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 254.

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